
Glass I I A 4? 
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THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM 



THE 

ANGLO-GERMAN 
PROBLEM 

BY 

CHARLES SAROLEA, d.Ph., DXitt. 
F.R.S. (Edin.) 

EDITOR OF "EVERYMAN" 

HEAD OF THE FRENCH DEPARTMENT IN THE 

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 




NEW YORK 
THOMAS NELSON & SONS 

LONDON EDINBURGH DUBLIN PARIS MELBOURNE 



Wit" 



First published in 1912 

7 



CONTENTS. 



Preface 7 



Introduction ..... 
Why does Europe distrust Germany ? 
Some Paradoxes and Contradictions of 
Modern Germany 

Prussia and Germany 

Reaction in Germany 

Militarism in Germany 

A Prussian General on the Coming War 

Nationalism in Germany and the Perversion 
of Patriotism .... 

How Prussia treats her own Subjects 

The First German Grievance . 

The Baghdad Railway and German Expan 
sion in the Near East 

The Second German Grievance 

Is German Socialism making for Peace ? 

The German Kaiser .... 

Conclusion . . • . • 

Sources consulted . 



l 9 

49 

68 

85 
105 

129 

156 

182 
207 
230 

247 
281 
296 
306 

35° 
369 



PREFACE. 



I. 



It is the object of the following pages, exhaust- 
ively and systematically, to study the Anglo- 
German problem in all its bearings, without 
reticence or ambiguity. I think it is high time 
that such a study should be undertaken. We are 
told, it is true, that the less said about a delicate 
situation the better. I do not believe it. I believe 
in outspokenness, in a free and frank discussion, 
provided the discussion be based on a thorough 
knowledge of the facts. Two great people must 
not be afraid of facing realities such as they are. 
In the words of Professor Harnack : " A per- 
manent peace can only be achieved by hard 
intellectual effort and intellectual honesty/' 
The first condition of a mutual understanding 
between England and Germany is that the whole 
case be brought before the tribunal of public 
opinion, that the truth, the whole truth, 
be told, that a festering wound be searched. 
The doctor who wants to cure a dangerous 
disease will not effect a cure by merely denying 



8 PREFACE. 

the danger, or by making light of the disease, or 
by trusting to the vis curativa of nature. No ! 
Rather will he investigate and probe the wound. 
And he will not be afraid of inflicting pain, if 
inflicting pain means the salvation of the patient. 
By all means let us be sympathetic and concilia- 
tory to our German cousins, let us be unstinting 
in our appreciation of their intellectual, artistic, 
and moral qualities, of their magnificent achieve- 
ments. But also let us not cover up the defects 
of their character and the shortcomings of their 
policy, and let us not load their sins on our own 
shoulders. Christian humility is a great virtue, 
but even the most humble Christian would not 
confess to a sin which had been committed by 
somebody else ; for to make such a confession 
would be to tell a lie, and it is neither necessary 
nor desirable to tell a lie for the purpose of con- 
ciliating an opponent. 

England cannot honestly admit the truth and 
reality of German grievances. England cannot 
admit that in the past she has ever adopted an 
attitude of contemptuous superiority towards the 
German people. Still less can England admit 
that she has systematically stood in the way of 
German colonial ambitions. She cannot admit 
it, for the simple reason that only a few years ago 
those German colonial ambitions did not exist. 
Almost to the end of his long rule, Bismarck 
would not have colonies, and he deliberately 



PREFACE. 9 

encouraged France in that policy of African 
expansion which Germany now objects to. 
Germany would probably have had a much larger 
colonial empire if she had chosen to have it. 
History teaches us that in the development of 
European colonization there are some nations, 
like the Spaniards and Portuguese, that have 
come too early in the field. There are other 
nations, like England and Russia, that have come 
in the nick of time. And, finally, there are nations 
that have come too late. The German people 
have arrived too late in the race for colonial 
empire. They may regret it, but surely it would 
be monstrous to use the fact as a grievance 
against the people of this country. I may 
bitterly regret that twenty years ago I had not 
the money or the energy or the foresight to 
invest in the development of Argentine, or 
that I did not buy an estate in Canada, which 
in those early days 1 might have got for a 
hundred pounds, and which to-day would be 
worth hundreds of thousands. But that is no 
reason why I should hate the present possessors 
of landed property in the Far West or in the 
Far South. That is no reason why I should 
wish to dispossess them of land which they have 
legitimately acquired, whether they owe it to 
their luck or to their pluck, to favourable 
circumstances or to their initiative and per- 
severance. 



io PREFACE. 

It is a consummation devoutly to be wished 
that the two nations should approach the settle- 
ment of their differences in a spirit of conciliation 
and goodwill, but I do not see how the cause 
of peace can be promoted by encouraging a belief 
in the German people that they have a long 
standing score to settle. Let that belief once 
become a rooted conviction in their minds, and it 
will rankle and fester. On the contrary, let the 
German people be convinced that untoward 
circumstances or lack of foresight in their own 
statesmen are entirely to blame if their colonial 
ambitions are not to-day fulfilled or if they 
experience political difficulties at home, and the 
rancour and hatred against England will dis- 
appear from their hearts. 



II. 



But because I refuse to believe that there is 
any j ustification in German grievances, I do not 
therefore agree with those well-meaning English 
writers who assert that the Anglo -German 
misunderstandings are entirely unreal, and that 
the present strained relations and the present ill- 
feeling between the two nations are purely super- 
ficial and are wholly due to artificial causes, that 
they are mainly the result of a mischievous Press 
campaign carried on by irresponsible journalists 



PREFACE. " 

and of a mistaken view of commercial interests. 
I submit that such statements are absolutely con- 
trary to the real facts. 

Alas ! the misunderstandings between Eng- 
land and Germany are not superficial but deep 
seated. They do not merely involve questions of 
commercial interests, but they are rooted in a 
conflict of principles and ideals. If a war 
between the two countries did break out, it 
would not be merely an economic war, like the 
colonial wars between France and England in 
the eighteenth century ; rather would it partake 
of the nature of a political and religious crusade, 
like the French wars of the Revolution and the 
Empire. The present conflict between England and 
Germany is the old conflict between Liberalism and 
despotism^ between industrialism and militarism^ 
between progress and reaction^ between the masses 
and the classes. The conflict between England 
and Germany is a conflict, on the one hand, be- 
tween a nation which believes in political liberty 
and national autonomy, where the Press is free 
and where the rulers are responsible to public 
opinion, and, on the other hand, a nation where 
public opinion is still muzzled or powerless and 
where the masses are still under the heel of 
an absolute government, a reactionary party, a 
military Junkertum, and a despotic bureaucracy. 

The root of the evil lies in the fact that in 
Germany the war spirit and the war caste still 



12 PREFACE. 

prevail, and that a military Power like Prussia 
is the predominant partner in the German Con- 
federation. The mischievous masterpiece of 
Carlyle on Frederick the Great, and his more 
mischievous letter to the Times, have misled 
English opinion as to the true character and 
traditions and aims of the Prussian monarchy. 
Prussia has been pre-eminently for two hundred 
years the military and reactionary State of 
Central Europe, much more so even than Russia. 
Prussia owes whatever she is, and whatever 
territory she has, to a systematic policy of 
cunning and deceit, of violence and conquest. 
No doubt she has achieved an admirable work 
of organization at home, and has fulfilled what 
was perhaps a necessary historic mission, but in 
her international relations she has been mainly a 
predatory Power. She has stolen her Eastern 
provinces from Poland. She is largely respon- 
sible for the murder of a great civilized nation. 
She has wrested Silesia from Austria. She has 
taken Hanover from its legitimate rulers. She 
has taken Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, 
Alsace-Lorraine from France. And to-day the 
military caste in Prussia trust and hope that a 
final conflict with England will consummate 
what previous wars have so successfully accom- 
plished in the past. They are all the more 
anxious to enter the lists and to run the hazards 
of war because it becomes more and more 



PREFACE. 13 

difficult to govern a divided Reichstag and a 
dissatisfied people without uniting them against 
a foreign enemy, and because they realize that 
unless they restore their prestige and consolidate 
their power by a signal victory the days of their 
predominance are numbered. 

Liberal publicists in this country ought to be 
the very last to fail to see the real points at issue 
and to ignore the fundamental fact that in Ger- 
many political aggressiveness abroad is explained 
by political reaction at home. It is perfectly true 
that England has no quarrel with the German 
people, that there has existed a hereditary 
alliance between the two nations, that they have 
fought side by side on many a battlefield, and 
that for generations the English people have 
paid ungrudgingly their tribute of admiration 
to the glorious achievements of the German 
people in philosophy and science, in literature 
and in music. But then the German people do 
not control the political situation. The German 
popular Press and the official Press Bureau 
of Mr. Hammann often do not even give them 
a chance to have the political problems brought 
before them. It is equally true that the 
assumption that war would benefit Germany 
is, to use the expression of Mr. Norman Angell 
in his epoch-making treatise, a "great illusion," 
and that the victor would certainly suffer as 
much as, or more than, the vanquished. But, 



14 PREFACE. 

then, the ruling classes and the middle classes 
are suffering under that illusion, and even 
the masses themselves — with the doubtful 
exception of the Socialists — are actuated, not 
by their true interests, but by their passions 
artificially inflamed. 

Instead of evading those fundamental facts 
just stated, let the English Liberals pro- 
claim them from the housetops, so that the 
German and the British merchant, and the 
German and the British artisan may hear them. 
Let Liberal publicists strain every effort to 
enlighten German public opinion as well as 
English opinion. Let them proclaim that the 
remedy of the present situation lies not in 
the satisfaction of imaginary grievances, in 
the concession of " territorial compensation " 
at the expense of third parties, but in the 
establishment of popular government in the 
German Empire, and in the political education 
of the German people. 



III. 



It may be objected by English readers that, 
not being a born Englishman, I am scarcely 
qualified to interfere in such an anxious and 
grave debate. On the contrary, I submit that it 
is precisely because I was born a Belgian that I 



PREFACE. 15 

have perhaps a better chance to be listened to by 
the German public. The German public in its 
present mood will not listen to English writers, 
even as the British public distrusts German 
writers. Only last year Professor Delbrtlck 
refused to write for the Contemporary Review 
simply because Dr. Dillon was a regular contrib- 
utor to that periodical, and because, according to 
the German professor, Dr. Dillon was poisoning 
the wells of public opinion in England. 

Nor can I admit that, because I was born in 
Belgium, I ought to consider myself as a dis- 
interested outsider with regard to the Anglo- 
German problem. It is true that in theory the 
neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by inter- 
national treaties ; but when I observe the signs 
of the times, the ambitions of the German rulers, 
and when I consider such indications as the 
recent extension of strategic railways on the 
Belgian-German frontiers, I do not look forward 
with any feeling of security to future con- 
tingencies in the event of a European war. 
1 am not at all convinced that the scare of a 
German invasion of England is justified. 
Indeed, 1 am inclined to believe the Germans 
when they assert that in case of war Germany 
would not be likely to invade Britain. She 
would be far more likely to invade Belgium, 
because Belgium has always been the pawn in 
the great game of European politics, and has 



1 6 PREFACE. 

often been, and may again become, the battle- 
field and cockpit of Europe. 

If, then, I cannot pretend that I am com- 
pletely impartial in this controversy, I may at 
least say that I am writing as a true friend and 
admirer of the German people. Indeed, it is be- 
cause I have learnt to admire the German people 
that I have also learnt to detest the Prussian 
spirit, which is the very negation of whatever 
is noblest and purest in the German genius. 
A Fleming by birth and a Dutchman by 
origin, I have perhaps as good a right to call 
myself a pure Teuton as most Nationalist 
Prussians who have an abundant admixture of 
Slav blood in their veins. I spoke a German 
dialect in the nursery. In my youth 1 nearly 
ruined my eyesight by reading Gothic script 
and German classics in those hideous editions, 
cheap and nasty, which have done so much to 
improve popular culture across the Rhine. I 
have revelled in German poetry, I have drunk 
at the fountain of German philosophy and 
theology. I may therefore claim to speak 
with some understanding and with genuine 
sympathy. A writer in the German K'dlnische 
Zeitung) commenting on a previous essay of 
mine on a German topic, regrets that I should 
not have studied the subject in a more detached 
and objective spirit. I can only refer that 
German journalist to the judgment and ap- 



PREFACE. 17 

preciation of my work which the greatest 
political writer or modern Germany, Professor 
Hans Delbrilck, has expressed in a biographical 
notice of myself which appeared in the Premsische 
Jahrbucher. Nobody knows better than myself 
how little I deserve the too generous praise 
which Professor Delbrttck has given to my 
political writings, but at least I can say this, that 
for twenty years I have studied the problems of 
international politics from personal observation, 
and in a spirit of disinterested research : " Sine 
amore et odlo quorum causas procul habeoT 

And although I cannot lay claim to the very 
doubtful virtue of absolute intellectual im- 
partiality and neutrality, I can at least say this, 
that I have done my utmost not to consider 
the problem from any English Nationalist point 
of view. I may assert in all honesty that I 
have not written this book in any narrow or 
insular spirit. I have tried to be what all 
educated Germans professed to be in the 
Golden Age of German philosophy or Ger- 
man literature. 1 have tried to be what the 
greatest German of all times— 1 mean, of course, 
Goethe, and not Count Zeppelin — has always 
claimed to be — namely, a Cosmopolitan, a good 
European ; and it is as a good European that 
1 venture to ask for a fair hearing in both 
countries. 

These personal explanations were necessary, 
2 



1 8 PREFACE. 

partly because I do not wish to compromise 
anybody but myself, and because I do not de- 
sire to be told that I am only expressing Eng- 
lish prejudices ; partly because in such a deli- 
cate controversy the personal equation means a 
great deal. Admirers of Prussian despotism will 
no doubt make a determined effort to dispute my 
qualifications or my right to speak. I am not 
afraid of my political opponents, and I shall 
answer them in the words of Themistocles : 
" You may strike, if you will only listen." 1 
shall not mind being attacked and hit hard, 
provided my arguments be listened to. The 
truth generally prevails, if there is no con- 
spiracy of silence against it. 



INTRODUCTION. 

Europe is drifting slowly but steadily towards 
an awful catastrophe which, if it does happen, will 
throw back civilization for the coming genera- 
tion, as the war of 1870 threw back civilization 
for the generation which followed and which in- 
herited its dire legacy of evil. For the last ten years 
two great Western Powers and two kindred races 
have become increasingly estranged, and have 
been engaging in military preparations which are 
taxing to the utmost the resources of the people, 
and are paralyzing social and political reform in 
both countries. A combination of many causes, 
moral and political, has bred suspicion and dis- 
trust, Vi* the fallacious assumption of conflicting 
interests has turned suspicion into hatred. Only 
a year ago England and Germany stood on the 
brink of war. If after the coup of Agadir, 
Germany had persisted in her policy, the con- 
flagration would have ensued, the storm would 
have burst out. The war cloud has temporarily 
lifted, but it has not passed away. The danger 



20 INTRODUCTION. 

is as acute as it was, because the causes which 
produced the recent outburst are still with us, 
and the malignant passions are gathering strength 
with each passing day. 

This formidable evil is threatening England, 
but it does not originate in England, and Eng- 
land cannot be held responsible for it. The 
period of aggressive Imperialism has passed away. 
Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and Mr. Rudyard Kip- 
ling, in so far as they once represented the old 
bellicose Imperialism, to-day are exploded forces. 
The English people were never more peacefully 
inclined, and Liberals and Tories are united in 
their desire for a pacific solution of the present 
difficulties. In this respect an extraordinary 
change has come over England in the last ten 
years. In the wonderful age in which we are liv- 
ing, where the law of acceleration reveals itself in 
politics and economics as well as in science, more 
decisive events have taken place during the last 
decade than during the entire previous half cen- 
tury, and the English people have matured and 
advanced in political wisdom to an extent which 
few citizens realize. A cynic might object that 
if England to-day is less aggressive, it is be- 
cause she is satiated and " saturated," because all 
the desirable places on the map of the world 
have already been painted red, and because the 
conquering Briton has taken up so much of the 
white man's burden that he is in need of a rest. 



INTRODUCTION. 21 

And he might further object that England to- 
day is so entirely absorbed in home affairs, and 
confronted with so many and such anxious 
internal problems, that she has neither time nor 
energy to spare for further Imperial expansion. 
The objection might seem plausible enough if 
history did not teach us that internal difficulties, 
so far from being an obstacle to external aggres- 
sion, are often one of its main motives. 
Only too frequently have statesmen found a 
spirited foreign policy the line of least resistance 
in the solution of their domestic difficulties. 

1 therefore believe that the enthusiasm for 
social reform which to-day animates British 
statesmen, to whatever party they belong, is the 
best proof of a sincere desire on the part of the 
British nation to preserve the peace of the 
world. 

But there are other causes which have contrib- 
uted even more efficiently to produce the pacific 
temper of the English people. Both the Trans- 
vaal War and the Russo-Japanese War, with the 
frightful sacrifices they entailed, have had a sober- 
ing effect on the national mind, and have laid 
bare the dangers of aggressive Imperialism. 
On the other hand, the remarkable results 
achieved by the diplomacy of King Edward the 
Seventh have brought home the conviction that 
in the promotion of national interests more may 
be achieved by tact and sympathy than by brute 



22 INTRODUCTION. 

force. But, above all, the concession of complete 
autonomy to the Dutch-speaking South African 
peoples, the Constitution of the South African 
Commonwealth, the loyalty of the Dominion of 
Canada, and its rejection of the reciprocity treaty 
with the United States have had an inspiring 
effect on the mother country, and have strength- 
ened her belief in the wisdom of a liberal 
and generous policy. England to-day has re- 
turned to her ancient traditions. The British 
people have outgrown the bonds of a narrow 
nationalism. In the political philosophy of the 
day, national patriotism has ceased to be an 
absolute category, an end in itself. Nationalism 
has become a relative category and a means to a 
higher end. The British Empire has become 
a world-wide federation of free, self-governing 
communities, including many different religions, 
but bound together by the same political ideal. 
The British Empire may be legitimately re- 
garded as the most decisive experiment in liberal 
statesmanship in the world's history, the most 
effective power for good in world politics, the 
most convincing proof that an unswerving respect 
for the political rights of the people is the strong- 
est bond of unity and loyalty, that order is com- 
patible with liberty, and that the conflicting claims 
of nationality can be and must be reconciled with 
the claims of humanity. In past ages the idea of 
empire has always been associated with the idea 



INTRODUCTION. 23 

of despotism. It is the unique glory of the 
British Empire that it is indissolubly associated 
with and synonymous with political liberty. As 
England has been the alma mater of repre- 
sentative government, so will the British Em- 
pire be the perfect type and exemplar of all 
free commonwealths, of all future federa- 
tions of civilized communities, the nearest 
approach to that federation of humanity which 
has been the philosopher's stone of human 
statesmanship. 

For the reasons which I have just stated, 
the pacific intentions of the English people to- 
day cannot be disputed, and for those self-same 
reasons we cannot accept the theory that Eng- 
land is quite as responsible as Germany for the 
present situation. We cannot admit that Ger- 
many is justified in saying, " We are preparing 
for war because we dread an attack from 
England," just as much as the English people 
think themselves justified in saying, "We are 
preparing for war because we dread an attack 
from Germany." If our interpretation of the 
significance of the British Empire is not a 
hollow phrase, the English people have actually 
broken through that vicious circle, and the con- 
clusion must force itself upon any impartial ob- 
server that in the present crisis the danger does 
not come from England, but that it undoubtedly 
does originate in Germany. 



24 INTRODUCTION. 

It is Germany and not England which is the 
storm-centre, the volcanic zone, in international 
politics. From there have come, ever since 
i860, the tension and friction, the suspicion and 
distrust. It is there that the pagan gods of the 
Nibelungen are forging their deadly weapons. 
I admit that it is impossible from the very out- 
set of our inquiry to establish a conviction which 
necessarily can only be reached at the conclusion 
of our argument, but 1 hope and trust that in 
the present volume we shall provide sufficient 
cumulative evidence to convince even the most 
sceptical. In this opening chapter we shall only 
dispose of a few preliminary objections, and 
answer a few previous questions proposed by 
those candid critics who at the beginning of our 
investigation would be inclined to dispute the 
reality of the danger against which we are seek- 
ing to protect ourselves, or by those critics who 
would deny the very existence of the problem 
of which we are seeking a solution. 

Many English and German publicists try to 
reassure us by telling us that the present Anglo- 
German peril is only a passing phenomenon, and 
that with sufficient goodwill and patience we 
shall soon see the end of it. " Deus dabit his 
quo que fin em," They tell us that the present situ- 
ation is mainly created by mutual misunder- 
standings, and that those misunderstandings are 
only too easily explained, in the first place, by the 



INTRODUCTION. 25 

almost universal ignorance of the two nations 
concerning each other's difficulties and character- 
istics, and, in the second place, by the peculiar 
psychology of the crowd, and by the mischievous 
workings of a Yellow Press bent on increasing 
its circulation by spreading sensational reports 
and inflaming popular passion. 

I am quite prepared to make full allowance 
for national ignorance and national prejudice. 
To restrict my criticism to the English public, 
I fully admit that the ignorance of the English 
people concerning their German cousins is 
prodigious. When we find that the study of the 
German language — that is to say, of a language 
which is the key to a glorious literature as well 
as the chief means of establishing business rela- 
tions with one of the great commercial Powers of 
the world — is almost " taboo " in every English 
public school and university, owing to the incon- 
ceivable pedantry and narrow-mindedness of edu- 
cational authorities ;* when we find that in the 
whole of the Scottish universities there does not 

* Lord Haldane is a great expert in German literature 
and German philosophy. He is Chancellor of one British uni- 
versity, and has been Lord Rector of another, and he is keenly inter- 
ested in educational reform. But I am not aware that either he or 
any other statesman has ever attempted to do anything to counteract 
the imbecile policy of the educational authorities and to encourage 
the study of German. In contrasting the intellectual relations of 
England and Germany we are reminded of the relative position ot 
the French people and of the German people before the outbreak 
of the war of 1870. The Germans knew everything about the 
French, the French knew little or nothing of the Germans. 



26 INTRODUCTION. 

exist one chair of German language and literature, 
and that in the university of Cambridge it has 
been left to the munificence of a Teutonic mer- 
chant to make adequate provision for the teach- 
ing of German ; when we find that a knowledge 
of Greek, only attainable by a small minority, 
and a smattering of Greek forced upon the vast 
majority of English schoolboys are considered 
more important than a practical mastery of the 
German language, which ought to be placed 
within the reach of every pupil ; when we find 
that ninety-five per cent, of the members of the 
House of Commons, whose first duty it should 
be to know at first hand the conditions which 
prevail in Germany, to keep in touch with the 
German Press, and with German public opinion, 
are incapable of reading a German newspaper ; 
when we find that the most popular English 
paper of the day recently sent out a corre- 
spondent to follow the German elections, who 
na'ively admitted that he did not understand a 
word of German ; when we see such an extraordi- 
nary state of things I am only too ready to admit 
that nothing that can be said about the igno- 
rance of the British public can possibly be too 
strong, and I feel it my duty to proclaim that 
the educational authorities who allow such a 
scandal to continue are guilty of an almost 
criminal neglect of duty, and that they must be 
held primarily responsible for a great deal of the 



INTRODUCTION. 27 

intellectual misunderstanding that exists between 
the two nations.* 

But however deplorable that ignorance may 
be, however much it may have contributed in 
the past to mutual differences, and however 
dangerous it might prove in case of a war, I do 
not think that it can account for the present 
crisis ; and I am driven to that conclusion by 
the simple reflection that the feeling of hostility 
is so much less acute and the attitude of de- 
preciation is so much less marked in England, 
where the ignorance of German is almost uni- 
versal, than in Germany, where the educated 
classes do possess a knowledge of the English 
language. 

Nor can it be said that the " psychology of the 
crowd " in both countries must be held mainly 
responsible for the existing situation. With re- 
gard to the German crowd I am ready to admit 
that ample allowance must be made for the 
animal spirits of a young and growing nation, 
especially when its rulers find it to their advantage 
to turn the popular mind away from the con- 
sideration of their own political shortcomings, 
in order to unite them against an imaginary 

* In the face of that ignorance, which is accepted by every 
legislator, how contemptible must appear the gushing cant about 
the admirable results of interparliamentary visits and conferences ! 
It must be no doubt infinitely less troublesome to attend parlia- 
mentary banquets and to indulge in fraternal potations and to intone 
the Gaudeamus igitur than to fight for a reform of our effete 
educational system. 



28 INTRODUCTION 

enemy. And I know full well that the whole 
history of the nineteenth century presents a 
lamentable record of similar periodical outbursts 
of national animosity. Thus France was the 
" hereditary enemy " of England before she be- 
came her ally. Thus Germany and Austria were 
" hereditary enemies," and fought a bitter war 
before they became loyal friends. Thus England 
was the " inveterate enemy " of Russia ; thus 
it was thought that the occupation of Merv, a 
sterile oasis on the Persian frontier, must be 
a casus belli y and thus England was subject to 
periodical fits of '" Mewousness" and "nervousness" 
before she became united to the Slav Empire in 
an Entente Cordiale. But the present misunder- 
standing between England and Germany is a 
different phenomenon. It cannot be traced to 
sudden gusts of popular passion. It cannot be 
explained by conflicting interests. It cannot be 
explained by racial differences, for they are 
kindred races. It cannot be explained by reli- 
gious differences, for both England and Germany 
are Protestant rather than Catholic countries. 
It cannot be explained by any hereditary hos- 
tility, for in the past England and Germany 
have never fought against each other on a battle- 
field. On the contrary, they have often fought 
as allies against a common foe. The causes of 
the present animosity, therefore, lie deeper, and 
no shallow phrases about the " passing moods of 



INTRODUCTION. 29 

the people," or the " psychology of the crowd," 
can be accepted as a solution of the difficulty. 

Nor do I think that the popular Press can 
be held responsible to any large extent for the 
Anglo-German peril. I admit that the Yellow 
Press has often made it a matter of business, and 
sometimes a remunerative business, to stir up 
ill-feeling amongst nations. But in the present 
case the newspapers have not created the ill- 
feeling ; they only gave expression to a feeling 
which already existed. In this connection it 
must be noted that in Germany anti-British 
hostility is by no means restricted to the Yellow 
Press. Any one acquainted with the German 
Press will know that a Conservative paper like 
the Kreuzzeitung or a National Liberal journal 
like the Preussische Jahrbticher are almost as 
aggressive in tone as a frankly Nationalist paper 
like the Zukunft. 

German and English publicists, whilst admit- 
ting the existence of a feeling of hostility, point 
out the many unmistakable signs of goodwill 
heralding a better understanding in the future. 
They point to the frequent exchange of inter- 
national courtesies, to the periodical visits of 
Members of Parliament and of representative 
men of the Churches ; they point to the visit of 
Viscount Haldane ; and last, but not least, they 
point to the many pacific assurances of the Ger- 
man Kaiser. With regard to the utterances of the 



3 o INTRODUCTION. 

Kaiser, I can only say that if the Kaiser has made 
many pacific speeches, his aggressive speeches 
have been even more numerous. I have no 
doubt that the Kaiser is perfectly sincere, and I 
believe him to be animated with the most cordial 
feelings for this country. If I am asked to 
explain the contradiction, I can only see one 
explanation, and it is not one which I am very 
willing to admit. And the explanation is this : 
when he is expressing words of peace and good- 
will he is speaking in his own private capacity 
and as the grandson of an English queen. On 
the contrary, whenever he utters words of ill- 
will and menace, whenever he waves the flag, 
when he shows the mailed fist, he is acting as the 
representative and speaking as the spokesman of 
a considerable fraction amongst his subjects. 

That there has existed in Germany a very 
widespread feeling of hostility against the 
English people we have uncontrovertible proof. 
And the evidence we have on no less an au- 
thority than the Kaiser himself. In the famous 
interview published by the Daily Telegraph, 
William the Second emphatically testified to the 
existence and to the persistence of the feeling 
which he had systematically attempted to counter- 
act. The admission raised legitimate indignation 
in Germany. It was ill-advised. It was calcu- 
lated to intensify the very animosity which it 
deprecated. But the fact itself, the existence of 



INTRODUCTION. 31 

the animosity, could not be disputed. After all, 
the Kaiser ought to know the feelings, if not of 
the majority of his subjects, at least of those 
ruling classes with whom he comes in contact. 

And therefore no reassuring interviews or 
utterances, even of an Anglophile Kaiser, can 
blind us to the significance of recent events. 
The signs of the times are too clear to leave 
us in any doubt with regard to the state of the 
popular mind in Germany. In England and 
Germany the public men of all parties and of 
no party, publicists of every colour and of no 
colour, interpret those signs in exactly the 
same way. When we hear in England leading 
Socialists like Mr. Blatchford and Mr. Hyndman, 
eminent Positivists like Mr. Frederic Harrison, 
apostles of peace like Mr. Norman Angell, all 
warning us that we stand on the brink of an 
abyss ; when we hear in Germany the leader 
of the National Liberal Party, Mr. Basserman, 
the leader of the Conservative Party, Mr. von 
Heydebrand, the leader of the Progressive 
Party, the Rev. Friedrich Naumann, men 
divided on many political problems but united 
in their suspicion of England, when we hear 
those men deliver inflammatory speeches in 
the Reichstag ; when the guarded and dignified 
speech of an English Cabinet Minister, who 
has always been known for his pro-German 
sympathies, has been distorted in Germany into 



32 INTRODUCTION. 

a challenge of war, and has called forth such 
extraordinary speeches as those of Mr. von 
Heydebrand ; when we see the most eminent 
German publicist, Professor Hans Delbruck 
of the University of Berlin, a Liberal and a 
friend of England, actually refusing to write a 
peaceful declaration for the Contemporary Review, 
because, in his opinion, such a declaration could 
not serve any useful purpose in the present ex- 
cited state or public opinion ; when we see the 
most influential journalist of the German Empire, 
Maximilian Harden, who is not only a writer of 
brilliant talent and immense learning, but who 
has the keen Semitic instinct for what appeals to 
the public, proclaiming again and again that 
things cannot go on any longer as they are, and 
month after month calling for the arbitrament 
of war, and repeating in the Zukunft his fateful 
burden, " Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delen- 
dam ; " when we see the German Crown Prince, 
who is no longer an impulsive and immature 
youth, but a responsible man of thirty, widely 
travelled, and with considerable political ex- 
perience, frantically applauding violent anti- 
British outbursts in the Reichstag, and being 
made into a popular hero for doing so ; when, 
finally, we see that the German Emperor him- 
self is being proclaimed a very apostle of peace 
merely because he courageously refuses to inflame 
the warlike passions ; when we see the Kaiser, 



INTRODUCTION 33 

nay even the war lord of Europe, being publicly 
derided and reviled for his pacific intentions, 
and when that glorious appellation, " William 
the Peaceful," has become a nickname and is 
turned into an insult ; when we can observe all 
those concurrent symptoms, surely we have a 
right to conclude that the international situation 
has indeed become one of imminent peril. 

Uninfluenced by those ominous signs of the 
times, English and German optimists still refuse 
to surrender, still persist in their optimism. 
They argue that the situation is no doubt serious, 
but that those outbursts of popular feeling in Ger- 
many, violent as they are, have largely been 
caused by English suspicion and distrust, and 
that there has been nothing in the German policy 
to justify that English suspicion and distrust. 
After all, deeds are more important than words, 
and by her deeds Germany has proved for 
forty-two years that she is persistently pacific. 
Since 1870 Russia has made war against Tur- 
key and against Japan. England has made war 
against the Transvaal. Italy has waged war 
against Turkey. France after Fashoda would 
have declared war against England, and after 
Tangier would have declared war against Ger- 
many, if France had been prepared. Of all 
the great Powers, Germany alone for nearly 
half a century has been determined to keep the 
peace of the world. 

3 



34 INTRODUCTION. 

The reply to this objection is very simple. I 
am not examining here whether a state of affairs 
which has transformed Europe into an armed 
camp of six million soldiers, and which absorbs 
for military expenditure two-thirds of the rev- 
enue of European states, can be appropriately 
called a state of peace. It is certainly not a 
pax romana. It is most certainly not a pax 
britannica. It may be a pax teutonica or rather 
a pax borussica, but such as it is, ruinous and 
demoralizing, it is also lamentably precarious 
and perilously unstable. And if Germany has 
kept this pax borussica for forty-two years, it 
has not been the fault of the German Govern- 
ment. Rather has it been kept because she has 
been prevented from declaring war by outside 
interference ; or because she has been able to 
carry out her policy and to achieve her ambi- 
tions without going the length of declaring war, 
or because a war would have been not only a 
heinous crime but a political blunder. 

After 1870 Bismarck twice prepared to deal 
a deadly blow to France, because France was 
rapidly recovering from her wounds and re- 
organizing her army. It was only the Russian 
intervention which prevented the Iron Chan- 
cellor from carrying out his plans. I am aware 
that some of the facts have been disputed. 
Such international differences generally are 
twisted and distorted, but the main facts of the 



INTRODUCTION. 35 

Franco-German incidents of 1 875 remain beyond 
cavil and dispute.* And it is highly significant 
that quite recently a great German scholar, 
Professor Karl Lamprecht of Leipzig Univer- 
sity,f in the conclusion of the nineteenth volume 
of his monumental history, should still cynically 
deplore and regret that in 1875 Germany should 
have missed a great opportunity and should not 
have fulfilled her destiny. 

Again, only four years ago, there was a danger 
of an outbreak of war when Austria, supported 
by Germany, annexed Bosnia-Herzogovina in 
flagrant violation of the Treaty of Berlin. War 
would no doubt have been declared if Russia 
had been prepared for it, if she had had time 
to recover from Moukden and Tsusima. 

But the real reason why Germany for forty 
years has kept the peace is because a war would 
have been both fatal and futile, injurious and 
superfluous. It would have been injurious, for 
it would have arrested the growing trade and 
the expanding industries of the empire. And, 
above all, it would have been superfluous, for 
in time of peace Germany reaped all the ad- 
vantages which a successful war would have 

* See the instructive revelations in the Memoirs of Sir Robert 
Morier, who was English Ambassador in Berlin. 

t It is noticeable that one of the leaders of the Pan-Germanists, 
Ernst Hasse, was also a professor of Leipzig University. In Pro- 
fessor Lamprecht he has made a brilliant convert who is a host by 
himself. 



36 INTRODUCTION. 

given her. For twenty-five years the German 
Empire wielded an unchallenged supremacy on 
the continent of Europe. For twenty years she 
directed the course of international events. 

But since the opening of the twentieth cen- 
tury Germany has ceased to be paramount, she 
has ceased to control European policy at her 
own sweet will, and weaker States have ceased 
to be given over to her tender mercies. 
To the Triple Alliance has been opposed the 
Triple Entente. The balance of power has 
been re-established. The three "hereditary 
enemies" — England, France, and Russia — have 
joined hands, and have delivered Europe from 
the incubus of German suzerainty. German 
diplomacy has strained every effort to break 
the Triple Entente, in turn wooing and 
threatening France and Russia, keeping open 
the Moroccan sore as the Neapolitan lazzarone 
keeps open the wound which ensures his living, 
and finally challenging the naval supremacy of 
England, and preparing to become as powerful 
at sea as she is on the Continent. 

And here we come to one of the crucial points 
of the Anglo-German controversy — the naval 
policy of the German Empire. I advisedly 
said one of the crucial points, for it is by no 
means the only one, nor even, in my opinion, 
the most important one. As I shall presently 
endeavour to prove, if Qermany suddenly 



INTRODUCTION. 37 

decided to reduce her naval armaments and to 
increase her army in proportion^ England would 
have even more serious reasons for anxiety than 
she has at present. 

Still there can be no doubt that for the 
present it is the naval policy of Germany 
which is the immediate cause of English 
alarm. England assumes that if Germany 
builds a powerful navy, that navy is mainly 
directed against her. It is built with the 
purpose of wresting from her the mastery 
of the sea. Unless we assume such a motive, 
it is impossible to account for the colossal effort 
which Germany is making. The German people 
would not willingly bear the double burden of 
a formidable naval expenditure added to their 
formidable expenditure on the army, they would 
not submit to a chronic deficit, if they did not 
think that the prize which is at stake was worth 
any effort and sacrifice on their part. Such is 
the obvious and anxious question which presents 
itself to the English mind, and I do not think that 
any official German explanation hitherto given 
is at all adequate or calculated to set at rest the 
public opinions of England. Without in the 
least questioning the abstract right of the Ger- 
man people to build any navy they choose, I am 
merely concerned to inquire whether the osten- 
sible reasons given can supply us with an ade- 
quate motive for her naval policy. 



38 INTRODUCTION. 

We are told that Germany has widely scattered 
colonies to protect, that she has world-wide com- 
mercial interests to defend, and that important 
changes may suddenly arise in different parts of 
the world which might render a powerful navy 
indispensable. For instance, the Chinese Empire 
or the Turkish Empire might break up, and 
Germany must be in a position to speak out 
in no uncertain voice, and to assert her legiti- 
mate claims. All the great Powers of the 
world — England, France, Russia, the United 
States, Japan — have built up colonial empires. 
Why should Germany not follow their example 
whenever she has a chance, and whenever a 
favourable juncture of events affords a favour- 
able opportunity ? 

At first sight the contention of Germany 
seems reasonable enough, but on closer ex- 
amination it is found to be without foundation, 
and to provide an absolutely inadequate motive 
for her present naval policy. Germany, merely 
to protect her commercial interests, does not need 
a powerful navy. She does not need a navy to 
fight the Herreros or the South Sea Islanders. 
And to defend her political interests in any 
part of the world, her formidable position 
as a continental Power would be sufficient to 
protect her against any wanton attack or any 
unwarranted infringement of her rights. 

It cannot be sufficiently emphasized in this 



INTRODUCTION. 39 

question of naval armaments that the position 
of England and Germany is radically different, 
and that in the two countries the army and 
the navy must serve two totally different pur- 
poses. 

Under present conditions of international re- 
lations, as a continental Power, Germany needs 
no powerful navy but needs a powerful army. 
In at least one definite sense it may be said that 
to Germany the army is essentially defensive, 
whilst the navy is mainly offensive. On the con- 
trary, England, as an insular and maritime Power, 
needs no mighty army but needs a mighty navy. 
In the same special sense to England the navy 
is essentially the defensive weapon, whilst a 
big army would be an offensive weapon. To 
put the position and mutual relationship more 
clearly : if to-morrow England started raising 
a powerful army of 500,000 soldiers, assuming 
that it could not conceivably be directed against 
France and Russia, but that it could only be 
used in alliance with France or Russia in a 
joint attack against Germany, Germany would 
legitimately take alarm ; and she would naturally 
argue that England would not make such 
tremendous sacrifices merely to send out 
an eventual punitive expedition to Nigeria or 
China. She would assume that England was 
preparing for an attack on Germany. And 
just in the same way when Germany is adding 



40 INTRODUCTION, 

to her formidable army a formidable navy, which 
could only be used against England, she can- 
not wonder if her naval policy gives rise to the 
gravest apprehensions and if the English people 
draw the inevitable inference that Germany, 
if not indeed contemplating an immediate 
attack, is at least preparing for such an even- 
tuality, when she judges that its necessity has 
arisen. 

Although the existence of any ultimate ag- 
gressive design against England has been again 
and again officially denied, it has now been ad- 
mitted by responsible ministers in the Reichstag. 
It is true that it is still expressed euphemistically 
and in a disguised form. We are told that the 
German navy must be sufficiently strong to 
inspire respect in the English people, so that 
even England must think twice before she 
dares to attack Germany. Since the outburst 
of popular indignation caused by the recent 
events of Agadir, some German writers go 
much further and frankly confess that they 
can see no reason why Germany should not 
challenge the maritime supremacy of Eng- 
land, and they suggest that there is no natural 
or divine law which gives to the English 
people for all time to come the mastery of 
the sea. 

To this German contention the English 
people reply that there does exist a natural 



INTRODUCTION. 41 

iaw, or, if we prefer, an economic law, which 
compels them to retain the mastery of the 
sea. It is not merely the protection of her 
empire, it is not even mainly the pro- 
tection of her oversea trade, which makes 
sea power an absolute necessity for England. 
There was a time when Britain ruled the 
waves mainly for reasons of empire and 
colonial expansion, but to-day, even if Eng- 
land entirely surrendered any maritime am- 
bitions, even if she gave up every one of her 
colonies, she would have all the more need 
to retain command of the sea, because on it 
depends not only her existence as an empire, 
but her existence as a nation. If she lost her 
sea power the daily food supply of her citizens 
would be at the mercy of any hostile fleet. 
In a few weeks the English people might be 
starved into submission and servitude, even 
though her soldiers might win another battle 
of Waterloo on the Continent. 

We are told, it is true, that an invasion 
of England is impossible, and the mere im- 
possibility or even improbability of such an 
invasion ought to dispose of any suspicions of 
German aggressive designs. We are told that 
naval experts have proved, and recent events in 
the Tripoli war have confirmed, that any German 
attempt suddenly to mobilize and to transport 
an army corps from the German to the English 



42 INTRODUCTION. 

shores would present almost insuperable diffi- 
culties, and would leave an English army ample 
time to meet the attack. 

I am not qualified to deal with the technical 
argument, but it is not necessary to be an 
expert to realize that naval strategy has many 
surprises ; that the element of chance and luck 
plays an even more important part in naval 
than in continental warfare ; and, above all, that 
modern inventions, hitherto almost untried, may 
revolutionize the naval battles of to-morrow. 
No expert can calculate or foretell the probable 
course of a naval campaign. It is true that an 
" Invincible Armada " to-day would be less at 
the mercy of the waves ; but she still remains 
at the mercy of other forces which are equally 
incalculable and uncontrollable. We do not 
know whether even a formidable superiority in 
Dreadnoughts would be decisive. Even as the 
sinking of one or two ships might block the Kiel 
Canal, so the explosion of a few mines might blow 
up several Dreadnoughts at the very beginning 
of the campaign and thus determine the issue of 
a war. Such an explosion actually did blow 
up part of the Russian fleet before Port Arthur, 
and decided the whole course of events. Nor 
must we forget that within the near future 
another fleet may play an important part in 
the final result — namely, the new fleet of aero- 
planes which to-morrow may entirely change 



INTRODUCTION. 43 

the conditions of both continental and naval 
warfare. Germany might conceivably send an 
aerial army of several thousand aeroplanes to 
the English capital, which might work more 
havoc than an invading army corps. One 
thing is certain, that if aero-technics make as 
rapid progress in the next five years as they 
have done within the last decade, England, 
for military purposes, will have ceased to be 
an island. 

But let us assume that the invasion scare is 
totally unfounded. Personally I am inclined to 
think that the fear of a German invasion has 
haunted far too exclusively the imagination of the 
English people, and has diverted their attention 
from another danger far more real and far more 
immediate. With characteristic na'iveti and 
insular selfishness some jingoes imagine that if 
only the naval armaments of Germany could be 
stopped, all danger to England would be averted. 
But surely the greatest danger to England is 
not the invasion of England : it is the invasion 
of France and Belgium. For in the case of an 
invasion of England, even the Germans admit 
that the probabilities of success would all be 
against Germany ; whilst in the case of an 
invasion of France, the Germans claim that the 
probabilities are all in their favour. It is there- 
fore in France and Belgium that the vulnerable 
point lies, the Achilles heel of the British Empire. 



44 INTRODUCTION. 

The German navy might eventually be useful to 
keep England in check, but, after all, the decisive 
weapon of attack is the German army, and the 
German people have only been prevented by 
their Anglophobia and megalomania from seeing 
this. In the past the battles of England have 
been mainly fought on the Continent, and so 
they will be in the future. A crushing defeat 
of France in the plains of Flanders or Cham- 
pagne, with the subsequent annexation of 
Northern Belgium and of Holland, would be 
a deadly blow to English supremacy. Well 
may the British people cling to the French 
entente as a Versicherungsvertrag, and the sooner 
that entente is transformed into an alliance the 
better for England. 

The real point at issue, therefore, is not 
whether Germany could risk or intends to risk an 
invasion of England, but whether she nourishes 
ambitions and aspirations which could only be 
satisfied at the conclusion of a successful war, or 
which, if satisfied without the arbitrament of 
war, would reduce England to a negligible 
quantity in European politics. That Germany 
at present nourishes such ambitions and aspira- 
tions is obvious to any student who keeps in 
close touch with German public opinion. Ger- 
many is not satisfied with her present boun- 
daries. She does not only ask for the open 
door which England has generously given her. 



INTRODUCTION. 45 

She does not only aspire to commercial expan- 
sion. She is bent on territorial expansion. She 
is bent on being not merely a German Empire, 
but a European Empire, and a World Empire. 
The old Napoleonic dream is with us once 
more. Already Austria, far more useful as a 
loyal ally than if she were annexed, is opening 
for Germany the gates of the East and coloniz- 
ing the south of Europe. Already the Dual 
Alliance is politically supreme from Hamburg 
to Salonica and Constantinople. Already the 
economic penetration of Germany and Holland 
and Belgium has transformed those countries into 
German economic dependencies. The political 
supremacy of the German Empire in continental 
Europe seems, therefore, within reach of im- 
mediate practical politics. And for such a prize 
ought not every subject of the Kaiser be ready 
to make any sacrifice ? 

There lies the danger in the immediate future, 
and the danger is drawing near. Germany is in no 
hurry. She can resist, and she will resist, popular 
pressure until she is ready. Time is working 
for her. And as Admiral Mahan recently re- 
minded us, despotism, which is the curse of Ger- 
many in time ot peace, may become in time of 
war an element of strength, for it ensures unity of 
purpose, concentration of energy, and discipline. 

And let us not imagine that the danger has 
been indefinitely postponed through the con- 



46 INTRODUCTION. 

elusion of the treaty with France and the solu- 
tion of the Moroccan crisis. Indeed, no solution 
has been attained. France has submitted to a 
national humiliation, and has been bullied into 
accepting ignominious conditions and into con- 
ceding to Germany a not unimportant part of 
her colonial empire. Her statesmen have justi- 
fied that retrocession of French territory on the 
plea that it was worth a considerable sacrifice 
to come to a "final understanding" with Ger- 
many on the African question, and to put an 
end once for all to the Moroccan imbroglio. 
Incredible though it seems, moderate and re- 
sponsible German publicists now tell us with 
grim humour that whilst France has been 
threatened into surrendering a great deal, she 
has obtained nothing in return. We are told in 
the most explicit terms by Dr. Daniels and by 
Professor Delbrttck that the Moroccan question 
remains an open question, that France has been 
taken in, that Germany has made no concession, 
and that the position of Germany in Morocco 
under the recent treaty conditions is stronger 
than it was under the Treaty of Algeciras. 

Every English reader will agree that such 
weighty utterances are painful reading. It is 
an ominous indication of the state of German 
opinion to be told both by the successor of 
Treitschke in the university of Berlin and by 
the foreign editor of the Prcussische Jahrbilcher 



INTRODUCTION. 47 

that they expect that before two years are 
over " sufficient inflammable material will have 
accumulated in Morocco to produce a conflagra- 
tion." It is painful to read that having just 
emerged from a dangerous crisis we shall be 
confronted within twenty -four months with 
another crisis infinitely more dangerous. For 
is it not obvious that if the German Govern- 
ment within two years were once more to 
reopen the Moroccan question, and once more 
came forward with fresh claims for territorial 
compensation, those claims could only be settled 
by war. And in my opinion there never would 
have been in European history a more criminal 
war on the part of Germany, and a more just 
war on the part of France. 

Such German statements as I have just al- 
luded to need no discussion or amplification. 
Nor do I think that it is necessary to say 
anything more to prove my argument and to 
drive home the conviction that the Anglo- 
German peril is not a vain delusion, that it is 
real, and that it is pressing. I may also claim 
that I have satisfactorily proved my contention 
that the peril does not originate in England or 
France, but that it originates with the German 
people themselves. I shall have to consider in 
the following chapters how that Anglo-Ger- 
man peril can best be met. I shall examine 
whether any of the current solutions proposed 



48 INTRODUCTION. 

can be accepted as a final settlement of the 
difficulty, and, if no such solution can be accep- 
ted, whether it is possible to suggest any other 
remedy which would cure the international 
political malady. 



THE 
ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 



WHY DOES EUROPE DISTRUST 
GERMANY ? 



I. 



O 



NE of the most striking features of contem- 
porary politics is the tragic moral isola- 
tion of Germany. Considered individually, few 
people are more deserving of sympathy, are 
more genial, more unassuming, more delight- 
fully simple. Yet collectively the Germans have 
few friends and many enemies. At the Inter- 
national Conference of Algeciras, specially con- 
vened at the request of Germany, the German 
representatives stood confronted with the almost 
unanimous hostility of the great Powers of the 
world.* Even the United States, notwith- 
standing the pressure of twenty millions of 

* See A. Tardieu's "La Conference d'Algesiras." 
4 



50 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Americans of German descent, stood faithfully 
by France, and although Austria was thanked by 
the Kaiser for having been the " loyal second " 
of her German allies, we must not forget that 
by none are the German people more cordially 
hated than by the Slav, Magyar, and Roumanian 
nations which form the majority of the Austrian 
Empire. 

Nor is the feeling of antipathy to Germany 
restricted to the great Powers. Even in those 
countries which, like Belgium, Holland, and 
Switzerland, have benefited most from the expan- 
sion of German trade, the Teutons to-day are 
as unpopular as the French or the English are 
popular. And this unpopularity reflects itself 
in the attitude almost universally prevalent with 
regard to the German language and literature. 
Whilst German commerce is increasing by leaps 
and bounds, the moral and intellectual influence 
of German culture is steadily diminishing. It is 
infinitely less than it was fifty years ago, when 
Germany was a second-rate Power. It is less 
than that of Russia or even Belgium or Norway. 
There is not one contemporary German writer 
who exerts anything like the influence which 
Tolstoy or Ibsen or Maeterlinck wields in con- 
temporary thought. Whilst the French language 
is becoming more and more the international 
language of the educated classes on the Conti- 
nent, the German language is almost universally 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 51 

neglected, notwithstanding its obvious practical 
uses. In some countries, like Bohemia, it is 
actually " taboo." 

Even the Germans cannot refuse to see this 
growing hostility which confronts them every- 
where, and they are compelled to suggest 
various theories to account for it.* German 
critics tell us that in France the anti-German 
feeling is due to the bitter memories left by 
the war of 1870: it is the Gallic vindictiveness 
born of defeat. In England it is due to 
commercial rivalry and to a natural envy at 
the growing prosperity of the empire. In all 
countries the antipathy to Germany is mainly 
the instinctive dread of the weak before the 
strong. Let us examine briefly if those explana- 
tions are sufficient to account for the universal 
feelings of dislike and distrust which Germany 
inspires at the present day. 

In France it is only too obvious that the 
Franco-German War has left ineffaceable memo- 
ries behind it. But the very persistence of those 
memories is a phenomenon which demands ex- 
planation. For it is one of the strangest and 
one of the noblest features of human nature 
that, as a rule, war leaves no permanent bitter- 
ness behind it. It has often happened, even 

* See Harden's lamentations in the Zukunft (September 1911) : 
l( Uns lebt kein Freund auf dtr weiien Erde " — " We have no friend 
in the wide world." 



52 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

after a long and bitter war, that enemies have 
drawn nearer together, having learned to respect 
each other on the battlefield. During the Seven 
Years' War the French sustained grievous defeats, 
yet Frederick the Great was almost popular after 
Rossbach. The battle of Leipzig was a crushing 
disaster to the French arms, yet Alexander the 
First, when he entered Paris in 1814, was the 
cynosure of all eyes and the hero of the Parisian 
mob. The English people and the French have 
been for centuries hereditary enemies, yet from 
the days of Crecy to the days of Waterloo never 
has defeat rankled long in the minds of the 
people, and the conclusion of peace has generally 
been the signal in France for an outburst of 
acute Anglomania. Even the humiliation of 
Fashoda has not prevented, a few years later, the 
conclusion of the Entente Cordiale. The history 
of many a battle between France and England 
reads like the description of a tournament 
between the heroes of mediaeval chivalry, and 
the preliminary courtesies of Fontenoy — " Tirez 
les premiers , messieurs les Francais ; " "Apres vous y 
messieurs les Anglais " — are characteristic of many 
an encounter between the two nations. 

The Franco - German War stands alone in 
modern history as one which has left behind it 
ineradicable feelings of hatred and revenge. 
The chivalry of European tradition was con- 
spicuously absent in the conduct of that war. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 53 

The victor hurled against the vanquished an 
implacable "Va victisf" He chose to violate 
that great principle of nationalities which has 
become the foundation of the political morality 
of Europe. In an age of democracy he chose 
to dispose of the destinies of millions of French 
people without their consent. He chose to 
treat the Alsacians and Lorrains as if they were 
so many pawns in the grim Kriegspiel, so 
many slaves to be transferred from one owner 
to another. 

It is not relevant to our purpose to examine 
how far Bismarck was justified in his policy. We 
are only trying to explain the feelings which that 
policy has evoked in France towards Germany. 
Nor must we forget that the explanation of bitter 
memories and of a feeling of revenge for wrongs 
endured only applies to France. It certainly 
does not apply to the relations between Germany 
and England. The Germans and the English 
have never fought against each other in the past. 
Rather have they fought side by side. There is 
no historical quarrel between the two nations, 
unless a patriotic German historian were to rise 
some day and use as a grievance against England 
that Wellington has deprived Blilcher of the 
glory and the laurels of Waterloo. 

To explain the antipathy felt towards Ger- 
many shall we fall back on commercial rivalry 
as the final explanation ? Even that explanation 



54 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

will not hold. Commercial rivalry at the present 
day may produce discomfort and anxiety. Be- 
tween civilized nations it does not produce 
hatred, unless the rivalry be manifestly unfair 
and dishonest. 

Twenty years ago the English people may 
have resented German competition because they 
actually did consider it unfair, and not without 
some plausible reasons. German trade origin- 
ally ousted English trade from many markets 
because conditions were not equal, because the 
standard of living was lower in Germany, because 
wages and profits were smaller and hours longer, 
and because the goods "made in Germany" were 
often a cheap and nasty imitation of British 
goods. The British workman may have legiti- 
mately felt towards the German artisan something 
of the feeling which a Trade Unionist workman 
feels towards a "blackleg" who accepts lower 
pay and does not play the game. And the Eng- 
lish feeling seemed all the more justified because, 
whilst Germany raised a tariff wall keeping out 
English goods, England kept her doors open 
and allowed the German Protected Trade to 
grow and expand under the sunshine of British 
Free Trade. 

But the days of unreasonable British resent- 
ment and of depreciation of their rivals have 
now long passed away. If originally the British 
manufacturer may have shown an undue ten- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 55 

dency to attribute German expansion to unfair 
methods of competition, he has long ago ceased 
to underrate the splendid qualities of his com- 
mercial rivals. Indeed to-day the English nation 
seems rather to err on the other side, and to 
unduly extol the superiority of German methods. 
To-day the Englishman admits, like a sports- 
man, that where he is being beaten, he is beaten 
in a fair game. He admits that the average 
German works harder, that he is better trained, 
that he shows greater adaptability to the needs 
of his customers, that he possesses a better 
knowledge of foreign countries and foreign lan- 
guages. The praise of German qualities and 
German attainments is to-day the burden of 
every British Consular report. 

We must therefore repeat that commercial 
rivalry, if it may cause grave anxiety, does not 
produce, and has not produced, mutual dislike 
or mutual depreciation. And even if we were 
inclined to explain the estrangement between 
England and Germany by commercial rivalry, 
that explanation would not apply to other 
countries, like Belgium and Holland and Den- 
mark, where Germany is equally unpopular. 
Belgium and Holland, so far from suffering from 
German expansion, have prospered in conse- 
quence of that expansion — two-thirds of the 
trade credited to Belgium and Holland are really 
German transit trade — yet the anti-German feel- 



56 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

ing is even stronger in those small countries 
than it is in England, and a Flemish-speaking 
Belgian will only learn German under absolute 
compulsion. It may be that those small coun- 
tries are imbued with a salutary terror of Ger- 
man political supremacy. It may be that Belgium 
and Holland and Denmark are dreading to be 
politically absorbed. But here again the in- 
stinct of self-preservation alone is not sufficient 
to explain the antipathy which those nations feel 
towards their mighty neighbour. The same 
dread existed in Belgium under Napoleon the 
Third ; yet if France was feared as a govern- 
ment, it did not inspire any feelings of antipathy 
and much less any feelings of hatred. During 
the last generation England was on several 
occasions a controlling factor in world politics, 
yet, with the exception of a brief period during 
the Boer War, the English people have never 
been generally unpopular. 

The truth is that none of the causes which 
we have just examined — neither the bitter 
memories of past wars, nor commercial rivalry, 
nor the dread of political absorption — are suffi- 
cient to explain the universal distrust and dis- 
like which other nations feel towards Germany. 

Those causes indeed seem inadequate to the 
German publicists themselves. So startling and 
so widespread does this antipathy appear even 
to German observers that in order to explain it 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 57 

they have been compelled to imagine a malignant 
and universal conspiracy against the German 
people. Even as French historians used to be 
always looking out for some traitor or some 
scapegoat in order to explain a national de- 
feat — Ganelon, Bourbon, Villeneuve, Dupont, 
Bazaine, Dreyfus — even so German historians 
to-day assume that their enemies have organized 
an Anti-German Trust to hem in and to isolate 
the German people. It is a generally accepted 
assumption in Germany that King Edward the 
Seventh was the arch-plotter in this European 
conspiracy, and this is one of the many imagin- 
ary grievances of Germany against England. 

As we shall discuss the grievance in a subse- 
quent chapter, we need not pause to consider it 
here. We need only mention it as an illustration 
of the remarkable psychology which is to-day 
prevalent in the German people ; and it will be 
more to the purpose if we proceed at once to 
examine and to discuss the real and deep-seated 
reasons which account for the feelings which the 
German people inspire in other nations. 



II. 



The inherent qualities of the German race 
and an extraordinary conjuncture of favourable 
circumstances have raised the German people to 



58 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

a position of political supremacy and commercial 
prosperity which have exceeded their wildest 
dreams, and this startling accession of wealth and 
power after centuries of humiliation have devel- 
oped to an inordinate degree self-conceit and 
self-assertion. We need not judge the German 
harshly on that account. All young nations 
have passed through those political measles. 
If to-day that disease is more virulent in 
Germany, it is because German greatness is 
more recent and has been more sudden. 
Politically and economically the Germans are 
the "parvenus" and upstarts of Europe, and 
they suffer from exactly those shortcomings 
which characterize the parvenu — vanity, vulgar- 
ity, and aggressiveness. The Germans have not 
had time to acquire that grace and tactfulness 
which have generally prevented French patriotism 
from being offensive to others. Neither have 
they acquired that reticence and reserve which 
have generally characterized the English. It 
almost seems as if the German people them- 
selves were amazed and dazed by the startling 
contrast between their former and their present 
fortunes, and a benevolent critic might almost 
assert that their present elation is a sign of an 
unconscious and instinctive humility. 

Whatever may be the cause of the state of 
mind of the Germans, they are certainly suffer- 
ing just now from acute "megalomania." The 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 59 

abnormal self-conceit, the inflated national con- 
sciousness, express themselves in a thousand 
ways, some of which are naive and harmless, 
whilst others are grossly offensive. They show 
themselves in a craving for titles and in gaudy 
and tasteless public buildings ; * in the thousand 
and one statues of Bismarck and William the 
First ; they reveal themselves in the articles 
of journalists and in the writings of historians ; 
but above all, the German megalomania finds 
expression in the seven thousand speeches and in 
the three hundred uniforms of the Kaiser. In 
examining the influence of William the Second 
we shall come to the conclusion that it is his 
defects far more than his virtues that have made 
him the representative hero of the German 
people. His winged words voice the aspirations 
of his subjects. Like the Kaiser, every German 
believes that he is " the salt of the earth " — " Wir 
sind das Salz der Erde" Like Nietzsche, the 
modern German believes that the world must be 
ruled by a super-man, and that he is the super- 
man. Like Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the 
German is convinced that he belongs to a 
super-race, and that the Teuton has been the 
master-builder of European civilization. 

National self-appreciation does not necessarily 
imply depreciation of the foreigner. Even the 
most extravagant patriotism of the French people 

* Sec an amusing article, " Omamente," in the Zukunft. 



60 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

has rarely prevented them from doing justice to 
the qualities of their neighbours. All through 
the nineteenth century every representative 
French writer — Michelet, Taine, Renan, Quinet 
— has glorified the virtues of the German race 
and the achievements of its thinkers and artists. 
In the heyday of Napoleonic tyranny Madame 
de Stael published her classical treatise, " De 
rAllemagne," the most generous tribute ever 
paid to German genius. During the horrors 
of the Franco - German War Victor Hugo in 
" 1' Annee Terrible " continued to extol German 
thought and German art ; whereas, on the other 
side of the Rhine, historians like Mommsen and 
Treitschke were reviling the Gaul and tramp- 
ling on the vanquished. 

Nor have the English people lagged behind 
the French in their recognition of German 
culture. Ever since Coleridge, with all their 
insularity, they have done justice to Germany, 
all the more sincerely, perhaps, the less they 
knew about her. For several generations the 
English people have tried to assimilate Ger- 
man philosophy: they have translated German 
theologians and higher critics ; they have wel- 
comed to their universities German professors, 
like Max M tiller. It is not too much to say 
that from the beginning of the nineteenth 
century there has been a continuous German 
tradition in English literature. With Carlyle 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 61 

and De Quincey, with Froude and Freeman, 
with Kingsley and Seeley, that tradition, whilst 
underrating the masterpieces of the French 
genius, has systematically overrated the pro- 
ductions of German thought and German art. 

It would have been well if German writers 
had shown the same generous appreciation of the 
French and the English mind. But ever since 
1 870 the Germans, whilst allowing for individual 
freaks of genius, seem to be blind to the merits 
of other nations, and have claimed for themselves 
a monopoly of culture. In their judgment the 
Russian race are rotten before they have grown 
to maturity, as they showed during the Russo- 
Japanese War. Even so the English are an 
effete and decadent people, as their recent mili- 
tary history proves. A recent article of Dr. 
Carl Peters on the decline of the English race 
which appeared in T)ie tVoche is representa- 
tive of countless similar utterances. As for the 
French they are doomed to premature extinction. 
It is true that, like the Greeks of antiquity at the 
time of their decline, the French still continue to 
produce a few great men in literature, science, and 
art : an Anatole France, a Pasteur, and a Rodin. 
It is also true that even in applied science they 
are still leading the way in such industries as 
the motor car and the aeroplane. But what is 
the little aeroplane of the Frenchman compared 
with the giant airship of Germany ? Is it not a 



62 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

fact that a thousand French aeroplanes do not 
cost or count as much as one Zeppelin ? 

The self-assertion of the Germans and the 
contempt for the foreigner reveal themselves 
in their political dealings with other nations. 
German statesmen continue the methods of 
Bismarck without having his genius. German 
politicians delight in shaking the mailed fist, in 
waving the national banner with the Imperial 
black eagle, the ominous and symbolical bird of 
prey. Wherever they meet with opposition they 
at once resort to comminatory messages. Com- 
pare the methods of the Emperor William with 
those of Edward the Seventh. Nothing illustrates 
better the differences between the characteristics 
of English and German diplomacy than the 
dramatic contrast between the bragging, indis- 
creet, impulsive, explosive manner of the Kaiser 
and the quiet, courteous manner of the English 
monarch. Nothing explains better the striking 
success which has attended English policy and 
the no less striking failure which has attended 
German policy. For in international as well 
as in private relations, intellectual superiority 
is often as efficient a weapon as an appeal 
to brute force. And all the might of the 
German Empire has not saved the German 
foreign policy from persistent bankruptcy. That 
bankruptcy is unanimously admitted even in 
Germany, and partly accounts for the present 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 63 

temper of the nation. The times have changed, 
and even the weak cannot now be bullied into 
submission. At the Algeciras Conference even 
those small nations whose most obvious interest 
it was to side with Germany gave their moral 
support to France. 

There still remains for us to examine one 
deeper reason why Germany is distrusted and 
disliked in Europe. She is mainly distrusted 
because she continues to be the reactionary force 
in international politics. Outside the sphere 
of German influence the democratic ideal has 
triumphed all over the civilized world, after 
centuries of heroic struggle and tragic catas- 
trophes. But in Germany the old dogma is 
still supreme. Wherever German power has 
made itself felt for the last forty years — in Italy 
and Austria, in Russia and Turkey — it has 
countenanced reaction and tyranny. In politics 
Germany is to-day what Austria and Russia 
were in the days of the Holy Alliance, the 
power of darkness. Whilst in the provinces 
of science and art the German people are 
generally progressive, in politics the German 
Government is consistently retrogressive. It 
cannot be sufficiently emphasized and repeated 
that, more than any other State — more even than 
Russia — Prussia stands in the way of political 
advance. It was Prussia that helped to crush 
the Polish struggle for freedom in 1863 ; 



64 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

when, a few years ago, English public opinion 
was protesting against the Armenian massacres, 
the Kaiser stood loyally by Abdul Hamid and 
propped his tottering throne ; when the Rus- 
sian Liberals were engaged in a life-and-death 
struggle with Czardom, the Kaiser gave his 
moral support to Russian despotism. It is 
not too much to say that it is the evil influ- 
ence of Prusso-Germany alone which keeps 
despotism alive in the modern world. 

I do not believe that all nations have the 
Government they deserve, and that they neces- 
sarily deserve the Government they have, any 
more than I believe that every husband has the 
wife he deserves or deserves the wife he has. 
Fortunate or unfortunate accidents may deter- 
mine political as they may determine matrimonial 
unions. In the course of time unexpected 
shortcomings may reveal themselves — incom- 
patibilities of temperament between Govern- 
ment and people as between husband and wife. 
At the same time it must be admitted that the 
German people have often too patiently and 
passively submitted to the tyranny of their 
rulers — that again and again they have sanctioned 
a Government policy which would have caused 
a revolutionary outburst in any free country ; 
and it is deeply to be regretted that they should 
not have sometimes turned against their own 
oppressors some of those angry passions which 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 65 

they have so freely exhibited against neighbour- 
ing nations. We must not forget that Bismarck 
was only able to realize his gigantic schemes 
in flagrant violation of the German constitu- 
tion. When Parliament refused to obey his 
behests he dismissed it. For several years 
before the Danish and Austrian wars he in- 
creased taxation and raised revenue without 
troubling about the consent of the Prussian 
Diet— without even observing the outward 
forms and fictions of the law. And it is 
strictly true that the Hohenzollern may 
legitimately claim that the triumphs of the 
German arms have not been triumphs of 
the German people, but of the Hohenzollern 
dynasty. 

We shall be able in a subsequent chapter 
to prove abundantly that, politically, the German 
people continue to remain in a state of pupilage 
and tutelage. The Prussian bureaucracy con- 
tinues to apply against its own subjects those 
despotic methods which have ensured its pre- 
dominance in the past. Prussia continues to 
oppress the Danes and the Poles. Mr. Norman 
Angell tells us that if Germany were to annex 
part of Belgium or of France, no individual 
German would be any the richer by one single 
acre of land, for the land would still remain 
the private property of each individual French- 
man or Belgian. That assertion, unfortunately, 

5 



66 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

would not hold for Prussia, for the Prussian 
bureaucrat does not recognize any inalienable 
rights of individuals wherever the interests ot 
the State are supposed to be at stake. The 
Prussian Government are depriving the Polish 
landowner and the Polish peasant of the land 
of their fathers simply because the Polish land- 
owner and the Polish peasant intend to remain 
Poles and refuse to become " Prussianized." It 
is true that the policy of the " Colonization 
Commission n has been a ghastly failure. Yet 
that Commission still survives, as a glaring in- 
stance of the extremities to which the Prussian 
Government will resort in case of necessity, 
and as a proof of their ignorance of the most 
elementary facts of political science. 

We are therefore reluctantly driven to the 
conclusion that the psychological, moral, and 
political causes which we have briefly analyzed 
are amply sufficient to account for the distrust 
and suspicion which Germany inspires every- 
where in Liberal Europe. And the distrust is 
not the result of ignorance or national prejudice : 
it is a reasoned conviction and the result of a 
prolonged experience. No doubt in most cases 
it is necessary to distinguish between the Gov- 
ernment and the people. No doubt also there 
are many indications that the power of Prussian 
militarism and Prussian feudalism is seriously 
imperilled, that the German Empire is in rapid 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 67 

transition, and that the law of acceleration which 
characterizes economic changes will also ulti- 
mately prevail in German politics. In the 
meantime Prussia continues to be the storm 
centre of Europe — the Prussian menace is more 
threatening than ever. And until that menace 
is removed, and as long as the Prussian spirit 
shall prevail in the councils of the German 
Empire, it behoves us to be vigilant, and not 
to forget that European liberty and European 
democracy are still at the mercy of military 
force and political tyranny. 



SOME PARADOXES AND CONTRA- 
DICTIONS OF MODERN GERMANY. 

It is one of the axioms of practical diplomacy 
that when two nations wish to settle their differ- 
ences and wish to bring complicated negotia- 
tions to a successful termination, their diplo- 
matic representatives shall not only consider all 
the facts immediately bearing on the questions 
to be settled, but shall also take into account 
the " personal equation/' the temper and char- 
acter of the litigants. Let us remember this 
preliminary condition of our problem, and do 
our utmost to get a precise knowledge of the 
present characteristics of the German people. 

When we are asked to formulate a deliberate 
opinion on the character of a friend whom we 
have known for a lifetime, we hesitate and 
pause and ponder, considering the complexity of 
human nature and the infirmity of our judg- 
ment. On the contrary, when we are asked to 
pass judgment, not on one individual, but on 
millions of whom we have no direct knowledge, 
and about whom we have very little indirect 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 69 

information, we do not seem to feel the 
slightest hesitation in expressing a strong and 
unqualified opinion ; and generally the less we 
do know, the stronger that opinion is likely to 
be. Forsooth, in the opinion of certain arm- 
chair politicians, are not all French people 
frivolous ! are not all English people utilitarians 
or individualists ! are not all Russians corrupt 
or superstitious ! 

As a matter of fact, to any thoughtful student 
of international politics there is no more delicate 
and difficult task than to express a competent 
opinion on any great collection of human be- 
ings. All generalizations on national character 
must be subject to considerable limitations. 
This is especially true with regard to the Ger- 
man people. In the case of Germany, any 
sweeping generalizations are manifestly futile 
and unreal. We have continually to qualify and 
modify our judgments ; we have continually 
to distinguish between the North and the 
South, between Catholics and Protestants, 
between the Government and the people ; 
we must constantly keep in mind, in judg- 
ing the German people as a whole, that 
although they have been welded into an empire, 
they have not really achieved national unity : 
which is hardly astonishing when we consider 
that the German Empire is composed of many 
elements heterogeneous in race and religion — 



70 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Danes and Poles, Alsacians and Hanoverians 
— and that it is only forty years since those 
heterogeneous elements have been politically 
combined. 

The history of civilization abundantly proves 
that spiritual unity is infinitely more difficult 
to realize than political unity. Spiritual unity 
necessarily brings about political unity ; political 
unity may never be followed by spiritual unity. 
Certainly the German people have not drawn 
any nearer to its realization after forty years 
of empire. Indeed, they continue to present to 
us at the beginning of the twentieth century 
a bewildering mixture of spiritual paradoxes 
and political contradictions. It is the purpose 
of this chapter briefly to analyze and to explain 
some of those paradoxes and contradictions. 



I. 



The German people of the past, as they were 
described, for instance, a hundred years ago 
by Madame de Stael in her classical book, 
" De rAllemagne," were incurable idealists 
and dreamers, artists and musicians. Politically 
they were broken up into five hundred prin- 
cipalities, and were apparently incapable of 
co-operation and combination. The educated 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 71 

German at that time seemed to possess only 
ideal and moral values. Like the French 
humanitarians and rationalists of the eighteenth 
century, whose loyal disciples they were, the 
great German writers and poets of the Golden 
Age of German literature — Lessing and 
Herder, Goethe and Schiller — had little feeling 
for the realities of national life. The German 
was not a zoon politikon, a political animal. 
He looked at political and social problems 
from the universal, not from the national point 
of view. The poet Heine, summing up in 
a famous epigram that idealistic tendency of 
the German mind, as contrasted with the 
tendencies of the French and the English, tells 
us that to the English belonged the empire of 
the sea, to the French belonged the empire of 
the continent, and to the Germans belonged 
the empire of the air. 

To-day the German has ceased to be con- 
tent with the empire of the air. He is not 
even satisfied with having achieved the empire 
of the continent ; he now aims at the con- 
quest of the sea. 

As for the conquest of the air, he still claims 
it. But the air to the modern German is no 
longer the metaphorical and symbolical element 
which Heine meant in his epigram ; the 
" empire of the air " is no longer the empire 
of pure thought and poetry — it is the military 



72 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

control and possession of the third element 
through airships and balloons. The German 
of to-day still wants to attain to the upper 
regions of the atmosphere, but no more on the 
wings of imagination, but transported in well- 
equipped battalions in the leviathan ships of 
Count Zeppelin. The German of to-day still 
wants to rise and to soar, but no longer in 
order to sow broadcast the seeds of ideas from 
the high altitudes of speculation, but rather to 
throw down bombs and explosives. That we 
should be left in no doubt as to the absolute 
" transvaluation of moral values " which has 
taken place in modern Germany, Emperor 
William in one of his illuminative and impul- 
sive speeches has told us who is the greatest 
German of the nineteenth century. Let the 
ignorant foreigner make no further mistake. 
The supreme incarnation of German genius 
and character is no longer Goethe or Beethoven, 
Kant or Wagner. The true German super-man 
is Count Zeppelin, the new viking of the air, 
the creator of the military aerial fleet. 

To-day the German glorifies in being a realist, 
a Realpolitiker. He only thinks of political 
power and colonial expansion, and he conceives 
power in its most material form — the power of 
the sword and the power of money, which must 
ultimately attend the power of the sword. Even 
when he discusses abstract questions of morality 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 73 

might is the supreme test of right. Only a few 
months ago Professor Hans Delbrttck, discuss- 
ing in a liberal spirit the petty persecutions of 
the Danish population in Schleswig-Holstein 
by the Prussian Government, blamed the 
bureaucracy, not because they were violating 
the rights of the Danish people, but because, 
by following their methods, they were acting 
against the interests of the State and undermin- 
ing its power. Professor Delbrttck condemned 
the Prussianizing policy, not because it meant 
to the Danes a violation of right, but because 
it brought to the Prussian State a diminution 
of might. 



II. 



We come to a second and no less striking 
contradiction which is at the root of most 
political difficulties in the German Empire. 
Germany once was the leading Protestant 
country, the country of Luther, the nursery of 
that Higher Criticism and of that rationalist 
theology which has ruled in British Universities 
and British Churches for the last generation. And 
that was especially true of Northern Germany 
and Prussia. For that very reason the Catholic 
South gave its allegiance to Austria. It was 
the historical mission of Austria to unite all the 



74 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

German-speaking people into a Greater Ger- 
many, to bring them back into the fold of the 
Catholic Church, and to reconstitute the Holy 
Roman Empire. Until the very eve of Sadowa, 
the leaders of the Catholic party sided with the 
Habsburg, and considered the possible victory 
of Prussia as a German disaster.* After the 
crushing defeat of Austria, the Catholic Church, 
under the guidance of Bishop Ketteler, gave up 
a forlorn hope, and decided that it would be 
wiser to come to terms with the victor. But the 
political conversion of the Catholics had come 
too late. The feeling of the Protestant North 
had been roused, and the aggressive attitude 
of the Ultramontanes precipitated the conflict. 
The cry of the National Liberals, "Los von 
Rom" became the watchword of the Prussian 
statesmen. After the Franco-German War 
Bismarck engaged in a life-and-death struggle of 
" culture " against ignorance and superstition. 
The conflict was fought with all the bitterness 
which always attends a religious war. The 
Catholic Church felt the mailed fist of the 
Iron Chancellor. Schools were closed, religious 
orders were expelled, bishops and cardinals 
were sent to prison. But the power of Rome 
proved too strong even for Bismarck, as it had 
proved too strong for the Hohenstaufen, for 

* This has been convincingly proved by Goyau, " L'Allemagne 
religieuse." 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 75 

Louis the Fourteenth, and for Napoleon. David 
triumphed over Goliath. Little Windthorst 
compelled the Giant to beat an ignominious 
retreat and to go to Canossa. 

Since the end of the Kulturkampf, and 
the extinction of the National Liberals as the 
controlling party in the Reichstag, the political 
and religious situation in Germany has dra- 
matically changed. German Protestantism, no 
doubt, continues to provide great scholars and 
to dominate in the universities. His Excellency 
Professor von Harnack is only one amongst an 
innumerable band of Higher Critics and Church 
historians and theologians. Professor Drews, 
who in his "Myth of Christ" attempts to deny 
the historical existence of Jesus, is the lineal 
successor of David Friedrich Strauss. In point 
of numbers the Protestant population is still 
stronger by one-third than the Catholic popula- 
tion. In point of wealth the Protestants are 
incomparably richer than the Catholics. But 
as a Church, Protestantism is a dwindling force ; 
as a political power she has ceased to dominate. 
It is the Catholic party, the Zentrum, which is 
the ruling party in the Reichstag. If the 
German Government cannot do and will not 
do all that the Centre demands, they cannot 
achieve anything which the Centre refuses to 
sanction ; and before even considering any legis- 
lative measure, whatsoever it may be, it is a 



76 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

preliminary condition that the approbetur of 
the Ultramontane leaders be secured. One of 
the greatest personal forces of modern Germany, 
Friedrich Naumann, in his book on German 
political parties, sums up the whole situation 
in a phrase which is hardly an exaggeration : 
"Germany has become, politically, a more 
prosperous Spain." 

In vain did Prince von Billow attempt to 
break up, in 1907, the power of the Ultramon- 
tanes. Where Bismarck had failed it was not 
likely that his epigon y with all his diplomatic 
ingenuity, was going to succeed. Billow at- 
tempted to form an unnatural coalition of the 
Reactionary-Radical bloc. The bloc was burst 
after a twelvemonth, and the Chancellor, after 
a nine years' rule, had to withdraw from the 
political stage, and he has now ample leisure 
in his Roman villa to meditate on the vanity 
of human greatness, on the ingratitude of 
princes, on the complex paradox of German 
politics, and on the omnipotence of the feeble 
old priest in the Vatican. 

The Catholic Centre continues to-day to 
present a solid front against both Socialists and 
Liberals. The Catholic Church continues to 
have its own charities, its own denominational 
schools which receive the Government grants 
under its own inspectors, to extend its Govern- 
ment patronage, and to fill the public services 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 77 

with its nominees. The Roman Catholic Church 
is more and more a State within a State, 
" imperium in imperio." 

The Lutheran King of Prussia is gradually 
transforming himself into a Holy Roman 
Emperor ; Holy because he is ruler by right 
divine, Roman because he receives his orders 
from the Eternal City. 



III. 



There is a third contradiction which strikes 
the foreigner in the Germany of to-day, and 
this is the contradiction between German 
action and German thought. It seems as if 
the German were seeking in the sphere of the 
intellect a freedom which is denied him in the 
sphere of politics, and as if he felt the need of 
avenging himself against the abuses of authority 
in practical life by glorifying anarchy in philos- 
ophy and art. Certainly in the province of 
thought the German leaves all the landmarks 
of the past behind him. He has no respect 
for tradition or authority. He gives free play 
to his fancy. He follows the newest fashions, 
" die neue Philosophic, die neurere Philosophic, 
die neueste Philosophic." Each thinker outbids 
his competitor in the boldness of his innovations. 
In England the most popular philosophers or 



78 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

theologians are those thinkers who advocate a 
reconciliation between religion and science, 
between the claims of the present and the 
claims of the past, the writings of Sir Oliver 
Lodge, or Benjamin Kidd, or William James, 
or Bergson. On the contrary, in Germany 
the most popular works are those of material- 
ists like Haeckel or Bolsche, and, above all, 
the writings of heralds of revolt like Nietzsche. 
And Nietzsche is universally popular, not be- 
cause of his intellectual integrity, not because 
of his fine moral personality, but because he 
is an iconoclast, an anti-Christian ; he is the 
man who philosophizes with a hammer, the man 
who proclaims the twilight of the gods, the 
man who has transvalued all the moral values 
of humanity. 

But once the German leaves the realm of 
pure thought he becomes again the bourgeois 
and the Philistine. He becomes the incarna- 
tion of those very defects which his favourite 
philosophers have been denouncing ; he who 
a moment ago was defying the gods, now 
submits to the insolence of a subaltern officer ; 
he who a moment ago claimed his absolute 
liberty of thought, and railed against the 
tyranny of superstition, now submits to the 
most petty regulations of the man in a uniform 
with a pointed helmet ; he who a moment ago 
demanded that the last barriers of the moral law 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 79 

shall be taken down, and that each man shall 
be a law to himself in practical life, is confronted 
at every step with the fateful words : " Es ist 
verboten " ! 

In the province of action the German is 
narrowly national. Every morning at breakfast 
he expects that his favourite newspaper shall pro- 
vide him with a good slashing attack upon the 
Englishman, the Frenchman, and the Russian. 
Yet in literature and art his tastes are mainly 
French and English and Russian. His favourite 
authors are Anatole France and Maeterlinck, 
Gorki, Tolstoy, Oscar Wilde and Bernard Shaw, 
Ibsen and d'Annunzio. 

It is difficult for an Englishman to realize the 
cosmopolitanism and the catholicity of German 
taste. In England Gorki and Ibsen are little 
more than names, and we are sure that some of 
their later plays would be hissed off the stage. 
We remember listening with impatience in one 
of the most important theatres of Berlin to an 
infinitely dull play of Gorki — The Children of 
the Sun — and we round to our amazement that 
the play was listened to with rapt attention 
by a full house. In England Monna Vanna 
is still forbidden by the censor. In Germany 
it has been acted thousands of times in every 
little theatre of the empire. It is not necessary 
to speak of the popularity of Shakespeare, for 
Shakespeare has become as much a German classic 



80 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

as an English classic. As for Mr. Bernard Shaw, 
it can be said without exaggeration that he is 
a greater favourite in Germany than in England. 
We have seen John 'Bull and his other Island, 
and even Man and Super-man, played to empty 
houses in one of the two theatres of Edinburgh. 
In Dresden or Leipzig it would probably have 
been difficult to secure a seat. 



IV. 



All those contradictions ultimately resolve 
themselves into a contradiction between the past 
and the present. Nowhere are those contradic- 
tions so glaring. Nowhere has the past left 
more abiding traces. It seems as if the German 
people had only yesterday emerged from the 
Middle Ages ; and, whilst remaining under their 
influence, had suddenly plunged into and become 
intoxicated with a new world. In the German 
Empire the times of the Hohenstaufen and the 
times of the Hohenzollern still co-exist side by 
side. If you visit Cologne or any of the old 
cities on the Rhine or in Southern Germany, 
the ancient town halls, the proud " burgs " and 
strongholds dominating the valley, the quaint 
and narrow streets with their protruding gables, 
the venerable Gothic cathedrals, all take our 
imaginations back to the Middle Ages. But take 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 81 

the electric car to the new industrial suburbs, 
with their overhead railways, with their towering 
chimneys, the steeples of the new German faith, 
with their huge brand new factories, and you 
might believe yourself to be in Chicago or St. 
Louis, except for the greater cleanliness of the 
towns and the presence of the ubiquitous 
Schutzmann. 

This comparison between the new industrial 
Germany and the cities of the United States is 
by no means far fetched or exaggerated. Acute 
observers like M. Jules Huret have again and 
again pointed out the resemblance between the 
industrial cities of Westphalia and the cities of 
the American West. The growth of Crefeld, 
Barmen, Elberfeld, has been almost as rapid as 
the growth of the mushroom towns in the New 
World. 



V. 



And last, but not least, we would like 
to draw attention to another contradiction and 
paradox which has a very important relation 
to the problems discussed in this book. We are 
referring to the overbearing pride and tenacity 
with which the German asserts his nationality at 
home and the excessive humility and unconcern 
with which the German merges his nationality 
abroad. 

6 



82 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

It is almost pathetic to hear German 
professors and historians constantly emphasiz- 
ing the pure and indelible character of the 
German race and nationality, to emphasize the 
reines Deutschtum and the Deutsche Gesinnung. 
As a matter of fact, so little has any specific 
and ineffaceable German character stamped itself 
on the individual citizen that the facility with 
which the German, once he has left his country, 
is assimilated, almost bespeaks a total absence 
of any political personality. 

In other words, the German emphasizes his 
political personality when he is in a majority. 
He sinks it when he is in a minority. He 
attempts, and almost invariably without success, 
to impose his nationality by force and by war, 
and yet under normal conditions and in times 
of peace he cannot resist absorption. In other 
words, the German is the most incapable of 
assimilating others, the least imperial race, and, 
at the same time, the most easily assimilated by 
other races. 

The French - Canadian, although loyal to 
the British flag, remains for ever a French- 
Canadian. A Dutchman remains a Dutchman, 
and doggedly resists absorption in South Africa. 
An Englishman remains hopelessly English, 
and wherever he goes he carries with him his 
golf clubs and his evening suit, his habits and 
his prejudices, his political creed and his Bible. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 83 

On the other hand, twenty millions of Germans 
and descendants of German settlers in the United 
States have been absorbed in less than two gen- 
erations ; they are now merged in the American 
Commonwealth, and lost to the Vaterland. 

And let it be noted that the phenomenon is 
by no means restricted to distant continents. It 
is even more conspicuous on the continent of 
Europe. Wherever a minority of Germans is 
settled on the same territory with a minority of 
Poles, Russians, or Hungarians, the Germans 
tend to be absorbed. Thus the proportion 
of the German-speaking to the non-German 
population steadily diminishes, although, after 
the Russians, the Germans are the most prolific 
race in Europe. 

We have not discussed the foregoing contra- 
dictions and paradoxes of modern Germany in 
any spirit of carping criticism, nor for the idle 
satisfaction of pointing out the irony and the 
tragi-comedy of her politics. On the contrary, 
we fully sympathize with the difficulties of the 
German people. But whilst sympathizing with 
those difficulties, it is absolutely necessary from 
the outset of our inquiry to realize them clearly 
and to explain them if we wish to understand 
the present complex and perplexing situation of 
which the political paradoxes and contradictions 
of modern Germany are both the cause and the 
result. 



84 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

And realizing those paradoxes and contra- 
dictions, if ever we are inclined on account of 
them to depreciate the German character, we 
shall remember that the German people are the 
victims of historical fatalities and geographical 
conditions over which they have had little con- 
trol. " Tout comprendre^ cest tout pardonner ! " 
Considering the enormous advance made by 
the German people, one would think that to-day 
they have outlived those fatalities and that they 
are strong enough to conquer their liberties. 
But alas ! an unbiassed study of the situation 
will soon drive us to the conclusion that 
historical and geographical fatalities are still 
sufficiently operative to provide the reactionary 
with arguments for perpetuating the present 
despotism and militarism. 



PRUSSIA AND GERMANY, 

I n the foregoing chapter we drew attention to some 
of the paradoxes and contradictions of modern 
Germany. There still remains to emphasize 
and to explain what is perhaps the most striking 
paradox, the most glaring contradiction of them 
all. The contradiction is the essential unity and 
identity of Prussia and Germany for political 
and military purposes, and, on the other hand, 
their absolute diversity for every other purpose 
and in every other capacity. And the paradox 
is the absorption of the whole by the part, 
the total surrender of the Germans who are the 
majority, to the Prussians who are the minority, 
and a minority to whom the Germans are vastly 
superior in intellectual and artistic gifts and 
attainments, and for whom they feel little 
sympathy. 

It is difficult to exaggerate the political 
domination of Germany by Prussia. The 
practice belies the theory : it is not as German 
Emperor, but as Prussian King that William 
the Second rules the confederation. The larger 



86 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

is merged in the smaller. The poor barren 
plains of Brandenburg and Pomerania rule over 
the smiling vineyards and romantic mountains 
of the south and west. The German people 
are governed more completely from Berlin and 
Potsdam than the French were ever governed 
from Paris and Versailles. And they are 
governed with an iron hand. In theory, every 
part of the empire may have a proportional 
share in the administration of the country; in 
reality, Prussia has the ultimate political and 
financial control. Germany pays the taxes ; 
Prussia spends them. Germany provides the 
soldiers ; Prussia commands them. And the 
Prussian War Lord and his Junkers in the last 
resort decide the issues of peace and war. 

To realize how complete is the Prussian con- 
trol we need only consider the fact that in the 
supreme Federal Parliament — the " Bundesrat " 
— for forty-two years the Prussian representatives 
have always had it their own way. Yet Prussia, 
according to the Constitution, has only got 
seventeen delegates out of fifty-two. When 
the Imperial Constitution was framed it was 
thought that the Prussian representation was 
far too small, and the fear was repeatedly 
expressed that the Prussian vote in the Bun- 
desrat would be overruled. But not once has 
it happened that the German majority in the 
Bundesrat has dared to oppose any important 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 87 

measure initiated by the Prussian Government. 
For all practical purposes, therefore, Prussia 
is the suzerain power. The German prin- 
cipalities and kingdoms are reduced to political 
tutelage and subjection. 

Such a complete control of one nation 
which is in a minority over other nations 
which form the large majority is surely a 
paradox in our democratic age and under a 
regime which claims to be one of universal 
suffrage. It becomes doubly paradoxical if we 
consider that the subject nations are entirely 
different from and vastly superior to the con- 
trolling power. And it is trebly paradoxical if 
we consider that the control is accepted, if not 
without grumbling, at least without strong pro- 
test, and certainly without actual rebellion. 

We need not dwell here on the geographical, 
ethnographical, and religious differences be- 
tween Prussians and Germans, between North 
and South. It has to be remembered, of course, 
that technically the kingdom of Prussia to-day 
includes many provinces, like the Rhine Prov- 
ince, which have nothing Prussian in character, 
and that we are using the word Prussian in its 
historical meaning. Historic Prussia is a barren 
and monotonous desert. On the other hand, 
Germany has the rich diversity of smiling 
vineyards and romantic scenery, is traversed 
by magnificent rivers, is the seat of pros- 



88 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

perous industries. Germany can boast of a 
comparatively pure Teutonic stock ; Prussia is 
a mongrel mixture of many races, and in its 
composition is certainly more Slavonic than 
Teutonic. The "colonization " of Prussia went 
on till the end of the eighteenth century, and 
its completion was one of the many achieve- 
ments of Frederick the Great. Western and 
Southern Germany is largely Catholic ; Prussia 
is almost entirely Lutheran. 

But it is not merely the external and physical 
or racial, or even religious, differences between 
North and South, between East and West, which 
must arrest our attention. It is more relevant 
to the purpose of our argument to emphasize 
the effect of those differences on the national 
character, and to point out the absolute oppo- 
sition between the Prussian temperament and 
the German temperament, the striking incom- 
patibility of disposition between Berlin and 
Munich, between Konigsberg and Cologne. 

The Southern and Western German is still 
to-day as he was in the days of Madame de 
Stael, artistic and poetic, brilliant and imagina- 
tive : a lover of song and music. The Prussian 
remains as he has always been, inartistic and 
dull and unromantic. Prussia has not pro- 
duced one of the great composers who are the 
pride of the German race ; and Berlin, with all 
its wealth and its two million inhabitants, strikes 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 89 

the foreigner as one of the most commonplace 
capitals of the civilized world. The Southern 
and Western German is gay and genial, cour- 
teous and expansive ; the Prussian is sullen, 
reserved, and aggressive. The Southern and 
Western German is sentimental and generous ; 
the Prussian is sour and dour, and only 
believes in hard fact. The Southern and 
Western German is an idealist ; the Prussian is 
a realist and a materialist, a stern rationalist, 
who always keeps his eye on the main chance. 
The Southern and Western German is independ- 
ent almost to the verge of anarchism ; he 
has a strong individuality ; his patriotism is 
municipal and parochial ; he is attached to 
his little city, to its peculiarities and local 
customs : the Prussian is imitative, docile, and 
disciplined ; his patriotism is not the senti- 
mental love of the native city, but the abstract 
loyalty to the State. The Southern and Western 
German is proud of his romantic history, of 
his ancient culture ; the Prussian has no 
culture to be proud of — politically he is an 
upstart. Prussia is a settlement, an army, and 
a bureaucracy rather than a nation ; but the 
Prussian is unswervingly loyal to the com- 
mander of that army, submissive to the chief 
of that bureaucracy. 

How shall we explain this startling paradox ? 
How is it, and why is it, that the artistic and 



9 o THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

exuberant, genial and sentimental German sub- 
mits to the hard rule of the commonplace, 
uninteresting, and dour Prussian ? 

If you ask ninety-nine out of a hundred Ger- 
mans they will not give you a reply. They know 
too little of and care too little about politics 
to be even aware of the fact. They are satisfied 
with appearances. They do not see the King 
of Prussia behind the German Kaiser. They 
are hypnotized by the glittering helmet of the 
War Lord. 

But if you succeed in discovering one in a 
hundred who understands the relation between 
Germany and Prussia, and who has thought out 
the political problem, he will probably give you 
something like the following reply : — 

" I know that there is no love lost between 
the Germans and the Prussians. 1 know that 
in culture and native ability we are as superior 
to the Prussians as our vine-clad hills are 
superior in beauty to the sandy wastes of 
Pomerania. And I know that in politics we 
play a subordinate part, although we are supe- 
rior. But I also realize that it is necessary for 
us to submit. And it is necessary for us to 
submit, precisely because of our virtues. For 
those virtues of ours are unpractical. And it is 
necessary for the Prussians to rule, precisely 
because of their shortcomings. For those short- 
comings are practical. The pure gold of the 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 91 

German temper could never be made into hard 
coin nor used to advantage. It could be made 
to produce splendid works of art, gems and 
diadems and ornaments, but for practical pur- 
poses, in order to forge the weapons of the 
Nibelungen, the alloy of the baser metal was 
indispensable. It required the mixture of Prus- 
sian sand and Prussian iron to weld us into a 
nation, to raise us to an empire. It is because 
we Germans are artists and dreamers and indi- 
vidualists that we could never manage our own 
affairs, that we have always been c non-political 
animals.' * On the contrary, it is because the 
Prussian has no brilliance, no romance, no 
personality, that he makes a splendid soldier 
and a model bureaucrat. Two things above all 
were required to make Germany into a powerful 
state — a strong army and a well ordered admin- 
istration. Prussia has given us both. 

" And let us not forget that Germany more 
than any other Power required such a strong 
army and such a strong administration, not only 
owing to the shortcomings of her national char- 
acter, but owing to the weakness and danger of 
her geographical position. Germany is open 
on every frontier. She has ever been harassed 
by dangerous enemies. Only a generation ago 

* This is again and again admitted even by the most patriotic 
German writers. (See General von Bernhardi's last book, "The 
Coming War : n " Wir sind ein unpolitisches Volk " — " We are a 
non-political people.") 



92 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

she was threatened on every side. On the north 
she had to face the rulers of the sea, who hampered 
her commercial expansion ; on the west she had 
to face the restless Gaul; on the south she was 
confronted with the clerical and Jesuitical empire 
of the Habsburg ; on the east with the empire 
of the Romanoff's. From all those enemies 
Prussia has ultimately saved us. The Hohen- 
zollern dynasty has proved a match for them all. 
" The whole annals of Germany and Prussia 
are a striking proof of the political weakness 
of the German and of the strength of the 
Prussian character. Again and again Germany 
has witnessed magnificent outbursts of national 
prosperity. She has seen the might of the 
Hohenstaufen ; she has seen the wealth of the 
Hansa towns. Again and again she has wit- 
nessed the spontaneous generation and blossom- 
ing of civic prosperity ; she has seen the glory 
and pride of Nuremberg and Heidelberg, of 
Cologne and Frankfurt, the art of DUrer and 
Holbein. But again and again German culture 
has been nipped in the bud. It has been de- 
stroyed by civil war and religious war, by 
internal anarchy and foreign invasion. The 
Thirty Years' War devastated every province 
of the German Empire, and such was the misery 
and anarchy that in many parts the people had 
reverted to savagery and cannibalism.* And 

* See Arvede Barine's " Madame : Mere du Regent." 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 93 

hardly had the country recovered from the 
horrors of the wars of religion, when repeated 
French invasions laid waste the rich provinces 
of the Rhine and Palatinate. So completely 
did German rulers of the eighteenth century 
betray their duty to the people that some 
princes degraded themselves to the point of 
selling their soldiers to the Hanoverian kings in 
order to fight the battles of England in America. 

"Whilst the German princes were thus 
squandering the treasure and life-blood of their 
subjects, there was growing up in the North 
a little State which was destined from the most 
unpromising beginnings for the most glorious 
future. It is true that the little Prussian 
State was wretchedly poor ; for that very 
reason the Prussian rulers had to practise 
strict economy and unrelenting industry. 
It is true the country was always insecure 
and constantly threatened by powerful neigh- 
bour ; for that very reason the people had 
to submit to a rigid discipline and a strong 
military organization. It is true the country 
was depopulated ; for that very reason the 
rulers had to attract foreign settlers by a just, 
wise, and tolerant government." 

A patriotic German might illustrate in the 
following simple parable the complex and strange 
relations between Germany and Prussia : — 

"The German people a century ago might 



94 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

be compared to the heirs and owners ot an 
ancient estate. The estate was rich and of 
romantic beauty. The heirs were clever, adven- 
turous, and universally popular. But although 
devoted to each other, they could not get on 
together. Their personality was too strong, and 
they were always quarrelling. Nor could they 
turn to advantage their vast resources, and the 
natural wealth of the estate only served to attract 
outside marauders. They were so extravagant 
and so unpractical that they would lay out beau- 
tiful parks and build magnificent mansions whilst 
neglecting to drain the land and to repair the 
fences. They would spend lavishly on luxuries, 
but they would grudge food to the cattle and 
manure to the fields. Thus, with all their 
splendid possessions, the German heirs were 
always on the verge of bankruptcy. 

"To extricate themselves, they decided to 
accept the services of a factor and manager. The 
factor was the Prussian Junker. He was an 
alien. For he could hardly be called a German. 
In blood he was more Slav than Teutonic. 
He was unrefined, unsympathetic, and over- 
bearing. But as a manager he was splendid. 
He bought up outlying parts to round off the 
estate. He paid more attention to the neces- 
saries than to the luxuries and the amenities 
of life. He was more careful to surround him- 
self with a strong police force than with poets 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 95 

and minstrels. But he was able to keep out the 
marauders and the poachers. He was able to 
protect the property against the stronger neigh- 
bours and to bully the weaker neighbours into 
surrendering desirable additions to the estate. 
In a short time the heirs, formerly universally 
popular, were cordially hated in the land. But 
their rents had increased by leaps and bounds, 
and the German estate had been rounded off 
and made into one solid and compact whole." 

Such, German writers would tell us, is the 
parable of Germany and Prussia. The Ger- 
mans are the gifted, generous, and spendthrift 
heirs to an illustrious domain. Prussia is the 
alien, upstart, unpopular, unsympathetic, bully- 
ing factor and manager. But to this bullying 
factor Germany owes the consolidation and 
prosperity of the national estate. 

The foregoing parable, no doubt, may ex- 
press some aspects of the relationship between 
Germany and Prussia, but as an explanation of 
German history it is an absurd parody, and in 
accepting it the German people are the victims 
of a perverse humility which would be incon- 
ceivable if we did not know that a school of 
historians in the service of Prussia have syste- 
matically accredited those views for many gen- 
erations. Neither are the German people the 
incapable and spendthrift heirs reduced by need 
to political impotence, nor has the Prussian 



96 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

factor been content with being the useful 
though unpleasant manager of the German 
estate. The factor has become the overbearing 
master, and is bent on dispossessing the Ger- 
man heirs of their legitimate rights, and on 
reducing them to political subjection. 

The parable only contains one fundamental 
truth. The Reformation had divided the Ger- 
man nation into two irreconcilable camps. 
Even after the religious passion had subsided, 
the obstacles in the way of German unity re- 
mained. German unity could not be restored by 
Clerical and Ultramontane Austria. It could not 
be restored by Bavaria, which was politically too 
feeble and under the influence of France. A 
third German power had to arise, Protestant 
enough to impose itself on the Lutheran popula- 
tion, yet tolerant enough to render any religious 
wars for ever impossible. 

The German people are slandering themselves 
when they lay themselves prostrate before the 
sword and the peaked helmet of the Hohen- 
zollern monarchy. They are not predestined 
for all time to come to be the utterly incapable 
politicians which they profess to be. They are 
not an essentially " unpolitical " race doomed 
to anarchy, and the Prussians are not the im- 
perial race predestined to supremacy. Indeed, 
in political capacity the Southern Germans are 
far more gifted than the Prussians. Their tra- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 97 

ditions of municipal government are as superior 
to the bureaucratic traditions of Prussia as the 
genius of liberty is superior to the genius of 
despotism. No country can boast of a more 
glorious civic history than the free German 
cities of the South and of the East. It is true 
that in the chaos of the religious wars those 
free institutions disappeared with almost every 
other vestige of German culture ; it is true that 
German Protestantism, by surrendering to the 
State both the temporal and spiritual power, 
proved favourable to despotism. But the Ger- 
man people would have learnt again their political 
lesson, and they would have learnt it in the 
only school where the art of government can be 
learnt — the hard and stern school of experience ; 
and certainly they will not learn the art of self- 
government from their Prussian masters. So far 
from training them in the art and science of 
politics, the Prussian despot has been the worst 
conceivable teacher they could have chosen ; 
and if his rule were to be perpetuated for many 
generations he would destroy the splendid 
municipal traditions inherited from the Middle 
Ages. 

The political dissensions and disasters of 
Germany are constantly given as a convincing 
proof of the political incapacity of the Ger- 
man people. But certainly the German people 
were not responsible for those dissensions and 

7 



98 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

disasters. The wars of religion of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries were the direct result 
of the Reformation, and the wars of the Revolu- 
tion and the Empire were the direct result of a 
general political upheaval of Europe. And if 
Napoleon did invade Germany, Prussia had 
forestalled France, and in 1793 had declared 
an unwarranted war against the French Re- 
public. In the nineteenth century the political 
dissensions in Germany were the consequence 
of the rivalry of Austria and Prussia, both of 
whom aspired to the control of the German 
Federation. It is absurd to see in those inevi- 
table divisions a proof of any inherent political 
incapacity of the people. And even if such an 
incapacity did exist Prussian despotism would 
not have been the remedy. 

And just as it is absurd to make the Ger- 
man people responsible for their political weak- 
ness, which has been the result of geographical 
conditions and historical conjunctures, it is im- 
possible to give to Prussia the credit of having 
put an end to German anarchy, and of having 
achieved German unity. That unity was inevi- 
table, because the German people wanted unity, 
and because all the forces of the times were in 
favour of unity. The most difficult task in 
the unification of Germany, the Zollverein, the 
customs union, was an accomplished fact long 
before 1848 for the greater part of the German 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 99 

Confederation. Prussian historians have dis- 
torted German history, and have thrown into the 
shade the heroic achievements of the past. The 
magnificent outburst of 1848 is passed over by- 
official annalists, and is nearly forgotten. But 
the fact remains that, so far from hastening on 
German unity, the ambition of Prussia postponed 
it. Sixty years ago the parliament of Frankfurt 
decreed the political unity of the country. So 
strong was the national desire, so unanimous 
the popular feeling, so clearly did the people 
understand that the only obstacle came from 
Austria and Prussia, that the German democracy 
offered the Imperial Crown to an autocrat 
known for his feudal principles. But the auto- 
crat, Frederick William the Fourth, refused to 
hold his title from the people. He realized 
that an empire established on a democratic 
foundation would put an end for ever to the 
irresponsible despotism of the Prussian king. 
But for this criminal selfishness of Frederick 
William, which stands in such a glaring contrast 
with the patriotic self-surrender of the people, 
and but for the Prussian betrayal of the interests 
of the confederation, German unity would have 
been achieved peacefully so far back as 1848. 
No doubt it would not have been achieved by 
blood and iron. But it still remains to be 
proved that blood and iron and the teeth of the 
dragon are the necessary ingredient or cement 



ioo THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

of a modern nationality. And no doubt Ger- 
man unity would not have been bought at 
the cost of the confiscation of popular liberty. 
But it remains still to be proved that the 
confiscation of popular liberty is the indis- 
pensable preliminary to the making of a great 
people. 

And, therefore, not only are we convinced that 
German unity would have come sooner without 
the intervention of Prussia, but it would have 
been closer, more real, and more permanent. 
As the contradictions which we analyzed in a 
previous chapter, as the many parties in the 
Reichstag abundantly prove, German unity is 
far from being an accomplished fact. Germany 
remains a geographical expression. After all, 
even to the most superficial observer, it must be 
apparent to-day that iron and blood have not 
welded Germany together. Neither Schleswig- 
Holstein nor Alsace-Lorraine, nor Hanover nor 
Poland, are integral parts of the empire. Even 
the particularism of the South has not wholly 
disappeared. The rifts are widening every day 
in the Imperial structure. Military despotism 
may artificially keep together the different parts 
and conceal the process of disintegration ; but 
that military despotism cannot last for ever in, 
a great industrial commonwealth honeycombed 
with Socialism. When the German people 
awaken from their political slumber we shall 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 101 

realize how little Prussia has done for German 
unity. 

For what is true of the political unity applies 
even more strongly to the moral and spiritual 
unity of Germany. The Germans are apt to rail 
at the political anarchy which prevails in France, 
at the civil distractions of the Dreyfus affair. 
It is true that a Dreyfus affair would have 
been impossible in Germany, for the simple 
reason that the German Jews still suffer from 
civil disabilities, and are still excluded from the 
army and from the responsible posts of the 
civil service, and mainly because in Germany 
the sense of political justice is not so acutely 
developed that an injustice done to a Jew 
would cause a civil war. And it is equally true 
that German dissensions are not forced on the 
superficial observer. In France any political 
divisions are revealed urbi et orbi. In Germany 
they are not proclaimed on the housetops. But 
as a matter of fact France is a united family 
compared to Germany. And a Frenchman to- 
day has ceased to inquire whether Calvin and 
Robespierre came from the North, and whether 
Mirabeau and Thiers came from the South, 
whether Montesquieu was a Gascon, and 
Corneille a Norman, and Bossuet a Burgundian. 
Compared to the Reichstag, the French Palais 
Bourbon is a harmonious assembly. There is 
no cleavage in France so profound as the 



ioa THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

cleavage between the German Catholic South 
and the Protestant North, between the industrial 
and Socialistic West and South-West and the 
reactionary and agrarian East and North-East. 
The reactionary Junkers east of the Elbe — or 
the Ost-Elbier y as they are nicknamed — the 
Social Democrats, the Clericals of the Centre, 
and the Protestant Freethinkers are arrayed 
in irreconcilable armies. Forty years ago the 
opposition between Catholics and Protestants 
culminated in the Kulturkampf. Catholicism 
emerged victorious, and peace was proclaimed. 
But that peace is only a truce. Equally pre- 
carious is the modus vivendi between the indus- 
trial army and the agrarian army ; and the day 
cannot be far off when religious war and social 
war will shake united Germany to its founda- 
tions, for Protestant and freethinking Germany 
will not for ever submit to being ruled by 
Westphalian and Bavarian priests. 

Not only have historians enormously ex- 
aggerated the services of Prussia to German 
unity, but even if those services had been as 
real and as far-reaching as they are said to be, 
the payment would have been extravagantly 
high. We might grant the vital necessity of 
a strong police, a strong army, and a strong 
administration ; and we might also grant that 
the kings of Prussia were, by training and tra- 
dition, best qualified to organize such a police, 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 103 

such an army, and such a bureaucracy. But in 
our complex industrial civilization, which can 
ultimately thrive only through freedom, initia- 
tive, and enterprise, an army and a bureaucracy 
must remain serviceable tools. If restricted to 
its proper function an army is the most useful 
of servants ; otherwise it becomes the most 
dangerous of tyrants. Any nation makes a bad 
bargain which surrenders its political rights in 
exchange for a temporary and precarious pro- 
tection. 

To come back to our former parable, it 
may have been necessary for the German heirs 
to engage the services of the Prussian factor, 
and to submit to his overbearing manners. But 
it was an evil day when they gave up to the 
Hohenzollern the control of the German estate. 
Too often has it happened in private life that 
for lack of vigilance on the part of the legitimate 
owners the factor has become the master, and 
turned out those whose interests he was to pro- 
tect. This is exactly what has happened in 
contemporary Germany. The Prussian factor 
has become a martinet and a tyrant. Fortu- 
nately, what to a private individual would be 
irreparable ruin need only be a temporary evil 
in a nation. The German people are beginning 
to realize that they have sold their political 
birthright for a mess of Prussian pottage. The 
Prussian hypnotism has lasted too long, and the 



io 4 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

people are awakening from their hypnotic trance. 
Let them become more fully conscious of their 
present serfdom, and they will claim and regain 
those ancient liberties which the Prussian 
Kaisertum and the Prussian Junkertum have 
taken away from them. 



REACTION IN GERMANY. 

We shall see in a succeeding chapter whether 
German Socialism is a force working for peace. 
But assuming for the moment that it is, two 
questions at once force themselves upon us : 
" Has German Socialism any decisive influence 
on the government of the country ? And have 
the German people any voice in settling the 
fateful issues of peace and war ? " This again 
brings us to the central problem of German 
politics : the struggle between political liberty 
and reaction. 

Reaction is supreme in every department of 
German life. Prussian despotism may be en- 
lightened despotism, and it may be beneficent. 
We do not wish to minimize whatever it may 
have done for the good of the people. Least 
of all do we wish to minimize its achievements in 
social legislation, through its insurance laws, and 
old age pensions. But neither ought we to over- 
rate its merits. In its social policy the Imperial 
Government was by no means inspired by dis- 
interested motives, any more than Bismarck 



106 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

was actuated by a love of democracy when he 
granted universal suffrage, or Beaconsfield 
when he extended the franchise in 1867. The 
main object which the German statesmen pur- 
sued in their social legislation was to conciliate 
the masses, to disarm the Socialists, and to 
extend their own power. Nor must we forget 
that any social legislation involving compul- 
sory measures and government supervision and 
legislation is much easier to carry out in a 
centralized and disciplined State like Germany, 
which is also an employer of labour on a huge 
scale. 

But we are not discussing here the relative 
merits of despotism and freedom. We are not 
discussing whether freedom with all its risks is 
preferable to despotism with all its benefits. We 
are trying to define the nature of Prussian des- 
potism. And our contention is that, whether 
enlightened or not, whether benevolent or not, 
it is certainly more despotic than in any other 
country ; and it is more despotic, because more 
systematic, more rigid, more absolute. That rigid 
despotism has prevailed ever since 1870. For 
a few years Bismarck tried to govern with the 
National Liberals, but they were compelled to 
sink their Liberalism and only to remember their 
Nationalism. And when they became restive, 
Bismarck discarded them. Many years after 
Bismarck, Prince von Billow for a brief space 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 107 

governed with the Radicals, but the Centre 
proved too strong for his coalition of Liberals 
and Conservatives, and the German Government 
once more was at the mercy of the " Black- 
blue bloc" the alliance of Catholic and Prot- 
estant reactionaries. 

Not only the Government, but the Constitu- 
tion of the empire itself is reactionary. At 
first sight it seems to rest on a democratic basis, 
the basis of universal suffrage. But we know 
from Bismarck's " Memoirs " that universal 
suffrage was only an opportunist measure to 
compel recalcitrant German principalities to join 
the Imperial federation. It was not an essen- 
tial part of the Constitution. It was not an 
end in itself, but a means to an end. If the 
means proved troublesome, it could be revoked, 
the concession could be withdrawn. But Bis- 
marck was not afraid. He had taken every 
precaution to prevent universal suffrage from 
being effective. He had learned from Louis 
Napoleon this most useful lesson, that universal 
suffrage can be made to be perfectly harmless, 
that it does in no wise commit the monarchy 
to a liberal policy, and that it may be manipu- 
lated at will, if the Government only shows 
sufficient diplomacy. Bismarck therefore knew 
what he was doing when he granted to the 
German Democrats the concession of manhood 
suffrage. And his anticipations have been fully 



108 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

realized ; manhood suffrage, even as in Belgium 
to-day, even as in the France of Napoleon the 
Third, has not proved an obstacle to absolutism ; 
rather has it proved an obstacle to parliamentary 
government. 

We are apt to forget that, strictly speaking, 
a parliamentary government does not exist in 
Germany, although we constantly speak of a 
" German Parliament." According to the 
Constitution, the Chancellor is not responsible 
to Parliament, he is only responsible to the 
Emperor. There is no Cabinet or delegation 
of the majority of the Reichstag. There is 
no party system. There are only party 
squabbles. I do not know whether Mr. Belloc 
would approve of the German Constitution, 
but it certainly enables the Government to soar 
high above all the parties in the Reichstag. 
German Liberals may be morally justified in 
their struggle against political reaction, but 
technically the Government are acting within 
their constitutional right. And when, there- 
fore, the Reichstag attempts to control the 
executive, it is rather the Reichstag which is 
unconstitutional. On the other hand, when the 
Emperor asserts his divine right, it is he who 
is true to the spirit of the Constitution ; he is 
only giving a religious interpretation and colour 
to a political prerogative which he undoubtedly 
possesses. And not only is there no parliamen- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 109 

tary government, but there is not even a desire, 
except with a small fraction of Radicals, to 
possess such a government. Prussian pub- 
licists again and again tell us that Germany 
does not want to copy English institutions. 
The old German monarchic institutions are 
good enough for Germany. Read the treatise 
of Treitschke, the great historian and political 
philosopher of modern Prussia. He system- 
atically attempts to belittle every achievement 
of the parliamentary system ; and every promi- 
nent writer follows in his footsteps. Prussia 
has not produced a Guizot, a Tocqueville, 
a Stuart Mill, or a Bryce. Her thinkers are 
all imbued with the traditions of enlightened 
despotism. Even the great Mommsen cannot 
be adduced as an exception. He makes us 
forget his Liberalism, and only remember his 
Caesarism. 

The powers of the Reichstag are very limited. 
It is mainly a machine for voting supplies, but 
even that financial control is more nominal than 
real. For under the Constitution the Assembly 
must needs make provision for the army and 
navy, which are outside and above party politics. 
And having previously fixed the contingent of 
the Imperial forces, the army and navy estimates 
must needs follow. In the present tension of 
international politics, a reduction is out of the 
question. Theoretically, the Reichstag can indeed 



no THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

oppose an increase, but practically the increase is 
almost automatic. The Reichstag could only post- 
pone it, and in so doing would have to face un- 
popularity. Every party vies with its rivals in 
sacrificing their principles on the altar of patriot- 
ism. Whereas the Catholic Party in Belgium 
has for twenty-eight years refused the means 
of national defence, and has made the Belgian 
army into a byword on the plea that barrack life 
is dangerous to the religious faith of the peasant, 
the German Catholics have voted with ex- 
emplary docility every increase of the army and 
navy. Only once did they dare to propose a 
small reduction in the estimates for the ex- 
penditure on the war against the Herreros. 
But the indignation they raised by their inde- 
pendent attitude, and the doubtful elections 
of 1907, taught them a practical lesson in 
patriotic submission which they are not likely 
soon to forget. 

The Reichstag, therefore, is largely a de- 
bating club, and its debates are as irresponsible 
as those of students in a university union, 
because no speech, however eloquent, carries 
with it any of the responsibilities of govern- 
ment. The Opposition in England is careful of 
the language it uses, and more careful of the 
promises it makes, because it knows that it 
may be called upon to fulfil its promises and 
to carry out the policy it advocates. In 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM, in 

Germany there is no such possibility. The 
Opposition is only platonic. It is doomed 
to impotence. 

But even if the Reichstag had the con- 
stitutional power, it could not make use of it, 
because it is hopelessly divided. The old curse 
of Protestant sectarianism and schism continues 
to cling to German politics — the incapacity to 
unite. There are many groups, and of these at 
least five are forces to be counted with : the 
Progressive Radicals, the National Liberals, the 
Conservative Protestants, the Social Democrats, 
and, above all, the Catholic Centre. All those 
parties fight for their own ends, and recent 
debates on financial reform have proved how 
sordidly selfish those ends are. The ruling 
classes refuse to contribute their share to the 
Imperial budget, and that budget is much less 
democratic than the English budget, where the 
income tax and the death duties fall mainly on 
the well-to-do classes. 

As no party is strong enough to constitute 
a majority, they have to enter into combination 
with other parties, and those combinations are 
generally more or less temporary, and always 
conditional. For circumstances are constantly 
changing, and the parties themselves are always 
shifting their ground. It is difficult for an out- 
side observer to thread his way through the 
quicksands of Reichstag politics. The French 



ii2 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Government has often been accused of being 
unstable, but German politics are far more shifty 
and unstable, more erratic and bewildering, than 
the politics of Republican France. 

But political instability is not the most serious 
consequence of this extreme division of parties. 
There is the far more serious consequence of 
political immorality, the absence of all principle, 
or the subordination of principle to party pur- 
poses. For parties, in order to secure a majority, 
have often to ally themselves with other parties 
which may have nothing in common with them, 
which may, indeed, have entirely opposite ideas. 
We constantly witness in the German Reichstag 
the most monstrous alliances. Extreme Prot- 
estants will ally themselves with atheistic 
Socialists, Radicals will ally themselves with 
Conservatives. There is no conceivable com- 
bination in the complex chemistry of modern 
politics which cannot be studied in the history 
of the German Reichstag. 

Under such conditions politics become an 
ignoble game of haggling, of bargaining and 
bartering. The very word political "prin- 
ciple " loses its meaning. Cynicism and in- 
differentism take its place. Opportunism reigns 
supreme. "Trimming" is reduced to a fine 
art. No party is loyal to its flag. Even the 
Catholics betray their trust and allow their 
Polish brethren to be persecuted. Political 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 113 

materialism, under the disguise of the Real- 
po/itik, is supreme in the empire.* 

It is the baneful consequences resulting from 
the extreme division of parties, which in recent 
years have converted many German politicians 
to the English " two party " system, at the very 
moment when in England the faith in the party 
system is beginning to be shaken. 

" A Parliament," says an eminent parliamentarian, Dr. 
Naumann, " which is composed only of two great parties 
has quite naturally the government in its hands, for 
the leading minister must have the majority behind him, 
if he does not want to-morrow to be a man with whom 
everything goes amiss, and who, therefore, is compelled 
to retire. Thereby, no doubt, the freedom of the elector 
is decreased, but the power of the elected is increased. 
Under the two party system the elector has only the 
right to decide between two Government groups. He 
goes to the group which promises him most or which 
accomplishes most. In promises the Opposition is 
naturally stronger than the Government majority, but 
when its turn comes to win, it is bound to fulfil its 
promises. There lies the limit of its agitation against 
its opponents. Parties which can come into power within 
an appreciable time must carry on a more moderate and, 
therefore, a more real agitation than parties which are 
necessarily excluded from power. If a Social Democrat 
could once be a Cabinet minister with us, what a training 
and discipline this would be to him and his followers ! 

* Nor is German politics by any means free from corruption. I 
am not alluding to the court scandals revealed by the Moltke-Harden 
Trial, but to the far more serious scandals and revelations of mal- 
versation and peculation in the navy. Many German high officials 
obviously thrive on the expansion of the navy. 

8 



ii 4 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

But the multiplicity of parties makes responsibility impos- 
sible. Responsible with us only is the Government. Parties 
talk, promise, desire, formulate, declaim, and debate." 

If the dissensions and divisions amongst 
German citizens are the cause of the multipli- 
city of parties, it is the multiplicity of parties 
which causes their weakness, and it is the weak- 
ness of parties which again accounts for the 
strength of the Government. The art of 
government in Germany for the last twenty- 
five years has consisted largely in playing 
off one party against another. There was a 
time when the most efficient way of dealing 
with the Reichstag was to bully it. Bis- 
marck was little inclined to conciliate or to 
coax a refractory assembly, but Hohenlohe, 
Biilow, and von Bethmann-Hollweg have dis- 
covered that the methods of the diplomat are 
more efficient than those of the soldier, that 
statecraft is safer and quicker than violence. 
The best definition of a German Chancellor 
to-day is that of a political rope dancer, or to 
use a more respectful metaphor, of a political 
chess player. In this game Billow has been a 
wonderful virtuoso. He has in turn utilized the 
Catholics and the Conservatives and the Radicals 
to achieve his purpose, using them to-day and 
discarding them to-morrow. It is true that even 
the most clever virtuoso must meet with 
temporary difficulties and must make a false 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 115 

move, but when the Chancellor makes a mistake 
it is easily retrieved. As long as he has the 
Kaiser behind him, the people and their elected 
representatives do not matter. He can always 
dismiss a recalcitrant Chamber. He need not 
do it as brutally as the irrepressible Herr von 
Oldenburg advised, and send a few Horse 
Guards to close the proceedings. He need only 
choose his own time and dissolve the Reichstag. 
Or, when he is driven into a corner, the Chan- 
cellor has only to raise some loud-sounding 
battle-cry. Of such battle-cries there is in 
Germany an inexhaustible supply. It may be 
difficult to unite the Germans on some vital 
question of constructive policy, but you can 
always create a movement and raise a cry 
against somebody. It may be an agitation 
against Clericalism. It may be the cry, "Los 
von Rom, 11 It may be an agitation against 
Socialism. It may be the cry, "Property is 
imperilled." Most efficient of all, it may be 
an agitation against England or France. It 
may be the war-cry, "The Vaterland is in 
danger ! " And whilst Socialists, Catholics, and 
National Liberals are fighting it out, the Chan- 
cellor secures his majority for the greater 
glory of the King of Prussia. 

There is a mysterious and exalted body 
in the German Empire, the Bundesrat, which 
few foreign newspapers ever mention, and of 



n6 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

which the average educated Englishman does 
not even suspect the existence. The Bundesrat 
in some respects may be compared to the House 
of Lords, but its power is not restricted to a 
right of veto. In several other respects it re- 
sembles the American Senate, but its attributes 
are far wider and more important. And those 
attributes have been steadily growing. To- 
day it is not the Reichstag which controls 
the Bundesrat — it is the Bundesrat which 
controls the Reichstag and reduces it to 
impotence. 

It will be objected that the foregoing summary 
judgment on the German Constitution does not 
err on the side of appreciation, and we admit that 
the Reichstag and the Bundesrat do not express 
and exhaust the whole of German public life. 
If, instead of describing those assemblies, we 
were to describe the activities of the efficient and 
much-maligned German bureaucracy and of the 
Civil Service, we might have a very different 
tale to tell. But, after all, we are discussing the 
political life of the empire, and not its adminis- 
trative machinery, and with regard to that life 
we do not think that our judgment is unfair. 
Still, lest we be suspected of being unduly severe, 
it may not be irrelevant to give the opinion of 
a prominent leader of the German Reichstag, Dr. 
Friedrich Naumann, who is both a patriot and 
a Liberal, and who for more than a generation 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 117 

has played a conspicuous part in the political 
struggles of his country : — 

"The German Empire has two political forces — the 
Bundesrat and the Reichstag — but of those forces the one 
is infinitely stronger than the other, for the Bundesrat can 
dissolve the Reichstag, but the Reichstag cannot dissolve 
the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat can play catchball with 
the Reichstag. Somewhere in their palace their delegates 
sit together in secret and throw our resolutions into the 
wastepaper basket. But they demand of us that we shall 
accept their proposals. — If the Reichstag does not do 
what the Bundesrat demands, there comes a smash. 
There is an appeal to national feeling, and the sinners 
must do penance. But when the Bundesrat does not do 
what the majority of the Reichstag has resolved, then 
nothing happens — absolutely nothing ! Such is the con- 
dition of affairs which we in Germany call, ' Parliamentary 
Government.' From this condition the Reichstag must 
be saved, or it will sink even lower — as low as the Roman 
Senate at the time of the emperors. 

" Poor, honest Reichstag ! I have pity on thee, although 
I myself belong to thee. Ministers are forced upon 
thee, and thou canst say nothing against it ! When on a 
particular day a Cabinet Secretary or an Imperial Chan- 
cellor falls into disfavour, the fact is hardly mentioned to 
us. The Reichstag is informed of it through the news- 
papers. That is what happened with Count Posadowsky. 
This man had his majority, not indeed for his programme 
but for his person. He enjoyed the confidence of the 
majority of the House, But that has not helped him — 
absolutely nothing ! 

" Poor, honest Reichstag ! what principles or measures 
of contemporary German politics really have originated 
from thee ? Every essential law has emanated from the 
Federal Governments, whether those laws have been 



n8 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

good or bad. Customs laws, insurance laws, Liberal 
politics, increase of the navy, finance politics — all those 
measures came into being after the silent Chamber of 
the Bundesrat had taken them in hand. The Reichstag 
has the right of initiative just as much as the Federated 
Government, but it lies in its composition that it can do 
nothing with this right. It has not yet found the means 
to compel the Bundesrat to do anything, because it has 
not got any stable leading majority, and the people feel 
instinctively that the Reichstag is only a kind of super- 
vising authority — a great ponderous bureau for drawing 
up proposals for the Government. Oh ! if the Reichstag 
could only carry through something of its own initiative. 
I see its members running to the State secretaries. In 
that assembly there is as much haggling as at the ex- 
change, but each group is making a bargain for itself. 
Bismarck is still laughing in his grave for having combined 
it all so ingeniously. No achievement of his reveals his 
statecraft to better advantage than his dispositions of 
the Bundesrat and the Reichstag, for those dispositions 
are the greatest obstacle to parliamentary government 
in Germany. He granted popular rights, but he took 
every precaution that the popular will shall not be 
carried out. He created an indissoluble secret college 
and a dissoluble public parliament. He knew perfectly 
well which of the two would prove the stronger, and we 
experience every day how completely he has tied the 
democracy while seeming to favour it." 

It is then unanimously admitted that in the 
Imperial Reichstag, as well as in the Bundesrat, 
reaction has continuously prevailed for forty 
years. But it might be said that in the Reichs- 
tag at least there has always been a strong, 
though impotent, opposition. Even this much, 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 119 

alas ! cannot be asserted of the Prussian Land- 
tag. In that assembly the very shadow of 
opposition has vanished, and the fact is all the 
more important because for all the realities of 
ordinary political life the Prussian Parliament is 
so much more important than the Reichstag. 

The Prussian Landtag may justly be called 
the most mediaeval assembly of modern Europe, 
compared with which even a Russian Duma is 
an advanced body. The electoral law by which 
the Prussian Parliament is elected is probably 
the most scandalous law in existence. Its repeal 
has been promised again and again by German 
statesmen, and even in speeches from the throne. 
Yet it continues to reign, an insult to common 
sense. 

Under the Prussian " three class " system 
voting is public, and the voter is therefore 
amenable to outside pressure. The voting is 
indirect, and therefore it is capable of outside 
manipulation. The first electors elect a small 
body, who in turn elect the representatives. 
For the purpose of election the citizens are 
divided into three classes, the voting power 
being in proportion to the taxes paid, and 
each class having equal voting power. Suppos- 
ing that a particular electoral division pays 
6,000 marks in taxes, the amount payable by 
one of the three classes would be 2,000 marks. 
If in that district there only lives one rich man 



120 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

paying that amount, he would by himself con- 
stitute the first class. If there are twenty 
people who each pay ioo marks in taxes, they 
form the electors of the second class. If there 
are 200 electors paying 10 marks each in taxes 
they form the third class. Thus one elector of 
the first class has as much electoral power as the 
20 electors of the second class, and as much power 
as the 200 electors of the third class. Those 
figures are, of course, arbitrary, and are only given 
to make the whole system intelligible. But, as a 
matter of fact, the disproportion of those figures 
is even exceeded in the reality. In the electoral 
circle of Berlin No. III. there exists the divi- 
sion 99. In that division lives the family of 
Botzov, brewers and landowners. One Mr. 
Botzov forms the first class by himself, and 
another Mr. Botzov forms the second class by 
himself, and all the 571 remaining electors 
constitute the third class. The two Messrs. 
Botzov together elect twice the number of 
electors chosen by the 571 electors of the 
third class. 

In the last election for the Prussian Landtag, 
in 1903, the following are the statistics of those 
qualified to vote : — 

The first class included . • 239,000 
The second class included . 857,000 
The third class included . 6,600,000 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 121 

It is necessary to go back to the good old 
times of Greece and Rome to discover an 
electoral system so ingenious as the Prussian 
system. We involuntarily think of the electoral 
law of Servius Tullius and Tarquinius Superbus. 
The Prussian ruling class may well be proud of 
evoking such ancient and classical associations ! 

When a country agrees to be ruled by such 
a monstrous system it is not to be wondered at 
that the influence of reaction should make itself 
felt in every department of public life. The 
reality of local self-government in Prussia only 
exists in the big municipalities. The ordinary 
local government authorities, who possess all the 
substance of political power — the Governor, or 
Oberpresidenty the Landrat, and the police — are 
the direct representatives of the Central Govern- 
ment, and through them the Prussian Govern- 
ment make their power felt in every German 
village. Nor must we forget that the higher 
administrative authorities almost exclusively 
belong to the nobility, and they defend the 
interests of their caste all the more thoroughly 
because they are invested with powers which 
far exceed the powers of any local government 
authorities in the United Kingdom. 

The same centralization reigns in the Civil 
Service and in the judicature. In England the 
judiciary is practically independent of and raised 
above party. In Germany the appointment of 



122 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

a judge depends, as in Great Britain, on his 
politics ; but he is not, as in Great Britain, 
taken from amongst those who have already 
achieved distinction at the Bar. He is not 
chosen because he is an able man or a brilliant 
man. Brilliancy would rather go against him. 
He must above all be a " safe " man, and his 
promotion depends on his subservience to the 
powers that be. Indeed the judiciary is for all 
practical purposes a branch of the Civil Service, 
and is not essentially different from any other 
branch. 

It has often happened in other countries when 
the expression of free opinions has become 
dangerous or difficult that independent political 
thought has taken refuge in the universities. 
Even in Russia the universities have been a 
stronghold of Liberalism. In the Germany of 
the first half of the nineteenth century many a 
university professor suffered in the cause of 
political liberty. In the Germany of to-day the 
universities are becoming the main support of 
reaction. Professors, although they are nomi- 
nated by the faculties, are appointed by the 
Government ; and here again the Government 
only appoints " safe " men. A scholar who has 
incurred the displeasure of the political authori- 
ties must be content to remain a Privat Dozent 
all his life. The much-vaunted independence 
of the Qerman professor is a thing of the past. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 123 

They may be independent scientifically ; they 
are not independent politically. It is not that 
scholars have not the abstract right to speak 
out, or that they would be dismissed once they 
have been appointed ; rather is it that they 
would not be appointed or promoted. A 
young scholar with Radical leanings knows that 
he will not be called to Berlin. 

The German universities still lead political 
thought ; they still wield political influence, 
and their influence may be even greater to-day 
than it ever was, but that influence is enlisted 
almost exclusively on the side of reaction. 

And what is true of the universities is true 
of the Churches. Of the Roman Catholic 
Church it is hardly necessary to speak. Non 
ragionar di lor> ma guarda e passa. The history 
of German Catholicism proves once more that 
the Church is never more admirable than when 
she is persecuted. During the Kulturkampf the 
Catholics stood for political liberty, whereas the 
so-called National Liberals stood for State cen- 
tralization and political despotism. To-day, from 
being persecuted, the Catholic Church has become 
a persecuting Church. She has entered into an 
unholy compact with the Prussian Government. 
She has ceased to be religious, and has become 
Clerical. She has ceased to be universal. She 
has become narrowly Nationalist. She might 
have played a glorious part in the new empire. 



124 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Instead she has resisted every attempt at financial 
reform. She might have resisted the oppres- 
sive policy against the Poles. Instead she has 
connived at oppression. She might have op- 
posed the orgies of militarism. Instead she has 
voted every increase in the army and navy. 
She has bartered her dignity and spiritual inde- 
pendence to secure confessional privileges, and 
to get her share in the spoils of office. 

The Protestant Churches have not had the 
same power for evil, yet they have fallen even 
lower than the Catholic Church. They have 
lost even more completely every vestige of 
independence. German university theologians 
may be advanced in higher criticism, but they 
are opportunists in practical politics. They 
are very daring when they examine the divine 
right of Christ, but they are very timid when 
they examine the divine right of the king and 
emperor. Protestantism produced one or two 
prominent progressive leaders ; but they have 
had to leave their Churches. Dr. Naumann 
has become a layman ; Stacker, when he 
espoused the cause of the people, was excom- 
municated, and the Kaiser hurled one of his 
most violent speeches against his once favourite 
Court chaplain. 

That speech of the Kaiser illustrates the 
paradoxical political situation of the Lutheran 
Churches in Germany. It has come to this f 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 125 

that in a Protestant country Protestant pastors 
are not allowed to discharge their duties as 
citizens, whereas the Government apparently 
see no objection to having the Catholic priests 
controlling the politics of the Reichstag. The 
Catholic priest enjoys a right which is denied 
to the Protestant clergy, and they enjoy the 
right for no other reason except that they have 
the might. 

Both the universities and the Churches 
having thus betrayed their spiritual mission, 
can it be said that the Press has acted as a 
check ? 

Even in countries where there exists no 
parliamentary government, the Press has often 
proved a powerful barrier against absolutism. 
Such was the function of the Press in 
Russia under Nicholas the First, and in 
France under Napoleon the Third. In Germany 
that check is sadly wanting. There are excel- 
lent German papers, like the Kolnische Zeitung, 
the K'olnische Folkszeitung, and the Frankfurter 
Zeitung, which for intrinsic value are equal to 
any English paper. But those papers have little 
power, and they do not represent a large body 
of public opinion. Indeed, public opinion in 
Germany is a myth, for it is not organized and 
it is inarticulate. 

German papers are broadly divided into two 
categories — the " business Press " and the 



126 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

" political Press." But that distinction is more 
apparent than real. Both kinds of newspapers 
are under the influence of the Government, 
the only difference being that in the one case 
the influence is direct, in the other case it is 
indirect. The Government has its favourite 
inspired channels, its own "reptile" journals, 
and its Press Bureau. In the provinces the 
local papers depend on the support of the 
authorities, as they cannot live without public 
advertisements. Even in the capital and in 
the chief provincial centres the newspapers 
cannot shake off official tyranny, because the 
Government has the monopoly or indirect 
control of the news agencies. 

But the Government alone cannot be held 
entirely responsible for the present condition of 
the Press. We must blame the political apathy 
of the people, and the political dissensions of 
the parties. We must not forget that there 
would be no room for any paper which was 
mainly political, and was run in the interest 
of one particular section. Parties are too 
much divided, and interest in politics is too 
feeble to provide adequate financial support to 
any important political paper. 

Catholic papers, like the Kolnische Volkszeitung, 
less famous but politically much more influential 
than the Kolnische Zeitung^ suffer probably less 
than others from Government interference ; but 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 127 

they can hardly be said to be independent, as 
they have exchanged the tyranny of the Church 
for the tyranny of the bureaucracy. 

The incongruity of an official Press does not 
seem to strike the ordinary German mind, and 
we find so able a writer as General von 
Bernhardi demanding, as one of the desiderata 
of the present political situation, a strengthen- 
ing and extension of the official Press, a more 
regular supervision, and a more generous 
support on the part of the Government, which 
must see to it that the newspapers shall inculcate 
sound principles and patriotic feelings in the subjects 
of the Kaiser, 

It has been left to a Hebrew journalist, 
Maximilian Harden, to establish the first 
absolutely independent political paper. Harden 
is unquestionably the most brilliant, the most 
original, the most independent, and the most 
influential journalist of the day. Even in 
France we do not see his equal. He is to the 
present generation in Germany what Heine 
and Boerne were to the second generation of 
the nineteenth century. Whether Die Zukunft y 
in order to support itself, does not rely too 
much on sensation and public scandal, and 
whether in Harden the personal equation is 
not too predominant are a different matter ; but 
the editor of Die Zukunft certainly has made 
himself a power, or Machthaber y of the empire, 



128 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

and the existence of his paper, even though its 
colour may come dangerously near the yellow 
shade, is a sign of the times. And it is one of 
the most hopeful signs, heralding far-reaching 
changes in the Constitution of the Vaterland, 
where political life has now reached its lowest 
ebb, and where things may have to become 
worse in order to get better. 



MILITARISM IN GERMANY. 

We are constantly told that the Germans are an 
essentially pacific people. Friends of Germany 
in this country quote the reassuring speeches of 
the Kaiser, the professions of politicians and of 
publicists, the peace demonstrations of the 
Socialists. We would fain believe those profes- 
sions, and those who make them are no doubt 
sincere. But there are in Germany forces making 
for war or for warlike feeling which are stronger 
and more significant than any peace demonstra- 
tions. We are not thinking here merely of vested 
interests, such as the gigantic Krupp and Thyssen 
factories, the shipbuilding yards of Kiel, the 
colossal military industries concerned with the 
production of war material ; nor are we thinking 
only of the tens of thousands of officers and 
Junkers who have also a professional interest in 
war, and who are animated with the war spirit. 
We are mainly thinking of those subconscious 
collective instincts and habits — of those deep- 
seated convictions which supply the decisive 
motives in the activities of nations as well as of 

9 



130 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

individuals. Deeds are more important than 
words, but political institutions, historical tradi- 
tions, and especially political and moral ideals, are 
even more important than isolated and ephemeral 
deeds. It is these, and not the interference of 
isolated politicians or diplomats, or even of 
rulers, that in the long run supply the ultimate 
and decisive motives for collective action. 

Now, no one who takes the trouble to study, 
however superficially, the traditions, the political 
institutions, the ideals of the Prussian people 
would be prepared to argue that they are those 
of a pacific nation. Prussia has lived and moved 
and had her being in war. The history of 
Prussia is essentially the history of epoch-making 
defeats like Jena, and more epoch-making vic- 
tories like Rossbach and Sedan. In the opinion 
of the leaders of Prussian thought, in the opinion 
of university professors, quite as much as in the 
opinion of the professional soldier, war has been 
and still is the great civilizing force — the condi- 
tion of morality in the individual, the source of 
strength and prosperity in the State. 



I. 



In the first place, Prussia is military by historic 
tradition, and from the very foundation of the 
monarchy. In the words of Professor Hans 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 131 

Delbruck she is a Kriegsstaat — a war-state. 
In the words of Freytag, " she is a whole 
nation of warriors." There lies her unique 
originality in the history of civilization. No 
doubt there have been other military people, 
like the Russians and the Romans. But in the 
making of Russia the Greek Orthodox religion 
has been an even more important force than 
war. The Romans were a military people, but 
they were even more emphatically a political 
people. They were the builders of city and 
empire, the creators of Law. Every schoolboy 
knows that, however interesting may be the 
campaigns of ancient Rome, even more inter- 
esting and more important are her internal 
struggles — the political conflicts between patri- 
cian and plebeian, between consuls and tribunes 
of the people. 

Now, in Prussia there have been no such polit- 
ical struggles. The interest of Prussian history 
is almost exhausted when we have narrated the 
story of its military campaigns, and the story 
of the internal preparation and organization in 
view of those campaigns. The purely political 
history of Prussia is almost a blank. It has been 
at most a history of administrative reform, im- 
posed from above and carried out by statesmen 
like Stein and Hardenberg. We miss the glori- 
ous fights for civil rights, the inspiring struggles 
against despotism, which even the history of 



132 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

despotic Russia reveals to us. Prussia has pro- 
duced great heroes on the battlefield ; she has 
not produced those civic heroes of liberty and 
martyrs of tyranny ; she has not produced those 
great popular statesmen, who stand on an even 
higher plane. As she has no Brutus and no 
Gracchi, no Cicero and no Caesar, neither has 
she any Hampdens or Washingtons, any Crom- 
wells or Mirabeaus. And that is why Prussian 
history to an outsider is so unspeakably dull 
and monotonous, so extraordinarily devoid of 
human interest. That is why even a genius 
like Treitschke or Carlyle cannot impart life 
to the national annals. Whereas most edu- 
cated men know something about the internal 
history of France and England, or Italy and 
Russia, few men outside Germany, or outside 
a small band of specialists, know anything 
about the military chronicles of the Prussian 
monarchy. 

It is to warfare that Prussia owes her terri- 
torial expansion, her place in modern history. 
It is to warfare that she owes her existence as a 
State. Without her army Prussia would have 
remained a barren plain, the mark of Branden- 
burg, the marsh of Pomerania. With her army 
she has wrested the eastern borders from Poland, 
Silesia from Austria, Hanover from its native 
rulers, Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, 
Alsace-Lorraine from France. And just as she 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 133 

owes to war her existence as a State, she owes to 
war her supremacy in the empire ; for, strange 
to say, the average German feels it almost as an 
offence if you believe in his own political capa- 
city. He accepts it as a dogma that without 
Prussia he could never have attained to unity — 
that, without the Prussian wars and without the 
Prussian leadership, Germany would still be a 
chaos of heterogeneous states. 

Prussia has been a " Folk in Waff en " — a 
nation in arms — to use the expression of von 
der Goltz. In other countries the king has 
been mainly a civil ruler. The head of the 
French Republic is a civilian. Even the head 
of the War Office is not a soldier. So deep seated 
is the distrust of militarism that the French 
President is only one out of many organs of the 
State. In England, even with a change of 
dynasty, the nation does not lose its identity. 
In a country like Prussia the monarchy is the 
keystone of the political structure. You could 
not conceive of an army without a war lord. 
The Hohenzollerns have been the hereditary 
war lords of Prussia. That is why they are so 
much more intimately identified with the history 
of their country than have been, for instance, 
the Hanoverian kings with the history of Eng- 
land, or the Bourbons with the history of 
France. Without metaphor, and in the strict 
sense of the word, the Hohenzollerns have been 



134 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

the master-builders of the Prussian State, if not 
of the German Empire. 

The Sieges Allee — the Alley of Victory — that 
impressive vista of statues of all the princes, 
legendary and historical, of the Hohenzollern 
dynasty in the park of Berlin — is a striking and 
symbolical representation of the deeds of the 
royal house of Prussia. The Sieges Allee may 
be an indifferent achievement from the point 
of view of the sculptor ; it may be a caricature 
of German history in the critical eyes of a 
scholar ; but that intimate association between 
the Prussian kings and the Prussian State, which 
is the lesson which William the Second intended 
to convey in planning the Sieges Allee^ is in strict 
conformity with historical fact. 

It is indeed difficult fully to realize how inti- 
mate that association has been. The modern 
rationalist would express it in the words of 
Frederick the Great : " The Prussian king is 
the first servant of the State." The monarchist 
of the old school would express it in the words 
of Louis the Fourteenth : " Vitat Jest mot" 
William the Second prefers to express it in the 
mystic and biblical phraseology of the " king- 
ship by right divine," of the consecration and 
dedication of the " Anointed of the Lord/' 

One fact is certain — namely, that the Prussian 
monarchy stands alone amongst European States, 
both in past achievement and present vitality, in 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 135 

power and majesty. And one understands the 
feeling of William the First, who obstinately 
refused in 1871 to accept the Imperial title, 
because his title as King of Prussia was higher 
to him and implied far more in political signifi- 
cance than the ornamental and shadowy dignity 
of a German Kaiser. 

In other countries one dynasty has succeeded 
another — destroyed like the Valois by its own 
corruption, or swept away like the Stuarts by 
the tide of revolution. In Prussia one and the 
same dynasty has ruled from the dawn of 
national history down to the present day. The 
Prussian royal title may be recent, and the 
Prussian kings may be counted amongst the 
upstarts of royalty, but their political power is 
of venerable antiquity. The Kaiser of to-day 
is the lineal descendant of the margraves who 
defended the marches of Brandenburg against the 
foreign marauder. And the spiritual identity is 
no less remarkable than the continuity of the 
royal succession. However different in temper, 
the Hohenzollern have all been animated with 
the same spirit, have professed the same political 
creed, have nourished the same high ambitions. 
There was little in common between Frederick 
the Second and Frederick the Fourth ; yet the 
bigoted ruler who, after the Revolution of 1848, 
refused the Imperial crown because he would not 
hold it from the will of the people, is as charac- 



136 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

teristically Prussian as the sceptical and cynical 
friend of Voltaire, who surrounded himself with 
men of letters, who played the flute, and wrote 
French verse. Again there was little in common 
between Frederick William the Third and 
William " the Great " ; yet the ill-fated van- 
quished of Jena had as exalted an idea of the 
royal prerogative as the Victor of Sedan, who 
assumed the crown of Charlemagne in the 
Gallery of Battles of the Palace of Versailles. 

The true Hohenzollern is not Frederick the 
Second, who although engrossed in war through- 
out his life, yet considered war only as a means to 
an end. The typical Hohenzollern is his martinet 
father, the Sergeant King, to whom his army was 
something so sacred and inviolate that he would 
never expose it to the hazards of the battlefield ; 
who loved the army like a true artist — that is 
to say, for art's sake, for its intrinsic beauty, 
and independently of any practical purpose. 

To the true Prussian ruler politics are 
subordinate to warfare. Art and science are 
either luxuries — as music and poetry were to 
Frederick the Second — or they are serviceable 
tools in the hands of the prince. We know the 
present attitude of William the Second to the 
literature of his day. To him poetry exists 
mainly for the inculcation of patriotism, and 
for the glorification of the heroic deeds of the 
Hohenzollern. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 137 

Military in its historical tradition, military in 
its dynasty, Prussia is no less military in its 
social organization. 

In England the army is almost invisible. 
The officer does not constitute a distinct class 
in the community. The English officer is as 
little as possible of a professional soldier. He 
only dons his uniform when he is on duty. In 
Prussia the officer is nothing if not professional. 
He is drawn, in the higher ranks, from the 
gentry, or Junker turn — for the Prussian nobleman 
owes military service to his liege. The officer 
forms a distinct caste — the first in the State, 
highest in dignity, noblest in the imagination of 
the common people, most beautiful in the dreams 
of the German maiden. A young girl in Eng- 
land who is herself, or whose parents are, socially 
ambitious, will want to marry a country gentle- 
man or a man who has gained distinction in 
public life. In Germany she will aspire to the 
hand of an officer. 

In Prussia the army is not only the centre of 
Society life, it is also the avenue to the highest 
offices, to the most coveted posts at Court and in 
the diplomatic service ; it is even the avenue to 
the most exalted posts in the civil service. And 
therefore there is no grievance which rankles 
deeper in the soul of the German Jew than to 
be excluded from the higher military ranks. 
Such is the prestige of the army in Germany 



138 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

that even those who cannot belong to the active 
service desire to belong to the Reserve. 

Even the student carries to the university 
the spirit and habits of the regiment ; and no 
student of the upper middle class, who in later 
life wants to play his part in Society, con- 
siders his education complete if he has not 
fought a duel, if his face is not disfigured by a 
scar. Foreign critics may blame the custom of 
the Mensur as a relic of barbarism ; but it 
forms part of the military Prussian system, it 
assists in inculcating the military temper, and it 
is in accordance with the fitness of things that 
the present German emperor should have 
pleaded for its maintenance in every well- 
ordered university. 

II. 

The Prussian monarchy is no less military in 
its political organization. Prussia remains a 
Machtstaat, not a Rechtstaat. Might is the ulti- 
mate criterion of political right. And in the 
last resort the might belongs to the Kaiser. 
Prussia remains an absolute monarchy. As we 
saw in a previous chapter there is no parlia- 
mentary government, no party system, no 
Cabinet. The ministers are responsible to the 
Chancellor, who is responsible to the Kaiser, 
who is responsible only to God Almighty. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 139 

To outward appearance the Reichstag, elected 
by a semblance of universal suffrage, is a 
democratic assembly. We have seen in a pre- 
ceding chapter how deceptive appearances are, 
and how in reality the Reichstag is a re- 
actionary assembly almost by virtue of the 
Constitution. The Conservatives have always 
been in power, and the Opposition is condemned 
to perpetual impotence. We have seen that 
the concession of the fiction of universal suffrage 
was made in order to conciliate the southern 
States and to coerce recalcitrant princes, and the 
concession has never led to serious trouble. The 
Imperial Parliament does not possess even the 
scanty measure of political rights which the 
English House of Commons already possessed 
at the time of the Stuarts. The Reichstag is 
a talking club. It does not initiate legislation. 
It may censure, but its censure does not carry 
any sanction. Its chief duty is to vote military 
supplies. The Minister of Finance is primarily 
the Paymaster of the Forces. 

There has been for some years a mild agitation 
in favour of representative government. It 
gathered force mainly from the blunders of 
the Government, and from the indiscretions 
of the Kaiser. In 1908 popular discontent 
seemed to come to a head. The publication of 
the famous Imperial interview in the Daily 
Telegraph seemed to rouse the temper of the 



1 4 o THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

people. The War Lord of Germany pledged 
himself to greater reserve. The Chancellor, 
Prince von Billow, retired after an adverse vote 
of the majority of the Reichstag. Liberal 
publicists were elated, and proclaimed that this 
was the dawn of parliamentary government. In 
reality, Prince von Billow retired, not because he 
had ceased to please the Reichstag, but because 
he had ceased to be acceptable to his Majesty. 
And so little was the Kaiser concerned about 
the political crisis, that whilst it was raging he 
spent one of the gayest holidays of his busy life. 
And the storm had hardly subsided when, after a 
few monthSjWilliam the Second emphatically, and 
more solemnly than ever, claimed in his Konigs- 
berg speech the rights which he held from God 
Almighty. " Sic volo> sic jubeo y stet pro ratione 
voluntas," Even in Russia there would have 
been a rebellion. In Prussia the people once 
more patiently submitted. The Preussische Jahr- 
biicher nodded approval ; and public opinion 
seemed to admire the Kaiser all the more for 
his soldierly pluck in asserting his prerogative. 

Future historians will tell us that the one 
moral of the political situation in Germany at 
the beginning of the twentieth century was 
supplied by the much - maligned Herr von 
Oldenburg when, after the T>aily Telegraph 
crisis, he advised his Majesty to send his royal 
soldiers to disperse the unruly assembly. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 141 



III. 

Even more remarkable than the reactionary 
and military constitution of Prussia is the temper 
of the people who submit to it. From childhood 
the military virtues of discipline and passive 
obedience are inculcated in the Prussian citizen. 
Liberty, equality, fraternity, are the words which 
arrest our attention in France. Es ist ver- 
boten ! are the words which meet us everywhere 
in Prussia. The Prussian may be aggressive in 
the assertion of his claims abroad, but at home 
he is the most long-suffering of subjects. There 
does not exist in the wide world a nation which 
is more pliable, which is more easily governed. 
Whatever his rulers may do, the Prussian never 
rises ; he rarely agitates, he only occasionally 
grumbles. And even that right of grumbling 
— of n'drglingy to use the expressive German 
term — has been disputed to poor Michel. In 
one of his early speeches the German Kaiser 
called on the Ndrgler to shake the dust off 
their feet and to leave the country. The 
Vaterland had no room for pessimists. The 
Kaiser was right. He was only following the 
logic of Prussian institutions. Is not the 
Prussian State a military organization, and in 
an army is not the public expression of dissatis- 
faction the beginning of rebellion ? 



1 42 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

The ignorant foreigner laughs at the three 
hundred uniforms of the German Kaiser. They 
have not learned the philosophy of Sartor 
Resartus, the " Clothes Philosophy " of Carlyle. 
They do not know the symbolical significance 
of the uniform in a military state, nor the 
superstitious reverence of the Prussian for the 
man with the braided coat and the peaked 
helmet. 

The Koepenick affair, which a few years ago 
provoked the wonder of the world and con- 
tributed to the gaiety of nations, strikingly 
illustrates that superstitious reverence. To 
future historians that apparently trivial police 
court incident gives a deeper insight into 
Prussian politics than many treatises on con- 
stitutional law, and the ingenious burglar 
showed a deeper understanding of the political 
psychology of his countrymen than many a 
Prussian statesman. And therefore the captain 
of Koepenick is more certain of passing down 
to posterity than Chancellor von Bethmann- 
Hollweg. 

The little town of Koepenick is about twelve 
miles distant from Berlin, on the Upper Spree, 
near Muggelsee. It possesses about twenty 
thousand inhabitants, and is one of the favourite 
excursion resorts of the east end of Berlin. 
On October 16, 1906, at one o'clock in the 
afternoon, a captain in uniform appeared at the 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 143 

rifle range of Plotzensee and commandeered a 
company of twelve soldiers who had just been 
relieved from service, ordering them to follow 
him to the neighbouring town of Koepenick. 
On arrival, the " captain " ordered them to load 
their guns and to put on their bayonets ; and to 
the amazement of the population he occupied 
with his little troop the town hall, whose issues 
were carefully guarded. He was acting in virtue 
of an order from the Emperor's Cabinet, to 
which the police submitted without making any 
further explanations. The "captain" ordered 
the offices of the mayor and treasurer to be 
opened to him. The population had gathered 
on the square before the town hall whilst the 
gendarmes were holding back the crowd. The 
" captain " ordered the mayor to close his 
accounts, and to hand over to him the municipal 
treasury, which amounted to four thousand and 
two marks. But there was a deficiency of one 
mark. With the presence of mind which he 
maintained to the end, the "captain" had a 
statement drawn up, and ordered the cashier to 
seal the bag containing the money, which by 
superior orders he had to remove to Berlin. 
The mayor and the treasurer were then con- 
ducted under military escort to their respective 
domiciles, where cabs, summoned by the police, 
were waiting to take them to Berlin. The wife 
of the mayor refused to be separated from her 



144 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

husband, and she took a seat with him in the 
cab. The brigadier of police took a seat in 
front of them and a grenadier took a place 
beside the cabman. The same procedure was 
followed with regard to the treasurer, and the 
two cabs started for the Berlin army head- 
quarters, where the " captain " arranged to join 
the prisoners, whilst he himself was leaving by- 
rail. When the cabs stopped in Berlin before 
the sentry at Unter den Linden, their arrival 
caused great sensation, and the officer on duty 
immediately telephoned to headquarters. The 
commander of Berlin, General von Moltke, ar- 
rived at once, and the mystery was discovered. 
The audacious " captain " had disappeared. 

It requires a stretch of imagination which 
exceeds the power of a jejune Englishman to 
realize that such an incident should have been 
possible in a capital of two million people at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. How 
is an insular Englishman to conceive of a 
burglar, merely because he has donned an 
officer's uniform, entering a town hall in 
glaring daylight ; arresting the mayor and 
officials ; ordering the books and the municipal 
treasury to be handed over to him ; sending 
the magistrates to prison in a cab ; and finally, 
walking away with the spoils, without having 
his authority once questioned by the bewildered 
but obedient municipal officers. In other 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 145 

countries such an incident would belong to 
comic opera. In Prussia it reveals the tragedy 
of despotism, the total absence of political 
initiative, the perversion of popular character, 
and the passive obedience of an unpolitical 
nation which yet claims to rule supreme over 
the civilized world. 

IV. 

A lover of paradox might plausibly contend 
that the German Socialist Party furnishes a more 
convincing proof than any other party of the 
military character of the Prussian monarchy. 
For the Prussian Social Democracy possesses 
in a sublime degree the same military virtues 
of passive obedience and discipline as the 
Kaiser's army. The Social Democratic Party 
is the army of labour, and the authority of 
" Kaiser Bebel," as he is nicknamed, is as 
absolute over this army of labour as the 
Kaiser's majesty over his Junkers. To the 
same military discipline we must attribute the 
law-abiding temper of the German Socialist, 
which is in such striking contrast with the revo- 
lutionary temper of Socialist parties everywhere. 
In other countries, for instance in Belgium, 
the Social Democratic Party possess as strong 
an organization as in Germany ; but that 
does not prevent the labourers from rising 

10 



i 4 6 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

against the powers that be. Street riots and 
barricades are not unfrequent episodes. In the 
last resort, when the claims which they assert are 
not granted, when legal means are exhausted, 
the Socialists appeal to the sanction of force. 
The Belgian Socialists in 1902 rose against the 
Conservative Government to secure the abolition 
of the electoral law and the plural voting 
system. Regiments were called out, and quelled 
the popular insurrection after several days' 
fighting. Only a few weeks ago they rose in 
spontaneous insurrection to protest against the 
increase of the Clerical majority at the parlia- 
mentary elections. 

In Prussia, for forty years, Socialists have 
protested by all legal means against an electoral 
law infinitely worse than the plural voting law 
of Belgium, against a law which even Bismarck 
proclaimed it necessary to amend. All those 
Socialist protests have been in vain, and the 
Prussian electoral law still subsists. Yet the 
Socialist Party does not rise. Bismarck again 
and again violated the Constitution of the land. 
But the Socialists have remained quiet, law- 
abiding citizens. 

At a distance Socialists appear formidable. 
In reality the Government does not fear 
them. Socialism is rather to the Prussian 
Government a useful bugbear to frighten the 
timid into reaction. Whenever the Social 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 147 

Democrat raises the red flag, the Government 
waves the black and white flag of the 
Hohenzollern. All loyal citizens rally round 
the Imperial banner, and the army and navy 
budgets are passed with acclamation. Without 
Socialism, reaction in Germany would be in a 
sorry plight. With the extreme division of 
parties in the Reichstag, the Government again 
and again would come to a deadlock. It is 
Socialism which supplies the propelling force. 
Even as in Belgium, where political conditions 
are very much like the conditions of Germany, 
the Socialist scare has kept the same Clerical 
Party in power for the unprecedented period of 
twenty-eight years, even so in Prussia Socialism 
has been the mainstay of reaction. 

And that is why, although the Socialists have 
an immense following, they have achieved very 
little. It is a singular and paradoxical fact that 
the most drastic Socialist legislation was passed 
before Socialism had become a party in the 
Reichstag. No social laws which have been 
voted for the last twenty years could compare 
for instance with the State Insurance laws, 
which were carried through at the very begin- 
ning of the present Kaiser's reign. And the 
reason is obvious. When the Socialist vote 
was only an insignificant minority, the Social 
Democrats were still surrounded with the halo 
and the prestige of terror, and the Government 



i 4 8 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

strained every effort to conciliate them, or to 
disarm their opposition. But now that the 
Socialist vote is counted by millions, the Ger- 
man Government have ceased to trouble, They 
have learned from experience how innocuous 
and law-abiding are the German "Genossen." 
They have learned from experience how 
much worse their bark is than their bite. 
The Government would indeed have dreaded 
the Social Democracy if, like the French 
Syndicalists, they had appealed to force. But 
the Prussian democracy does not appeal to 
force. In Prussia it is only the police and the 
Government that have -the sanction of brute 
force behind them. 



V. 



It may be contended that the military tradi- 
tions and the social and political organization 
are relics of a distant past, that a new spirit is 
revealing itself, that old Germany is rapidly 
passing away. There would be some reason 
for entertaining such a belief, if the political and 
moral ideals of the rising generation were not 
instinct with exactly the same military spirit as 
the old traditions and institutions. I know that 
the average journalist does not trouble much 
about ideals, and that he pays far more attention 
to a sensational move in the ever-changing chess 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 149 

game of politics. Yet, once more, if we want to 
make a reliable forecast of the future, we must 
not forget that it is ideals which in the long 
run count most in the practical policy of 
nations. Political institutions may only be 
historical survivals, but ideals always point to 
the future. To use Carlyle's expression, " The 
future is nothing but the c realized ideal ' of 
the people.'* Ideals, once they have taken firm 
possession of the national mind, are the guiding 
motives, the permanent forces, the lodestars of 
nations. The whole French Revolution is 
contained in Rousseau. The whole English 
Free Trade policy is contained in Adam Smith. 
English Radicalism is contained in Bentham and 
in Mill. English Toryism is contained in 
Burke. It is the moral and political ideals 
which, together with economic and geographical 
conditions, make human history. 

Now the moral and political ideals of Germany 
have never been more military, they have never 
been less pacific than they are to-day. The 
French people, the English, and even the 
Russians have long ceased to believe in war as 
the mainspring of human progress. Whether 
we take Bentham or Mill, Burke or Stephen, the 
English ideal is that of an industrial community, 
of a free commonwealth, not of a military 
State. The English ideal is that of a Recht- 
staat, not of a Kriegstaat. 



150 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Some of the most influential political 
philosophers of England have been under the 
influence of Darwin, of the doctrine of the 
struggle for life and the "survival of the fittest." 
And in our day we see many militarists still 
adducing Darwin as the exponent of a military 
philosophy. There could be no more shallow 
and confused interpretation of the Darwinian 
theory as applied to human society. For no 
thoughtful Darwinian would be prepared to 
admit that the fittest are the most warlike, and 
that the struggle for life must necessarily take 
the form of war. On the contrary, a Darwinian 
would remind us that war is the application of 
anti-Darwinian principles, and that war, like 
emigration, by eliminating the young and the 
brave, tends to the survival of the unfittest. 
To the English Darwinian philosopher the 
struggle for life takes many forms ; and the 
decisive struggle for life in modern humanity is 
not the external and superficial struggle of the 
battlefield, but the permanent and deeper 
internal struggle of the city, of the laboratory, 
of the workshop, of the home, of the soul, the 
struggle for political rights or legal rights, the 
struggle for religious freedom, the economic 
struggle for a living or for a higher standard of 
living, the struggle for truth. And therefore 
the martyr and civic hero is a truer apostle of 
the Darwinian theory than the soldier. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 151 

Such is the political philosophy of the 
Englishman, which has become the political 
philosophy of the European. Such also was the 
political philosophy of old Germany, of Herder 
and Goethe, of Lessing and Kant. Kant wrote 
in favour of perpetual peace. Lessing ex- 
pounded the " education of the human race." 
But not such is the political or moral ideal of 
modern Germany hypnotized by Prussia. That 
ideal is based on a totally different Welt- 
anschaung. Contemporary German philosophy 
is a " war philosophy." In France we may find 
isolated thinkers, like Joseph de Maistre, who 
are the apostles of war, who maintain that war 
is a divine and providential institution, one of 
the eternal verities. In Germany the para- 
doxes of De Maistre are the commonplaces of 
historians and moralists. To an Englishman 
war is a dwindling force, an anachronism. It 
may still sometimes be a necessity, a dura Lex, 
an ultima ratio, but it is always a monstrous 
calamity. In other words, to an Englishman 
war is evil, war is immoral. On the contrary, to 
the German war is essentially moral. Indeed, 
it is the source of the highest morality, of the 
most valuable virtues, and without war the 
human race would speedily degenerate. It is 
the mainspring of national progress. There are 
three causes which have ensured the present 
greatness of the German Empire : moral virtue 



152 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

in the individual, political unity, and economic 
prosperity. If we were to believe modern 
theorists, Germany owes all three to the 
beneficent action of war. Germany is not 
indebted for its culture to the genius of its 
writers or artists, but to the iron and blood of 
its statesmen and warriors. It is the glorious 
triumvirate of Bismarck, Moltke, and von 
Roon who have been the master-builders of the 
Vaterland. 

It may be contended that the same " war 
philosophy M still survives in France, all the 
preaching of Tolstoy, all Hague Conferences 
and Peace Congresses notwithstanding. And it 
may be argued that the universal popularity of 
Napoleon is in itself a sufficient proof of that 
military tendency of our age. But the pacific 
temper of the French people has been again and 
again demonstrated in recent times, and the 
worship of Napoleon has little in common with 
the "war philosophy" of Germany. What 
appeals to us in the Napoleonic campaigns is the 
romance of war, its glamour, its pomp and 
circumstance, the prodigious and unique story 
of the " Corsican adventurer." And what 
ennobles the Napoleonic wars is the Revolu- 
tionary ideal which they originally carried from 
one end of Europe to the other, the democratic 
institutions which the Imperial legions have 
done so much to spread. And what appeals in 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 153 

Napoleon himself is the statesman and lawgiver 
more than the soldier, and the lawgiver more than 
the statesman, and the man more than either the 
soldier, the statesman, or the lawgiver. It is the 
" man of destiny," the super-man, the Titanic 
personality, the sublime parvenu, that makes a 
universal appeal to the imagination of mankind. 

The doctrinaire militarist politics of Mommsen 
and Treitschke, of von Sybel and Houston 
Stewart Chamberlain, have nothing to do with 
the poetic interest which we take in the 
Napoleonic legend. Whether we are French 
or English we read the " Memoirs " of Marbot or 
S6gur, not as we read the cc Memoirs ' ' of Frederick 
the Great, but as we read the battles of the Iliad 
or of the Nibelungen, as we read the " War 
and Peace " of Tolstoy. When we read the 
immortal Russian novel, we do not pause and 
ponder to consider whether Tolstoy is in favour 
of war or against war. So little is our interest 
in the story identified with the pacifist principles 
of Tolstoy, that in most translations the philo- 
sophic part is entirely left out. Now it is exactly 
the philosophical, the moral significance of war, 
which arrests the Prussian mind. To him war 
is not merely a theme for poetry and romance. 
He does not admire it for its picturesqueness or 
its dramatic beauty. To him it has an austere 
grandeur, an intrinsic nobility. 

Our main contention then is, that as the 



154 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

pacific philosophy of Herder and Kant, or 
Goethe and Lessing provides the key to the 
old Germany described in Madame de StaeTs 
masterpiece, even so the military philosophy 
of Mommsen and Treitschke, of Bismarck 
and Nietzsche gives us the key of modern 
Prussianized Germany. The whole German 
people have become Bismarckian, and believe 
that it is might which creates right. The 
whole of the younger generation have become 
Nietzschean in politics, and believe in the will 
to power, der fVille zur Macht. That political 
philosophy is to-day the living and inspiring 
ideal which informs German policy. And it is 
that philosophy which we have to keep constantly 
in mind if we wish to understand the currents 
and undercurrents of contemporary politics and 
make a correct forecast of the future, if we wish 
to distinguish between what is real and unreal 
in international relations, between the professions 
of politicians and the aims and aspirations of the 
people. German statesmen may protest about 
their love of peace, but the service they render 
to peace is only lip service. Peace is only a 
means, war is the goal. We are reminded of 
Professor Delbruck's assertion that, considering 
the infinitely complex conditions of modern 
warfare, many years of peace are necessary to 
and must be utilized for the preparation of the 
wars which are to come. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 155 

How, then, can we be reassured by any- 
German pacifist protests and demonstrations ? 
How can we believe that German peace is any- 
thing more than a precarious truce as long as 
German statesmen, German thinkers, German 
teachers and preachers unanimously tell us that 
the philosophy of war is the only gospel of 
salvation ? How can a patriotic German, if he 
is consistent, abstain eventually from waging 
war when he is firmly convinced that his 
country owes her political unity, her moral 
temper, and her Imperial prosperity, whatever 
she is and whatever she has, mainly to the 
agency of war ? When war has done so much 
for Germany in the past, will it not do greater 
things for Germany in the future ? 

War may be a curse or it may be a blessing. 
If war is a curse, then the wells of public opinion 
have been poisoned in Germany, perhaps for 
generations to come. If war is a blessing, if 
the philosophy of war is indeed the gospel 
of the super-man, sooner or later the German 
people are bound to put that gospel into practice. 
They must look forward with anxious and eager 
desire to the glorious day when once more they 
are able to fight the heroic battles of Teutonism, 
when they are able to fulfil the providential 
destinies of the German super-race, the chosen 
champions of civilization. 



A PRUSSIAN GENERAL ON THE 
COMING WAR.* 

I. 

As a rule the deliberate military policy of a 
nation remains the secret of diplomacy and 
the afterthought of statecraft. As for military 
feeling and the military spirit, so far as they 
exist amongst the people, they generally re- 
main subconscious, unreasoned, and instinctive. 
It is therefore a piece of rare good fortune to 
the student of contemporary history when the 
designs of statesmen are carefully thought out 
and revealed by one who has authority to speak, 
and when the instinct of the masses is explained 
and made explicit by one who has the gift of 
lucid statement, of philosophical interpretation, 
and psychological insight. It is precisely those 
qualities and characteristics that give importance 
and significance to the recent book of General 

* General Friedrich von Bernhardi, " Deutschland und der 
Nachste Krieg." Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, Stuttgart und Berlin, 
1912. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 157 

von Bernhardt on " Germany and the Coming 
War." The author is a distinguished represent- 
ative of that Prussian Junkertum which forms 
the mainstay of the military party and which 
rules the German Empire. He therefore 
speaks from the inside. And his previous 
works have earned him a high reputation as 
an exponent of the science of war, and have 
worthily maintained the traditions of Clausewitz 
and Von der Goltz. Nor are these the only 
qualifications of the author. General von Bern- 
hardi's new book possesses other qualities which 
entitle him to a respectful hearing. He writes 
with absolute candour and sincerity ; his tone 
is unexceptionable ; he is earnest and dignified ; 
he is moderate and temperate ; he is judicial 
rather than controversial. Although the author 
believes, of course, that Germany stands in the 
forefront of civilization and has a monopoly of 
the highest culture, yet his book is singularly 
free from the one great blemish which defaces 
most German books on international politics — 
namely, systematic depreciation of the foreigner. 
Von Bernhardi does not assume that France is 
played out or that England is effete. He is 
too well read in military history not to realize 
that to belittle the strength or malign the 
character of an enemy is one of the most 
fruitful causes of disaster. 

Altogether we could not have a better guide 



158 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

to the study of the present international situa- 
tion from the purely German point of view, 
nor could we find another book which gives us 
more undisguisedly the "mentality,'* the pre- 
judices and pre-judgments, and opinions of the 
ruling classes. And it is a characteristically 
German trait that no less than one-third of 
the work should be given to the philosophy 
and ethics of the subject. General von Bern- 
hardi surveys the field from the vantage-ground 
of first principles, and his book is a convincing 
proof of a truth which we have expressed else- 
where that in Prussia war is not looked upon 
as an accident, but as a law of nature ; and not 
only as a law of nature, but as the law of 
man, or if not as the law of man, certainly 
as the law of the " German super-man." It 
is not enough to say that war has been the 
national industry of Prussia. It forms an 
essential part of the philosophy of life, the Welt- 
anschaung of every patriotic Prussian. Bern- 
hardi believes in the morality, one might almost 
say in the sanctity, of war. To him war is not 
a necessary evil, but, on the contrary, the source 
of every moral good. To him it is pacificism 
which is an immoral doctrine, because it is the 
doctrine of the materialist, who believes that 
enjoyment is the chief end of life. It is the 
militarist who is the true idealist because he 
assumes that humanity can only achieve its 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 159 

mission through struggle and strife, through 
sacrifice and heroism. It is true that Bern- 
hardi ignores the greatest of Prussian philoso- 
phers, whose immortal plea in favour of 
perpetual peace is dismissed as the work of 
his dotage. But if he dismisses Kant, he 
adduces instead a formidable array of thinkers 
and poets in support of his militarist thesis ; 
Schiller and Goethe, Hegel and Heraclitus in 
turn are summoned as authorities. Even the 
Gospels are distorted to convey a militarist 
meaning, for the author quotes them to remind 
us that it is the warlike and not the meek that 
shall inherit the earth. But Bernhardi's chief 
authorities are the historian of the super-race, 
the Anglophile Treitschke, and the philosopher 
of the super-man, Nietzsche. Nine out of ten 
quotations are taken from the political treatises 
of the famous Berlin professor, and the whole 
spirit of Bernhardt book is summed up in the 
motto borrowed from Zarathustra and inscribed 
on the front page of the volume : — 

"War and courage have achieved more great things 
than the love of our neighbour. It is not your sympathy, 
but your bravery, which has hitherto saved the shipwrecked 
of existence. 

" ' What is good ? ' you ask. To be brave is good." 
(Nietzsche's, "Thus spake Zarathustra," First Part, 
10th Speech.) 

It is no less characteristic of contemporary 



160 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

German political philosophy that from begin- 
ning to end Bernhardi maintains consciously, 
deliberately, a purely national attitude, and that 
he does not even attempt to rise to a higher 
and wider point of view. Indeed the main 
issue and cardinal problem, the relation of 
nationality to humanity, the conflict between 
the duties we owe to the one and the duties 
we owe to the other, is contemptuously relegated 
to a footnote (p. 19). To Bernhardi a nation 
is not a means to an end, a necessary organ of 
universal humanity, and therefore subordinate 
to humanity. A nation is an end in itself. It 
is the ultimate reality. And the preservation 
and the increase of the power of the State is the 
ultimate criterion of all right. " My country, 
right or wrong,*' is the General's whole system 
or moral philosophy. Yet curiously enough 
Bernhardi speaks of Germany as the apostle 
not only of a national culture, but of universal 
culture, as the champion of civilization, and he 
indulges in the usual platitudes on this fertile 
subject. And he does not even realize that in 
so doing he is guilty of a glaring contradiction ; 
he does not realize that once he adopts this 
standpoint of universal culture, he introduces 
an argument and assumes a position which are 
above and outside nationalism. For either the 
German nation is self-sufficient, and all culture 
is centred in and absorbed in Germany, in which 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 161 

case Prussian nationalism would be historically 
and philosophically justified ; or culture is 
something higher and more comprehensive and 
less exclusive, in which case national aims must 
be estimated and appraised with reference to a 
higher aim, and a national policy must be judged 
according as it furthers or runs counter to the 
universal ideals of humanity. 

General von Bernhardi starts his survey of 
the international situation with the axiom that 
Germany imperatively wants new markets for 
her industry and new territory for her sixty-five 
millions of people. In so doing, he only reit- 
erates the usual assumption of German political 
writers. And he also resembles the majority of 
his fellow publicists in this respect that he does 
not tell us what exactly are the territories that 
Germany covets, or how they are to be obtained, 
or how the possession of tropical or sub-tropical 
colonies can solve the problem of her population. 
But he differs from his predecessors in that he 
clearly realizes and expresses, without ambiguity 
or equivocation, that the assertion of her claims 
must involve the establishment of German 
supremacy, and he admits that those claims are 
incompatible with the antiquated doctrine of 
the balance of power. And von Bernhardi also 
clearly realizes that, as other nations will refuse 
to accept German supremacy, and to surrender 
those fertile territories which Germany needs, 

11 



162 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

German expansion can only be achieved as the 
result of a conflict — briefly, that war is unavoid- 
able and inevitable. 

First of all a war with France. And here 
again, in expressing his conviction that Germany 
must primarily settle accounts with the French 
people, the Prussian General involves himself in 
a curious contradiction. He tells us that Ger- 
many wants war because she wants an expansion 
of power and territory, which could only be 
obtained as the prize of victory. He ought, 
therefore, to accept, like a true disciple of 
Bismarck and Nietzsche, the full responsibility 
of the war. He ought to have the courage of 
his convictions. But the General has not that 
courage, and he refuses to incur that responsi- 
bility. He proceeds at once to shift the burden 
on to the French people, and he tells us that 
France ultimately must be held accountable, 
because France is still animated with the spirit 
of revenge, with the desire to avenge Metz and 
Sedan, and to recover her lost provinces. 

Now, whoever knows the state of public 
opinion in France also knows that the assertion 
of the General is absolutely contrary to fact, and 
that the French people will only fight if they 
are attacked. No doubt they will fight with 
grim determination if driven into war ; no 
doubt they will not allow themselves to be 
dispossessed of any part of their colonial empire 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 163 

simply because Germany wants an outlet for 
her population ; but it is certain that France 
will never be the aggressor, that she will never 
initiate a war either for revenge, or for honour, 
or for lust of territory. She will refuse to be 
the aggressor, not only because the stakes are 
too high and the country too rich and pros- 
perous, but because a war, whether successful or 
unsuccessful, would be fatal to the ruling classes 
of the Third Republic : if unsuccessful, the Re- 
public would be swept away in the disaster ; if 
successful, the victorious general would establish 
a dictatorship or restore the monarchy. 

Even as Bernhardi thinks a war with France 
unavoidable, so he believes that a war with 
England cannot be warded off. And here once 
more, with strange inconsistency and lack of 
moral courage, he would like to relieve his 
countrymen of a formidable responsibility. In 
his opinion it is England that is determined to 
attack Germany and to annihilate her fleet and 
her trade. But here again any one acquainted 
with the trend of public opinion in England 
knows that von Bernhardi is ludicrously wrong 
in assuming that England will gratuitously 
attack her neighbour. The writer himself 
admits that until 1902 the very possibility of a 
war with Germany had never entered the brain 
of an English statesman, whereas it is a bare fact 
that the probability of a war with England has 



164 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

occupied for forty years the thoughts of leading 
German historians and politicians. In one sense 
it is true that if German policy is really what he 
assumes it to be, Prussian diplomacy may so 
" shuffle the cards " that England may be com- 
pelled to take the initiative of war. And Bern- 
hardi is right in assuming that England might 
be driven into war, not only to repel an attack 
against her own shores, but to repel a wanton 
attack against France. England may have to 
wage war to maintain that very balance of 
power which the Prussian general dismisses so 
contemptuously as an exploded principle of 
policy. Many will agree that in such an 
event, England, in fighting for herself, would 
fight once again for European liberty. As in 
the days of Philip the Second, of Louis the 
Fourteenth, and Napoleon, England may have 
to defend once again the independence of the 
European continent. The English reader will 
have difficulty in repressing a smile when, by 
a curious inversion of parts, the gallant General 
claims for his own country this glorious position 
of champion of European liberty. For is it not, 
so he argues, the English mastery of the sea 
which is threatening the independence of all 
nations ? And he does not hesitate to urge 
this strange plea for the German Empire at 
the very same moment when he claims for the 
German Empire the undisputed supremacy of 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 165 

the Continent* Verily Prussian patriotism 
does lead its apostles to adopt strange readings 
of European history. 



II, 



Assuming the war with France and England 
to be inevitable, von Bernhardi realizes that the 
conflagration cannot be restricted to those two 
countries. Not only would the allies of the 
Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance be drawn 
in, but even the small neutral countries would 
not escape. Nations like Belgium, Holland, and 
Denmark could not possibly remain disinterested 
spectators, for Denmark would have to keep 
the gates of the Baltic open to the German fleet 
and keep them shut to the British fleet. If she 
did not consent to this, her territory would have 
to be occupied. Copenhagen would have to be 
bombarded as it was during the Napoleonic wars. 
And in the same way Belgium and Holland 
would have to keep the mouths of their rivers 
open to German traffic to supply Germany with 
foodstuffs, and to carry on German trade under 
a neutral flag. If they did not discharge that 
vital function they would have to be conquered. 
In short, even assuming England to retain the 

* It is true that in his new interpretation of European history, 
Napoleon was, as against England, the champion of European 
liberty. 



166 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

mastery of the sea, every move of England on 
the sea would have to be answered by a German 
conquest on the Continent. 

The war of to-morrow, therefore, will not be 
like the war of 1870, a war confined to two 
belligerent forces : it will be a universal 
European war. Nor will it be a humane war, 
subject to the rules of international law, and to 
the decrees of the Hague Tribunal : it will be 
an inexorable war ; or, to use the expression of 
von Bernhardi, it will be "a war to the knife." 
Nor will it be decided in a few weeks like the 
war of 1870 : it will involve a long and difficult 
campaign, or rather a succession of campaigns ; 
it will mean to either side political annihilation 
or supremacy. 

General von Bernhardi legitimately assumes 
that a war so momentous, so decisive, in which 
the whole future of his country is at stake, must 
be anxiously prepared for in every detail. And 
the preparation must be twofold : diplomatic and 
national. 

The diplomatic preparation can be summed up 
in one sentence : it must aim both at strength- 
ening the Triple Alliance and at weakening the 
Triple Entente. 

With regard to the weakening of the Triple 
Entente, von Bernhardi does not seem to be 
very hopeful. Recent events in Morocco have 
shown that it will not be easy to separate France 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 167 

and England. It is true, on the other hand, 
that at the Potsdam Conference, German diplo- 
macy succeeded in driving a wedge between 
France and Russia. But any rapprochement 
between Germany and Russia can only be 
temporary and precarious. The interests of the 
two Qovernments may be identical in both coun- 
tries, because there is a solidarity and complicity 
of despotism, but the interests of the two nations 
are absolutely opposed, and the Slav feeling in 
Germany, as in Austria and in Russia, is every 
year growing more bitter against the Teuton. 

German diplomacy must therefore devote 
itself mainly to strengthening the Triple 
Alliance, and this can only be done by two 
means : first, by consolidating the bond with 
Italy ; and secondly, by securing the support of 
young Turkey, and thus transforming the Triple 
Alliance into a Quadruple Alliance. 

The existing alliance with Italy has, unfor- 
tunately for Germany, been loosened by the 
Franco - Italian understanding, and by the 
Tripolitan War, and it is permanently en- 
dangered by Italy's determination to recover 
Trieste and the other Italian-speaking parts of 
the Austrian Empire. In order to be linked 
for ever to Austria and Germany, Italy must, 
therefore, be made to give up her irredentist 
aspirations. If Italy were ever to become an 
Adriatic Power, she would sooner or later come 



168 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

into conflict with Austria. On the contrary, if 
Italy could be made a Mediterranean Power, 
she would necessarily come into conflict with 
France and England. It must therefore be 
the constant endeavour of Austro-German 
diplomacy to divert Italian ambitions from the 
Adriatic to the Mediterranean, from the Eastern 
towards the Southern shores. And there are 
many signs to-day which indicate that the 
preaching of General von Bernhardi is meeting 
with an all too ready hearing in Italy. An in- 
fluential Nationalist section of the Italian people 
is bent on securing for Italy the possession of 
Tunis and Algeria, and on restoring in favour 
of Italy the ancient Mauretanian Empire of the 
Romans. These Mauretanian conquests shall 
be the prize of the Italian alliance with Ger- 
many and Austria in the coming war. 

The consolidated Triple Alliance must be 
still further strengthened by the adherence ot 
Turkey. Von Bernhardi is perfectly right in 
assuming that a Turkish alliance would be ot 
supreme advantage to Germany. The chief 
Mohammedan Power, if it took sides against 
England, would rouse the religious fanaticism 
of the Mussulman population of Egypt and 
India, and part of the British fleet might have 
to be diverted from Northern waters to quell a 
rebellion in the East. And there is consider- 
able danger that Turkey may be dragged into 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 169 

the Quadruple Alliance. As I have attempted 
to prove elsewhere, Germany is every day 
strengthening her grip of the Turkish Empire. 
But we may still hope that the Turks may see 
in time that a war with England would be 
suicidal, for although the Kaiser has pro- 
claimed himself the protector of three hundred 
million Mohammedans, it is more than doubtful 
whether he would be able to help them in their 
hour of need. In the present Tripolitan War, 
as well as in the Moroccan imbroglio, Turkey 
has had solemn warnings, and has been made 
to realize how little she can rely on German 
promises or on German support. Not to men- 
tion the danger arising from Russia, Constanti- 
nople would be at the mercy of a British fleet. 
Turkey would risk complete annihilation for 
the doubtful advantage of becoming, in case of 
victory, a German protectorate. 



III. 



If the views of General von Bernhardi's 
Realpolitik in matters of foreign policy are 
often unreal and fantastic, and do not resist 
the most superficial examination, it must be 
granted that he does not overrate their impor- 
tance. After all, the issue of the coming war will 
not rest with the diplomats, but with the Ger- 



170 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

man nation. For the "coming war" will be 
pre-eminently a national war, and must be met 
by national preparations. Victory can only be 
secured if every German citizen rises to the 
emergency, submits to the necessary sacrifices, 
and if the German State has the foresight and 
energy to make adequate financial, technical, 
and political preparations. 

With regard to the financial preparation, 
the great danger lies in the stinginess of the 
Reichstag. Its guiding principle seems to be that 
current military expenditure must be met from 
the ordinary revenue. Such a principle might 
be legitimate enough in ordinary times, but in 
critical times, such as those in which we are 
living, extraordinary needs must be met by 
extraordinary means — that is to say, by loans. 
The resources of the German taxpayer are very 
far from having reached their extreme limit. 
Whereas England pays for her army and navy 
twenty-nine marks per head of the population, 
Germany only pays sixteen. England has 
always set an example to other nations in ad- 
ministering her finances wisely and cautiously, 
and at the same time in providing liberally for the 
defences of the country. Let Germany imitate 
the example of England in both respects. The 
wars of the Revolution and the Empire were 
not paid out of the ordinary revenue, and after 
a hundred and twenty years the English tax- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 171 

payer is still paying off the enormous debt 
accumulated at the end of the eighteenth cen- 
tury. Yet English statesmen acted with supreme 
wisdom in thus burdening the future in order 
to secure a victory. For defeat would have 
mortgaged the future of the people far more 
than the heaviest loan. 

In discussing the technical preparation for 
the coming war, General von Bernhardi warns 
his countrymen against blindly accepting some 
universally prevalent assumptions, and especially 
the assumption that victory will be mainly en- 
sured by sheer weight of numbers. And here, 
unexpectedly enough, the militarist is almost 
found to agree with the pacifist. The General 
strongly protests against the odious rivalry in 
armaments and the superstitious belief in big 
battalions. He reminds us that in the past vic- 
tories have always been achieved by minorities. 
History has proved by examples innumerable 
that masses have only been a decisive factor in 
war when the adversaries were equal in all other 
respects, or when " the numerical superiority of 
one army exceeded the measure and proportion 
which is fixed by the law of numbers." But in 
most cases it was a particular advantage on one 
side — better equipment, superior valour of the 
troops, superiority in command or superiority 
in the motives of action— which ultimately 
secured victory even against overwhelming 



172 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

odds. Rome conquered the world with minori- 
ties. Frederick the Great with minorities de- 
fended himself against the Powers of Europe 
allied against him. Quite recently the Japanese 
army triumphed over adversaries enormously 
superior in numbers. 

Not only will victory not be decided by 
numbers, but numbers may prove a positive 
danger, for the greater the masses, the smaller 
the technical value of the troops. Unwieldy 
armies not only make far greater demands on 
the commanders and presuppose far greater 
organizing power, but they are also far more 
difficult to move, and mobility on the battle- 
field is one of the essential conditions of success. 

Quality, then, is far more important than 
quantity. In the infinitely complicated war of 
to-morrow, which will be full of surprises, 
everything will depend on the fighting qualities 
of the unit, on the initiative of the soldier — 
on the " personal equation " of the individual. 
And those indispensable military qualities can 
only be acquired by protracted service. At 
present universal service exists only in name, 
and the present German Government has tried 
to replace it by increasing to an enormous 
extent the reserve forces. Von Bernhardi has 
little faith in the reserve for offensive purposes, 
and he leaves us in no doubt as to his opinion 
by calling the reserve " a military proletariate." 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 173 

It is interesting to compare Bernhardt views 
with those of one of the ablest parliamentary 
leaders and publicists of Germany. Dr. Fried- 
rich Naumann has emphasized the fundamental 
differences between the war of yesterday and the 
war of to-morrow, and has pointed out what 
will be the chief difficulties the military com- 
mand will have to contend with. 

"The war of the future is a problem of economic 
organization of the most difficult nature and the highest 
technical achievement, such as has never been hitherto 
demanded from any army. The old military qualities 
must give way to the organizing qualities. No doubt the 
courage and endurance of the individual soldier must 
remain for all times the foundation of military power, but 
organizing genius is required in order not to waste that 
courage and endurance. This is clearly shown from a 
mere examination of the colossal numbers engaged. To 
transport, to locate, and to feed these masses of men is the 
daily preoccupation of the military authorities. That they 
rightly understand the nature of the problem is certain, 
but it is very doubtful wliether the problem can ever be 
adequately solved by commanders who are recruited from 
the Junkertum. Mere military capacity does not suffice 
here. Both enemies and friends admit that our corps 
of officers possess such military capacity. Anxiety only 
arises with regard to their other qualifications. We know 
that our nation possesses in its industries successful 
organizers, brains accustomed to direct great quantities 
of material and ' personnel ' — men who create new con- 
ditions of life for whole economic districts without having 
to appeal to any mystical authority. As democratic 
politicians we may often have to oppose bitterly those 
captains of industry, but if it comes to war we shall be 



174 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

willing to be led by them, because we know that they 
have the brains. It is true that they must not meddle 
with the technical duties of the officers, but the adminis- 
tration of the war material must be their province. And 
even with regard to the technique of war, it becomes 
from year to year more questionable whether this can be 
managed more efficiently by a corps of noblemen than 
by the representatives of middle-class technique. How- 
ever much we may value the moral qualities of the old 
ruling class — and, with all political differences of opinion, 
we shall not minimize those qualities — we must admit 
that we are witnessing a transformation of methods of 
attack and defence which in addition to the old question 
of iron discipline raises the modern question : how far 
shall we be able on the battlefield to replace the human 
unit through machinery? It is obvious that this will 
never succeed completely, for there does not exist a 
machine which does not need a human soul to work it. 
At the same time it is doubtless that in this direction 
mighty changes are at hand. We can see here a repeti- 
tion of the process which we notice in nearly all in- 
dustries — the subordination and displacement of human 
labour in mines, machines, and means of transport. If 
you examine a weaving mill you shall find comparatively 
few men : the whole place is already full of the produce 
of labour which has been accomplished elsewhere. Even 
so in war : the front ranks must be supplied with human 
units in as limited a quantity as possible; but those units 
must have the mechanical ability in the blood. Those 
conditions do already exist to a large extent in naval 
warfare. Ships are built and equipped with an in- 
significant number of men compared to their fighting 
power. But those men must work like animated 
machines. Even so the air fleet of to-morrow will 
demand a large amount of technical application and 
technical ability, but very few military units. War is 
becoming impersonal, and is becoming reduced to a 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 175 

rivalry of money and economics. That even here mili- 
tary members of the nobility may achieve great results is 
shown by the admirable example of Count Zeppelin. 
But the impression remains that there still survive in the 
army the traditions of the pre-industrial age — traditions 
not only of loyalty and discipline, but also of technical 
ignorance. We have still too much of the parade soldier 
whose knees are more pliable than his fingers or his 
brain. The industrializing of the army is coming, but 
very slowly. It begins with the artillery, but it ends at 
the cavalry. We have still failed fully to realize that 
under a system of universal service a nation pays and 
labours in order that its weapons shall be absolutely 
of the first class. The nation which can put the best 
technique into the military service will probably, in the 
altered conditions of modern warfare, achieve victory." 

Whether Dr. Naumann is right or wrong, 
there can be no doubt that General von 
Bernhardi studiously avoids the tremendous 
economical and organizing issues raised by- 
modern warfare ; and the reason probably is 
that he could not have done so without tres- 
passing on the province of controversial politics. 
He would have had to examine whether the 
patriarchal and feudal regime in Germany is 
calculated to encourage that organizing genius 
and that technical preparation which, according 
to Dr. Naumann, will be so vital in the war of 
the future. 



176 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM, 



IV. 



We do not feel qualified to discuss the 
technical merits of Bernhardt proposals, but 
with regard to his plan of campaign we draw 
special attention to the two chapters on the 
naval part. The Leitmotiv of those chapters 
is that German naval strategy will have to be 
mainly defensive. But although the German 
navy will have to fight under the cover of her 
coast defences, she may utilize the favourable 
opportunity to make surprise attacks on the 
British fleet. Nor must we forget that the 
German army will be able to co-operate with 
the naval defences. After all, the ultimate 
issues of the campaign in the future, as in the 
past, must depend on the land forces ; and it 
is on the Continent, in France or Belgium, that 
the decisive battles will be fought. 

Precisely because the final issue will largely 
depend on the personality of the soldier, the 
moral and civic preparation must be at least 
as important as the technical, and here the 
Government has an important part to play 
through the school and through the Press. 
Both the school and the Press must both persistently 
emphasize the meaning and the necessity of war as 
an indispensable means @f policy and of culture^ and 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 177 

must inculcate the duty of personal sacrifice. 
To achieve that end the Government must 
have its own popular papers, whose aim it 
will be to stimulate patriotism, to preach 
loyalty to the Kaiser, to resist the disintegrat- 
ing influence of Social Democracy. 

But not least important is the political prepara- 
tion for the war. Statesmanship and diplomacy 
confine themselves too much to consolidating 
alliances and entering into new understand- 
ings. Nothing could be more dangerous than 
to rely too much on treaties and alliances. 
Alliances are not final. Agreements are only 
conditional. They are only binding, rebus sic 
standibus y as long as conditions remain the 
same — as long as it is in the interest of the allies 
to keep them ; for nothing can compel a state 
to act against its own interest, and there 
is no alliance or bond in the world which 
can subsist if it is not based on the mutual 
advantage of both parties. It is therefore 
essential that the war shall be fought under such 
conditions that it shall be in the interest of 
every ally to be loyal to his engagements ; 
and therefore it is essential for the State so 
to direct and combine political events as to 
produce a conjuncture of interests and to pro- 
voke the war at the most favourable moment. 

There seems to prevail the idea that Ger- 
many ought on no account to take the often- 

12 



178 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

sive. For ten pages von Bernhardi strongly 
opposes that popular assumption, and urges 
the necessity for Germany to take the initia- 
tive. He protests against a timorous and 
expectant policy ; there may be in the his- 
tory of the nation moments so critical that it 
becomes the duty of the rulers to take the 
initiative. 

" Wherever we open the book of history we find every- 
where evidence of the fact that wars begun with virile 
decision at the right moment have produced, politically 
as well as socially, the happiest results. On the contrary, 
political weakness has only produced misery, because 
the statesman lacked the decision to take upon himself 
the responsibility of a necessary war, because he expected 
to bring about by diplomatic negotiations the solution of 
irreconcilable conflicts. 

" The Great Elector has laid the corner-stone of Prussian 
power by successful offensive wars. Frederick the Great 
has laid the corner-stone of Prussian power by successful 
offensive wars, and has followed the traces of his glorious 
ancestor. He noticed how his state hovered in an 
untenable intermediate position between that of a petty 
principality and that of a Great Power, and he showed 
himself determined to give a decisive character to this 
ambiguous existence. The aggrandizement of his territory 
had become a necessity if Prussia wanted to exist on 
a business footing and bear its royal name with honour. 
The king saw this political necessity, and took the bold 
decision to challenge Austria. None of the wars which 
he waged were forced upon him. None did he postpone 
to the last extremity. Always he reserved it to himself 
to initiate the attack, to forestall his adversaries, and to 
secure the roost favourable chances." 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 179 

" The great art of politics," says Frederick the 
Great, " is not to swim against the stream, but 
to turn every condition to one's own advantage." 
The art of politics consists much more in 
utilizing favourable conjunctures than in pre- 
paring for those conjunctures. Cleverness is 
better calculated to preserve what one already 
possesses ; boldness alone is capable of adding to 
one's possessions. When Frederick heard the news 
of the Emperor Charles the Sixth's death, he 
said to his privy councillors : " I will submit 
a problem to you. When one has an advantage 
over one's opponent, must one or must one 
not utilize it ? " 

This necessity for Germany to abandon a 
" timorous and expectant policy" is the Leitmotiv 
of von Bernhardi's book. " In a bold initiative 
lies our salvation to-day as much as in the 
times of Frederick the Great. We must look 
at this truth with a clear eye." 

" It may be objected, no doubt, that an aggression on 
the part of Germany might produce an unfavourable 
position by bringing about those very conditions under 
which the Franco-Russian alliance would come into force. 
If we did attack France or Russia, either ally would be 
compelled to come to the rescue, and we would find 
ourselves in a much worse position than if we had only 
to combat one adversary. // must therefore be the duty 
of our diplomacy so to shuffle the cards as to compel 
France to attack us. We might then expect that Russia 
might remain neutral. 



180 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

" One thing is certain, we shall not determine France to 
attack us by mere passive waiting. Neither France nor 
Russia nor England need attack us to obtain what they 
want. As long as we are afraid to be the aggressors, 
they can, through diplomatic means, subject us to their will, 
as has been proved by the recent Moroccan events. And 
therefore, if we wish to bring about an attack on the part 
of our enemies we must initiate a political action which, 
without attacking France, yet will hurt her interests, and 
those of E?igland, so severely that both states will feel 
obliged to attack us. The possibilities for such a procedure 
present themselves as well in Africa as in Europe." 



V. 



With these unmistakable and ominous words 
of the Prussian General we conclude our ex- 
amination of his book, for they convey its most 
instructive lesson and they express its main 
significance. 

It cannot be said that, so far as the probable 
issue of the coming war is concerned, the author 
has lifted the veil which hides the future from 
us. Rather has he made darkness more visible. 
Precisely in emphasizing that the moral factor 
will be the decisive one, he has deepened the 
mystery and uncertainty, because moral forces 
cannot be calculated. And the very fact that 
the " coming war " will be one of life and 
death is in favour of France, for it ought to 
inspire the French with the courage of despair. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 181 

The interest and importance of the book, 
therefore, is not due to any fresh light 
which it throws on the military problem. 
Rather is it due to the vivid light which it 
throws on the state of public opinion in 
Germany, and especially on the "mentality" 
of those in high places. The General has 
spoken with the frankness of the soldier, and 
not with the reticence of the diplomat. The 
British people will be grateful to the gallant 
soldier for his candour, however cynical. They 
will remember some of his admissions and 
some of his indiscretions, and they will perhaps 
be less inclined to political optimism — less 
inclined to assume that the present differences 
between Germany and England are to be 
removed by international courtesies, by Parlia- 
mentary visits and banquets, or that the present 
difficulties will be solved by a policy of passive 
acquiescence and blissful repose. 



NATIONALISM IN GERMANY 

AND 

THE PERVERSION OF PATRIOTISM. 

The erroneous political philosophy which in 
Germany has produced the prevailing militarism 
has also resulted in a perverted, exclusive, and 
aggressive nationalism. Whereas England has 
slowly extricated herself from the shackles of a 
narrowing and insular patriotism, and has risen 
to a higher and nobler conception of a free 
empire, the German people still continue to 
worship the old heathen idols of jingoism. 



I. 

There is no task which is more urgently 
needed to-day than a careful and systematic 
working out of a true philosophy of patriot- 
ism, and a searching criticism of the current 
political ethics, mainly in their international 
aspects. The most confused notions continue 
to prevail on the relations of one nation to 
another, on the relations of nationality to 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 183 

humanity, on our respective duties to the one 
and to the other. Yet those questions are 
not only of vital philosophical value, but also 
of far-reaching practical importance, for on the 
answer which we shall give to them must 
depend in many cases the issues of peace and 
war. 

We seem to take our moral philosophy from 
two entirely different sources, according as it is 
concerned with private or with public life. Our 
private morality we take from the Gospels, but 
our public morality we take from paganism. 
In the one we recognize the jurisdiction of 
Christ ; in the other we proclaim our allegiance 
to Caesar. Once we have crossed the national 
frontier, our neighbour ceases to be a fellow- 
Christian ; he becomes a foreigner and an alien, 
and in our relations to him we obey a different 
moral code. Virtues and vices change names ; 
collective egotism is dignified into the virtue 
of patriotism ; deceit, lying, double-dealing, 
which would dishonour a private citizen, are 
dignified into principles : the Will to Power, or 
the raison d'itat. Greed and pride, which in 
private life would be cardinal sins, become 
political virtues, and assume the disguise of a 
noble ambition and a high sense of honour. 

Patriotism, therefore, very far from being the 
simple and obvious idea which we assume it to 
be, is essentially complex and contradictory. If 



i&4 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

it has inspired the most heroic deeds, it has also 
been perverted to the most ignoble uses. And 
the moral perversion is based on an intel- 
lectual confusion. And as this intellectual 
confusion arises from the fact that we fail to 
distinguish the different elements which it con- 
tains, our first task must be one of careful 
dissociation and analysis. 

In its primary sense patriotism is the love 
of our native country. It is a beneficent pro- 
vision of nature by which the barren plains and 
bleak climates of the North inspire as passionate 
a devotion in man as the smiling vineyards and 
the radiant sunshine of the South. The moral 
idea need not enter into this elemental love. 
It is born of habit and instinct, of association 
and adaptation, and we deserve no credit for it. 
As Montaigne already remarked in the sixteenth 
century, the " savages of Scotland do not care 
for the gardens of Touraine." We do not love 
our country because it is beautiful or wealthy ; 
we love it because it is our native country. 

In another and wider sense, and considered 
from the point of view of the community and 
not from the point of view of the individual, 
patriotism is mainly the instinct of self-preserva- 
tion. It is the collective instinct which compels 
the citizen to rise in defence of his country 
when it is threatened by a foreign invader. It 
is the same feeling which animated the Red 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 185 

Indians to defend their virgin forests against 
the " pale-face " intruder, and which during 
the great Revolution sent fourteen armies to 
the frontier. This patriotism, again, is not in 
itself a moral virtue. Rather is it an organic 
necessity. It is a spontaneous vital reaction 
of the community. It may lead to heroic 
deeds, just as maternal love inspires the most 
sublime sacrifice even in jackals and tigers. 
Very frequently it is conducive to the most 
flagrant violation of right. It is often only a 
pretext to invade and despoil our neighbours. 
Patriotism, as has been said, is often the last 
refuge of a scoundrel. 

But in our complicated and artificial civiliza- 
tion it is but seldom that we meet patriotism in 
its primitive and instinctive forms. It is gener- 
ally mixed up with other elements. It is not 
only the spontaneous love of the individual for 
the country of his birth — it is not only the 
spontaneous reaction of the community in time 
of danger — patriotism becomes an absolute 
principle, an ideal of public duty, the most 
comprehensive of virtues. 

It is at this point, when we try to dissociate 
the natural and instinctive elements and the 
moral and artificial elements which enter into 
the composition of patriotism, that one difficulty 
after another arises to confront us. Why should 
we owe a duty to the nation merely as such, 



1 86 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

and what is the moral foundation of nation- 
ality? Why should we necessarily consider a 
nation as an Absolute, as a moral personality, 
when it is often only a geographical expression, 
or a state based on physical force, or a territory 
which may be merely the spoils of conquest ? 
And why should there be a double and often 
contradictory morality? Why should the moral 
law which guides us in private life cease to 
guide us in public life ? And even though our 
country may have a right in the hour of danger 
to claim the sacrifice of our lives, why should 
it also have a right to claim the surrender of 
our moral conscience ? And ought not the 
national ideal be kept in strict subordination 
to the higher ideals of humanity ? 

If we examine the different answers which 
have been given to those questions we shall 
find them equally wrong. The answer of the 
man in the street is superficial or immoral ; the 
answer of the philosopher is inadequate and 
unreal. 

The general assumption which underlies the 
argument of the philosopher is that we can only 
realize our highest moral ideals in the State and 
through the State, and that in the State we live 
and move and have our being. But this 
assumption demands considerable qualification, 
and is mainly a survival of antiquity. It is 
derived from a time when the State — the 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 187 

Politeia or Civitas — absorbed all the activities, 
temporal and spiritual, of the citizen ; when 
the State was indeed the source of all human 
morality, of human knowledge and human art. 
But Christianity has broken up the ancient 
State, and has divested it of most of its moral, 
religious, and artistic attributes. Christianity 
has given us a divided duty. It has introduced 
the internal and eternal struggle between the City 
of Man and the City of God. Modern thought 
has completed the disintegrating process, and 
to-day, in addition to the conflict between the 
selfish individual impulses and the duty which 
we owe to the State, we are distracted between 
the claims of the narrow national activities and 
the wider human activities. So far is the State 
from being the foundation of morality, that 
moral progress has generally been obtained in 
defiance of national law ; so far is the national 
state from entirely absorbing our activities, that 
all the highest activities of man — art, science, 
and religion — are to-day not national but inter- 
national. 

The classical doctrine, then, provides far too 
narrow a foundation for modern patriotism and 
modern nationality. It does not take into 
account the subtle and complex changes which 
have passed over the modern world ; it does 
not enlighten us on the manifold conflicts of 
our divided duties. 



1 88 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

On the other hand, can it be said that the 
popular conception of patriotism is any more 
satisfactory than the abstract doctrines of phi- 
losophers ? Is the wisdom of the people wiser 
than the wisdom of the theorist ? Shall we 
find a more secure foundation for patriotism 
in any assumed superiority of culture of one 
nation over another? 

Is the Hungarian patriot justified in forcing 
the Magyar culture on the Croatian and Rou- 
manian people simply because in his opinion 
Magyar culture is superior ? Is a Russian and 
Prussian patriot justified in imposing Russian 
and Prussian culture upon the Polish nation 
because they are assumed to be superior to 
Polish culture? Would England be justified 
in imposing English culture on the South 
African Dutch because English culture is 
assumed to be superior to the Dutch ? 

In reply to that argument we assert that the 
superiority of any one culture cannot possibly 
be proved. On the contrary, it can be proved 
that no such superiority does exist ; and even 
if it did exist, it could not justify outside 
interference. 

Our first contention is that no absolute 
superiority of one civilized people over another 
can be proved. Experience shows that any 
assumption of superiority is purely subjective 
and arbitrary, and is invariably challenged by a 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 189 

contrary assumption on the part of other nations. 
Not only every great nation but every small 
nation brings forward the same claims, and is 
equally proud of its historic achievements. 
Italians and Spaniards, Dutchmen and Belgians, 
Danes and Swedes, Russians and Germans, 
Englishmen and Frenchmen, all boast equally 
of their superior culture. 

And our second contention is that if the 
superiority of one nation over another cannot 
be proved, it is for the simple reason that such 
superiority does not exist. For where would be 
the final criterion of such superiority ? Would 
it be in the realm of thought or in the realm of 
action ? Would it be in science or in religion, 
in painting or in music, in commerce or in 
politics ? No nation is superior to another 
nation in every one of those activities, and it is 
impossible to assert which of those activities is 
more important than the other. As the result 
of a natural law and of a universal law which 
we shall presently examine, in virtue of the law 
of economy and the law of compensation, we 
generally find that in proportion as one nation 
is superior in one activity it will be inferior in 
another direction. If the Englishman may claim 
superiority in politics, the German may claim 
superiority in music, in art, or in philosophy. 

And our third contention is that, even if the 
superiority of one nation could be proved, it 



190 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

would not justify that aggressive policy "which 
is the policy recommended by the average 
patriot. Because the German is superior to the 
Pole or to the Tchech it does not justify him 
in depriving the Tchech or the Pole of their 
land or their language or their political rights, 
not only because the Pole might one day him- 
self become superior, if he were allowed to 
expand, but simply because moral or political 
superiority cannot be imparted by force — simply 
because in oppressing the Pole the Prussian 
would not improve the Pole, but would himself 
deteriorate below the level of the Pole. Violence 
demoralizes both the people who use it and the 
people against whom it is being used. 

There may be extreme cases where outside 
interference is justified, as in the case of the 
colonization of a degraded race by a demon- 
strably superior race, as in the case of the 
domination of a white race over a coloured race. 
But even if we assume that the rule of the white 
race over a coloured race invariably benefits the 
black or the yellow race, such interference is 
irrelevant to the argument of patriotism. The 
Englishman does not interfere in Africa or in 
Asia mainly in order to introduce English 
civilization : he interferes in the name of our 
common Christianity and humanity. In India, 
after one hundred and fifty years of rule, the 
English do not think themselves justified in 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 191 

forcing upon the natives specific English institu- 
tions like representative government or trial by 
jury. Nor have they even used their political 
power to introduce Christianity. The right of 
intervention in the case of inferior races is not 
limited to one nation — it is a right, and indeed a 
duty, which is supposed to be common to all 
Western powers. It is the duty of the white 
man, who claims this additional burden, because 
he is stronger to bear it. So true is this that 
the colonization and evangelization of the dark 
places of the earth — the "partition" of Africa 
and of Asia — has been arranged in our days 
by international agreements. It has not been 
claimed as the sole right or duty or " provi- 
dential " mission of one supreme Power. 

We must therefore seek elsewhere for the 
moral foundations of patriotism. We must seek 
other reasons to justify the principle of nation- 
ality, and we shall find that those reasons are 
exactly the opposite of the reasons which are 
generally advanced. The ultimate moral reason 
for the existence and maintenance of those 
political units which we call nationalities lies 
not in the exclusive superiority of any nation, 
but, on the contrary, in the limitations which 
are incidental to every nation. We believe 
in nationality, not because any one nation has 
monopolized all the virtues, but because no 
nationality can possibly monopolize or has 



192 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

monopolized all the virtues ; because each 
nation has only received certain specific gifts ; 
and because other nations and other conditions 
are required to develop other gifts which may 
be equally important. We believe in nationality, 
not in order that all nations shall be made 
similar — not in order that there may be estab- 
lished one abode of political perfection, one 
ideal commonwealth — but because in God's 
universe there must be many mansions. 

And we prefer the diversity of nationalities 
rather than the uniformity of a universal Roman 
Empire for the same reasons which make us 
prefer the varied landscape of coast and moun- 
tain rather than the uniform level of one vast 
plain, however rich and fertile. We prefer the 
diversity of nationality for exactly the same 
reasons which make us prefer individuality and 
personality rather than the sameness of an 
abstract type. As no climate or country can 
produce all the fruits of the earth, so no single 
nation can produce all the fruits of culture. As 
the English soil does not produce grapes, so the 
English temperament does not produce plastic 
art, and has left it to the southern nations to 
create the divine harmonies of music. England 
is a great civilization ; but, great as it is, it is not 
complete. 

Ours is a "pluralistic" universe, to use the 
expression of William James, a universe of free 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 193 

activities ; and this pluralistic principle applies to 
the political world as much as to the moral and 
spiritual world. All nations are complementary. 
No national civilization is complete, and its in- 
completeness is the necessary result of a natural 
law ; whether we call that law the law of com- 
pensation, or the law of limitation, or the law of 
division of labour, or of differentiation, or the law 
of variation ; or whether we call it, in philosophical 
language, the principium individuationis, of individ- 
uality and personality ; or whether we attribute 
it, with the theologian, to the taint of original 
sin and the imperfection of human nature. 

Therefore separate nations can only develop 
in some directions, and all superiority in one 
direction must be paid for by inferiority in an- 
other direction. A few chosen individuals — a 
Leonardo da Vinci, a Michael Angelo, a Goethe — 
may escape from this fatality. Whole nations, 
millions of individuals, cannot escape from it ; 
and for that reason we find that some nations 
are great in the arts of peace and others in the 
art of war. Some are supreme in commerce, 
others in philosophy. Some are supreme in 
theology, others are supreme in science. And 
for the same reason it is in the greatest nations 
that we find the most startling shortcomings 
and deficiencies. England has not produced 
one single supreme musician or sculptor \ 
Germany has not produced one single comic 

13 



1 94 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

poet ; Scotland has not produced one single 
mystic thinker ; Spain has not produced one 
single supreme scientist. 

Each nation, then, by virtue of its economic 
conditions, agricultural or industrial — by virtue 
of its geographical position, insular or con- 
tinental, mountainous or level — by virtue of its 
historic traditions, military or peaceful, Catholic 
or Protestant — develops a culture of its own, 
strictly limited, necessarily imperfect. And it is 
precisely because of those limitations and imper- 
fections, and in order to ensure the diversity and 
complexity of humanity, that as many nations as 
possible should be allowed to retain and develop 
their individuality — their artistic, religious, in- 
tellectual, and political personality. To subject 
Europe to the influence or to the political con- 
trol of one single Power would be to transform 
Europe into a Chinese Empire. Even assuming 
Germany, England, or France to be vastly 
superior to their neighbours, the supremacy of any 
one nation would be a catastrophe for civiliza- 
tion. It would damage both the victor and the 
vanquished, and it would damage the victor 
more than the vanquished. The vanquished 
might develop certain qualities under suffering 
and persecution, the victor would be demoralized 
by the use of brute force, and his spiritual 
superiority would disappear by the very abuse 
he would make of it. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 195 

The invariable verdict of universal history is 
against any monopoly and supremacy — against 
any form of aggressive Imperialism, political or 
religious, imposing its rule in the name of a 
higher civilization. The Roman Empire was 
destroyed by the very weapons which were used 
to subject inferior races. The Romans were 
the victims of the very tyranny which they used 
against others, and Roman decadence was only 
arrested because the policy of aggressive 
Imperialism was reversed ; because the spiritual 
forces of religion, law, education, and com- 
mercial intercourse were eventually substi- 
tuted for temporal supremacy ; and because 
even the barbarians were granted the same 
political rights as the citizens of Imperial Rome. 
But even thus the revival of the Roman Empire 
was only temporary, and a time came when the 
unity and uniformity of Rome were replaced by 
the infinite diversity of the Middle Ages. 

Even at its best Imperialism is not a human 
ideal. Civilization is not based on unity, but 
on diversity and personality, on individuality 
and originality. And if there is one lesson 
which history preaches more emphatically than 
another, it is this : that small nations have in 
proportion contributed infinitely more than 
great empires to the spiritual inheritance of our 
race. Little Greece counts more than Imperial 
Rome ; Weimar counts more than Berlin ; 



196 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Bruges and Antwerp and Venice count more 
than the world-wide monarchy of Spain ; and the 
dust of the Campo Santo of Florence or Pisa 
is more sacred than a hundred thousand square 
miles of the black soil of the Russian Empire. 

No doubt there must be unity in the funda- 
mentals, economic and religious, of human 
civilization. As the infinitely varied phenomena 
of life suppose common chemical and physio- 
logical processes of combustion, of respiration, 
and circulation, even so the infinite complexity 
of social life supposes a common foundation. 
Full scope must be given to the diversity of 
human nature and human personality. 

In conclusion, then, our political philosophy 
in general, and our philosophy of patriotism in 
particular, require complete revision. True 
patriotism is at the opposite pole from jingoism. 
The ideal of nationality is not born of pride, 
but of humility. Nationality is not based on 
the superiority of any one people, but upon the 
limitations common to all mortality. Nation- 
ality does not justify the supremacy of the 
strong : it imposes and presupposes a scrupu- 
lous regard for the equal rights of the weak, who 
may be superior in moral culture in proportion 
as they are inferior in military power. 

In the light of the foregoing principles the 
word "empire" completely changes its meaning. 
The modern empire has nothing in common 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 197 

with the empires of the past. The modern 
empire may be based on identity of language, 
although the British Empire includes French- 
speaking and Dutch-speaking peoples, and 
although the Austro-Hungarian Empire is a 
very Babel of nations. The modern empire 
generally assumes community of political ideals. 
It never implies the rule of a suzerain people 
over subject races. It is not based on despot- 
ism, but on voluntary co-operation. It is 
essentially a federation of self-governing com- 
munities, and is presided over by an older, 
wiser, and more experienced people, primus 
inter pares, which establishes its rule not on 
brute force, but on the force of suasion and 
example and sacrifice. 

If those principles are correct — if each nation- 
ality must be conceived as one out of many 
specialized organs of human culture — if the 
theory of nationality is indeed the application 
to the science of politics of the principles of 
compensation, concentration, and division of 
labour — then it must necessarily follow that 
nationality can be neither final nor exclusive, 
neither absolute nor universal. 

The national ideal cannot have absolute value. 
The universal only is absolute ; and a national 
ideal, as such, cannot be universal. If it were, 
it would cease to be national ; it would neces- 
sarily appeal to universal humanity. 



198 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

And national ideas as such cannot be final. 
Nationality is the means and condition of human 
advance , but it is humanity which is the goal. 
By definition, nationality is deficient and limited. 
We must submit to and work within those 
limitations. We must not glorify those limita- 
tions into perfections. We must lay upon our 
souls the humblest tasks of citizenship. We 
must not claim for this humble service the 
august significance and the unlimited scope of 
the service of man. As we stated before, the 
highest activities of mankind — art, science, and 
religion — have all ceased to be national. They 
have all become international. 

And the national ideal cannot be exclusive. 
We must see to it that humanity shall not 
suffer from exclusive absorption in national 
aims. And above all, we shall never allow the 
national ends to be in opposition to the interests 
of humanity. In order to be good Englishmen 
and good Germans we must first of all be good 
Europeans. There exists a solidarity of Europe 
and America against Asia and Africa. An 
offensive alliance of one European nation with 
an Asiatic people against another European 
nation — as, for instance, the alliance of England 
and Japan against Russia, or the alliance of 
Germany with Turkey, or the old diabolical 
compacts of the English and the French with 
the Red Indians — is a crime against civilization. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 199 

And therefore the popular catch-word, " My 
country right or wrong," is a perversion of 
patriotism. Wrong does not cease to be wrong, 
and injustice and persecution do not cease to be 
injustice and persecution, simply because, instead 
of being inflicted upon individuals, they are 
inflicted upon millions of sufferers. We know 
that in the world of crime there exist admirable 
examples of devotion— that even a burglar may 
be loyal to another burglar unto death ; but a 
citizen owes no loyalty to national crime. I 
shall not stand by my country if she is morally 
wrong; and the highest service 1 can render 
her is to prove that she is wrong, and to 
prevent her from persisting in the wrong. 
If I cannot persuade my country when she 
pursues an unjust policy, all I can do is to 
wish and pray that she may not succeed, and 
that she may be defeated : for a defeat on 
the battlefield may be a great blessing — the 
only means to bring a nation back to sanity 
and to see the evil of her ways ; whilst victory 
obtained in a wrong cause may be the most 
awful calamity that can befall a nation, and one 
that may deflect the whole course of national 
history. 



200 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 



II. 



The political philosophy which we have just 
outlined has been slowly gaining ground in 
England. The English ideal of nationality has 
been broadening out into the ideal of a federa- 
tion of nations, and the English conception of 
patriotism has been undergoing a correspond- 
ing change. We are not reverting to the vague 
cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century, but 
we are more and more abandoning that spurious 
and narrow jingoism which can be best described 
as collective egotism, and which remains the 
most formidable stumbling-block in the advance 
of humanity. We still retain the permanent 
foundation, the eternal human element, the love 
of the native city. Indeed, our relationship to 
the city is growing more intimate. We are 
again looking at the city with the passionate 
devotion of a citizen of mediaeval Florence or 
Venice. We are gradually realizing that there 
is ample scope for our citizenship in the little 
civic group, and that as the family is the nucleus 
of the city, the city is the nucleus of the com- 
monwealth, and that the health of the larger 
group is bound up with the prosperity of the 
smaller. 

Our political progress may be largely uncon- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 201 

scious. Our political philosophy may still be 
vague. It may not yet be based on the firm 
rock of principle. It may still be at the mercy 
of catch-words and phrases. It may not be a 
match for powerful vested interests. The 
English people never were a nation of systematic 
thinkers : they have left it to Montesquieu, 
Tocqueville, and Guizot to frame a complete 
theory of the British Constitution and of repre- 
sentative government. But the English political 
practice has ever been in advance of political 
theory. The English people have learned from 
bitter experience. Their wisdom has been the 
outcome of their blunders. It has also been 
the necessary result of national expansion, 
and expansion on insular and parochial prin- 
ciples. The American commonwealth was lost 
to England through class rule and selfish state- 
craft. Wise statesmanship has brought one- 
third of the habitable globe under British rule ; 
and that rule is to-day the most just, the most 
moderate, the most tolerant, and the most 
adaptable, the most progressive, government of 
the modern world. 

The bond which holds together the different 
parts of the British Empire may be difficult to 
define. It is always difficult to define the 
higher and deeper realities of life. One fact is 
certain : that bond is not material, but moral 
and spiritual. It does not appeal to the lust of 



202 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

power and greed. It appeals to the imagination 
and to the ethical sense of the English people. 
Economic interests may divide — indeed, must 
divide — the different parts of the British Empire. 
As in private life the material interests of different 
members of one family are necessarily contrary — 
as the demands of one child on the paternal 
inheritance must encroach on the portion of the 
other — so the commercial interests of Canada 
and Australia may run counter to the interests 
of the English people. But if they are divided 
in economic interests, the different parts of the 
British Empire are united in the communion 
of the same ideals. In all parts we find the 
same love of order and liberty, the same respect 
for personality, the same abhorrence of tyranny, 
the same participation in the glorious inheritance 
of English literature. Hostile tariffs may be 
imposed to keep out British imports ; no tariffs 
can keep out the ideals of British culture. 

And what is true of the political ideal of 
England is largely true of the French ideal. 
The Frenchman has always been a humanist. 
In the words of Macaulay, " the French mind 
has always been the interpreter between national 
ideas and those of universal mankind." It is 
the law of France, the Code Napoleon, which 
has been adopted to-day by the greater part 
of the civilized world, and the universality of 
French culture is expressed to-day in the won- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 203 

derful internationality and universality of the 
French language. As in England, so in France, 
the human ideal does not exclude and impover- 
ish the national ideal ; rather does it include it 
and enrich it. The French patriot is all the 
prouder of his country, he is all the more 
enthusiastic in its service, because he feels that 
the cause of France is identified with the service 
of humanity. 

III. 

Whilst the national spirit in France and 
England has been steadily widening, exactly the 
opposite process has taken place in Prussia. 

The German writers of the eighteenth cen- 
tury were pre-eminently teachers of humanism. 
The very idea of nationality seems to have been 
alien to them. Literature and philosophy were 
cosmopolitan. Even Frederick the Great only 
spoke French, and surrounded himself mainly 
with French writers. Goethe would not be 
made into a jingo ; he retained his admiration 
for Napoleon ; he refused to follow in the steps 
of Korner, and to write patriotic verses. Schiller 
was willing to be made a French citizen by a 
revolutionary assembly. Kant forgot that he 
was a Prussian, that he belonged to a military 
state, and he wrote in favour of eternal peace. 
Heine spent the greater part of his life in 



204 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

France, and was permeated with French influ- 
ences. An ideal cosmopolitanism was the 
characteristic of the Golden Age of German 
poetry and German thought. 

Something of that cosmopolitanism has sur- 
vived to-day in German literature. It may be 
partly accounted for by the dearth of contem- 
porary German art, which again is the penalty of 
German materialism. But it is largely the result 
of that intellectual curiosity which survives as 
one of the most precious legacies of the German 
past. Ibsen, Tolstoy, Gorki, Maeterlinck, Ber- 
nard Shaw, Oscar Wilde, are as popular across 
the Rhine as in their native countries. No liter- 
ature can boast of such an admirable body of 
translations ; and in this respect the Germans 
are only surpassed by the Russians. 

But in politics the German people have become 
narrowly national, intolerant, and aggressive. 
National selfishness is glorified into a principle. 
The oppression of other nationalities is extolled 
as a duty. 

I repeat once more that we ought, no doubt, 
to make every allowance for the fiery outburst 
of German jingoism. Germany is politically a 
young nation, and all young nations seem to pass 
through this malady of political infancy. And 
the exclusive nationalism of to-day may only be a 
temporary as well as a necessary reaction against 
the vague and unpractical cosmopolitanism of 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 205 

former generations. We must constantly re- 
member that Germany until the middle of the 
nineteenth century remained a geographical 
expression. Even as an exile who has long 
been a homeless wanderer appreciates all the 
more intensely the blessings of a home, so the 
German has developed a passionate attachment 
to his country. But this attachment has become 
the all-absorbing, jealous, suspicious, and morbid 
passion of an unbalanced lover. German patriot- 
ism has become distorted, perverted, and is to- 
day an inexhaustible source of political evil. It 
seems as if to-day it cannot assert itself with- 
out assuming a hostile attitude to other nations. 
Claiming every privilege for his own nation- 
ality, the German refuses every political right 
to other nations. He demands, not equality, 
but supremacy. He does not base his right 
on the moral principle of respect for per- 
sonality. Pedantry is joined to violence, and 
the university professor becomes the accom- 
plice of the policeman in establishing his claim 
on the superiority of German culture, on the 
right of the super-man and the super-race to 
rule inferior man and inferior races, oblivious 
of the fact that the claim of German superiority 
is mainly one of military strength. 

The relation of the Teuton to non-Teutonic 
nations, both in the German Empire and the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, is one of the saddest 



206 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

chapters in contemporary history. Danes in 
Schleswig-Holstein, Poles in Posen, Frenchmen 
in Alsace-Lorraine, are denied the most elemental 
political rights. In Austria, German oppression 
is worse. Austria-Hungary has been described 
as the whirlpool of Europe. It might be more 
fittingly described as the international pande- 
monium of the Continent. The barren strife 
of nationalities paralyzes progress and removes 
every landmark of political morality ; and each 
nation avenges itself when opportunity arises, 
and the oppressed in turn become the oppressor. 
Even as the Germans oppress the Tchechs and 
the Italians, so the Poles oppress the Ruth- 
enians, and the Magyars the Croatians and 
the Roumanians. Racial politics in Germany 
and Austria are so chaotic and bewildering that 
it has become impossible to decide on which 
side is the right or on which side the wrong. 
The twentieth-century politics of the two em- 
pires, inspired by the evil genius of Prussia, 
is a convincing proof of the truth of the political 
philosophy which we have attempted to outline, 
and will be to future generations an eloquent 
object-lesson, showing to what extremities of 
barbarism even a great nation can be driven 
which ignores the fundamental principles of 
political morality and follows the will-o'-the- 
wisp of a perverted patriotism and an inflated 
imperialism. 



HOW PRUSSIA TREATS HER OWN 

SUBJECTS. 

At the end of the eighteenth century a State 
which had played an important part in the 
history of modern civilization was effaced from 
the map of Europe and its territory divided 
between Prussia, Russia, and Austria. The 
partition of Poland had been a foregone con- 
clusion from the beginning of the century. For 
generations the three empires had been sow- 
ing dissension amongst the Polish noblemen 
and fanning religious hatred, and had ren- 
dered government impossible in the elective 
monarchy. At last the designs of the three 
neighbouring empires had been fulfilled. The 
deed had been done, and, to use the delicate 
witticism of Frederick the Great, the three 
monarchs were able to " communicate and par- 
take of the eucharistic body of Poland." 

The deed was done, yet the ultimate political 
purpose of the three despots was frustrated. 
The Polish nation was killed, but not the Polish 



208 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

nationality. Ever since the fatal partition Poland 
has remained an open sore in the body politic 
of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. The Polish 
question is behind every great difficulty which 
arises in Central Europe. On the one hand, it 
has created a solidarity of reaction and despot- 
ism, the three empires being equally interested 
in preventing the realization of Polish national 
aspirations. Above and behind the present 
Triple Alliance of the Austrian, Russian, and 
Italian people there is another secret triple 
alliance of the three emperors, held together by 
a common interest to keep down the Polish 
nationality. On the other hand, the twenty 
millions of Poles distributed along that his- 
torical frontier line where the three continental 
empires meet are also held together by the 
invisible bond of common sufferings, common 
traditions, and common aspirations. 

Every political symptom seems to indi- 
cate that in the end the spiritual bond of the 
people will prove stronger than the tyranny of 
their oppressors. For a hundred years insur- 
rections, followed by merciless repression, law- 
lessness, and violence, have been the order of 
the day. But Germany, Austria, and Russia, 
if they have killed Poland, have not been able 
to kill the Polish nationality. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 209 



I. 

The destinies of the Polish nation have been 
very different and yet very similar in the three 
empires. In Austria the Poles enjoy practical 
autonomy, and more than once have played a 
leading part in the Austrian Parliament. But 
relegated, unfortunately, to a remote corner of 
the Austrian federation, separated from Prussia 
and Russia and Poland, mixed up with an enor- 
mous population of pauperized Jews, engaged 
in a religious and racial conflict with the 
Uniate Ruthenians, the Galician Poles lead a 
precarious political existence. 

In Russia the Poles continue to be oppressed 
by the bureaucracy of the Czar. They continue 
to be deprived of the use of their language as 
well as of their religious and political rights, 
but the Russian persecution has made the Poles 
not weaker but stronger. They have ceased to 
rise in open rebellion, but they oppose against 
their oppressors that passive resistance and deter- 
mination which sooner or later must conquer. 
To-day Russian Poland is perhaps the richest 
part of the Russian Empire, and when the day 
of freedom finally comes for the empire of the 
Czars, it is impossible to conceive that Polish 
autonomy can be withheld any longer. 

In Prussia the persecution of the Poles has 
14 



210 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

been no less persistent. It has not assumed the 
violent forms which it takes in Russia ; it has 
not led to wholesale massacres and bloody insur- 
rections ; it has borrowed the forms of the law ; 
it has called in the assistance of the Code. But 
it has been even more systematical, more meth- 
odical, more hypocritical, and equally odious, 
and it may be asserted that to-day the Prussian 
Government is even more hated by the Poles 
than the Russian Government. And certainly 
persecution has been as disastrous a failure in 
Prussia as it has been in Austria and Russia. 
So far from suppressing or repressing the Polish 
nationality, so far from depressing its vitality, 
the Prussian persecution has only stimulated it. 

The rapid increase of the Polish population 
has given alarm to the Prussian Government. 
Provinces which for generations had been Ger- 
man now become Polonized. Even Silesia sends 
several Polish members to the Reichstag. And 
the increase of the Polish population extends 
to the towns as well as to the country. The 
strict regulations of the Roman Catholic Church 
on mixed marriages still further favour the ex- 
pansion of the Polish nationality. Wherever a 
Catholic Pole marries a German Protestant 
the second generation becomes Polish and 
Catholic. 

This sudden Polonization has been a severe 
blow to Prussian pride and a source of grave 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 211 

anxiety to Prussian patriotism. Were the Prus- 
sians going to be driven back in the East ? 
Were the frontier provinces, the marches of the 
empire ; was Silesia, the hard-won prize of Fred- 
erick the Great ; was the very cradle of the 
Prussian monarchy to come into the possession 
of an alien and hostile race ? Was the tragedy 
of Bohemia, which once was German -and 
now has become Tchech, going to be repeated 
once more? And when the great day of 
reckoning comes between the Slav and the 
Teuton, when the Pole is reconciled with his 
Russian brother and will combine against the 
common foe, will Prussian Poland be allowed 
to fall into the hands of Prussia's hereditary 
enemies ? 

For the Prussian rulers merely to propose 
such a question was already to solve it. The 
Polish nation was a danger to the Vaterland, 
therefore it must be crushed. The Prussians 
have always had an almost morbid sense of 
national patriotism, but they have always had 
little regard for the patriotism of others. 

In 1886 Bismarck decided to interfere with 
the natural law of increase, and to check the 
Polish infiltration. The problem was : What 
form ought the interference to take ? How could 
the advance of the Polish population be arrested 
most efficiently and most rapidly ? The Turk- 
ish method of Armenian massacre was not to 



212 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

be thought of. Wholesale transportation was 
equally out of the question. To restrict the 
Poles, like the Jews in Russia, within a certain 
area, within " the pale," was impracticable. To 
disperse the Poles all over the empire would 
only be to spread the disease, for owing to 
their gregarious habits the Poles would continue 
to form little islands of Slavonia. The inven- 
tive genius of despotism, which in Bismarck 
was never at fault, finally suggested to him a 
vast scheme of Government colonization, which 
was soon to be followed by compulsory expro- 
priation. The Prussian Government was to 
acquire extensive estates, and German settlers, 
mostly Protestant, were to be established on 
them. And if sufficient land could not be 
acquired by free purchase the Polish landowner 
and the Polish peasant would be compulsorily 
expropriated. In 1886 the famous colonizing 
commission, the " Ansiedelungs Commission," 
was appointed. 

As the Poles were gradually to be dispossessed 
of their land, so they were to be deprived of 
their language. The use of Polish was pro- 
hibited in public meetings. The national 
language was soon ousted from the schools, 
and children were forbidden to pray to God in 
their mother tongue. 

Those methods might well be considered 
objectionable from a moral point of view, and 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 213 

injurious to the fair fame of German civilization. 
They might also be considered perilous from 
a political point of view. At a time when 
Prussia was honeycombed with Socialism, it 
was a dangerous precedent to violate the rights 
of private property and to resort to wholesale 
expropriation. At a time when the religious 
passions roused by the Kulturkampf had 
gradually subsided, it might be dangerous to 
raise once more the Catholic question which in 
Poland was bound up with the linguistic and 
racial question. And finally, the unjust persecu- 
tion of the Prussian Poles might rouse the four 
millions of Austrian Poles, whose weighty polit- 
ical influence might be used against Germany 
in the Triple Alliance. 

But if the methods used by Bismarck were 
doubtful and dangerous they were deemed neces- 
sary. Bismarck, the great enemy of the Jesuits, 
never hesitated to adopt the principle which is 
supposed to be the lodestar of the Jesuit order : 
the end justifies the means. The end was sacred. 
The end was the salvation of Prussia ; it safe- 
guarded the future of the German race, which 
was imperilled by the Polish invasion. 

The fact that the colonization scheme was 
initiated by Bismarck prejudiced half of the 
educated Prussians in its favour. Bismarck had 
decreed a policy, therefore it must be good. At 
the end of his life Bismarck had become to his 



214 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

countrymen not only a great statesman, but 
the incarnate genius of statesmanship. In the 
Walhalla of national heroes he had become 
a demi-god. The worship of Bismarck was a 
religion even to Liberal politicians. 

It is difficult at the present day to understand 
how any critical student of German politics could 
have believed for one moment in the infallibility 
of Bismarck's policy. Few statesmen have made 
more grievous mistakes. It is true that he 
achieved the one great object of his life, the 
unification of Germany ; but it has become in- 
creasingly doubtful whether that object would 
not have been attained without Bismarck — if more 
slowly, all the more securely and permanently. 
One fact is certain : all the political schemes 
of Bismarck in the latter part of his life have 
been uniform failures. He wanted an under- 
standing with Russia, yet he failed to prevent 
the Franco-Russian Alliance. He failed to fore- 
see and to direct the colonial aspirations of his 
countrymen. He missed opportunities for ex- 
pansion which were never to recur. He initiated 
the Kulturkampf, and was beaten by little 
Windhorst. He decreed the Sozialisten Ge- 
setz, and his anti-Socialist laws only stimulated 
the growth of the Socialist Democratic Party. 
He made the German Empire, yet he was igno- 
minously dismissed by the German emperor ; 
and he spent the last years of his life in carry- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 215 

ing on a vindictive campaign, which undermined 
the prestige of the empire which he had built up. 
But the last legacy of Bismarck was also the 
most fatal. No other part of the Bismarckian 
policy shows more glaringly the fatal weakness 
of his methods. The anti-Polish legislation has 
operated for a quarter of a century. A civil war 
has raged, and has widened the gulf between the 
two races. Lawsuits without number have taught 
the people to defy the law. Little children have 
been taught to abhor the language of their op- 
pressors. The Polish school strike of 1907 is 
an unexampled phenomenon in modern history, 
and it lasted over a year. The Colonization 
Commission has spent over five hundred million 
marks. The price of the land has doubled. The 
landowner has been enriched. The peasant and 
the taxbearer have been made poorer. But al- 
though poorer, the Polish peasant has retained 
the land of his father, and the area occupied by 
the Poles is actually larger than it was. And 
although poorer the Pole has become politically 
stronger. The Polish peasant has been taught 
virtues which hitherto were foreign to his nature. 
He has been educated by his oppressors into 
self-sacrifice and thrift, organization and disci- 
pline. The two races stand facing each other 
in irreconcilable opposition. A few concrete 
facts will illustrate better than any general 
statements the condition of affairs which at the 



216 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

beginning of the twentieth century prevailed 
in Prussian Poland. 

The following anecdote illustrates the close 
connection which exists in Prussia between the 
land question and political loyalty. It shows 
that, under the regime which to-day rules in 
Prussia, the owner of a large estate is as com- 
pletely the master of the votes of his tenants 
as was the English landowner in the Golden 
Age of the " rotten boroughs " : — 

The owner of a vast estate, in whose bound- 
aries was included one entire electoral district, 
assembled his tenants and dependants and 
promised them a banquet in the event of all 
the votes without a single exception being 
favourable to the Conservative candidate. The 
banquet did not take place because, at the 
declaration of the polls, there was found that 
one vote, one single vote, had been given in 
favour of the Liberals. That vote had been 
given by the shrewd landowner himself in order 
to save the cost of the banquet ! 

In 1908 the following scene was enacted 
before a Prussian law court : — 

"Accused Biedermann, how much does your 
patrimony amount to ? " 

" I do not know exactly/' 

" But approximately ? " 

CC I am the most highly-assessed Polish tax- 
payer, and I pay into the Imperial German 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 217 

Treasury more that thirty thousand marks a 
year." 

" You are a born German, as your name 
suggests, and late in life you have learned 
Polish?" 

"That is not true. My grandfather took 
part in the great Polish revolution." 

" Is it true that you buy the land of German 
landowners in order to transfer it to men of 
your own race ? " 

" I do not only buy German land, I also 
acquire and resell Polish property." 

" Is it true that you employ the services of 
German middlemen, whom you bribe to acquire 
German property ? " 

"Exactly so. I do my best to imitate the 
German Government Colonization Commission, 
which hires Polish middlemen to expropriate 
my fellow-citizens." 

"You then confess that you take advantage 
of the good faith of the Germans ? " 

" I would like to have all the millions which 
would be required to acquire the estates which 
are offered to me every day." 

"By what insidious means do you succeed 
in bribing your German agents, and making 
them a gang of traitors to their country ? " 

" I have never sought them out. They come 
and ask me to employ them, and I accept them 
or refuse them according to the needs of the 



2i 8 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

moment. The other day a major in the army 
presented himself to me, and offered to assist 
me in deceiving the Germans in the interest of 
the Polish nationality. By the way, that major 
was not a civilian ! " 

" Is it true that you never resell an estate 
which you have acquired unless you are perfectly 
sure that it remains in Polish hands ? " 

"Exactly so, Mr. President. That is my 
duty as a Pole." * 

II. 

In this great Polish controversy, which con- 
tinues to rage in the German Empire, it is 
important that we should closely and impartially 
examine the arguments adduced on both sides. 

An acute and sympathetic French observer, 
M. Huret, in the fourth volume of his great 
work on Germany, considers the question as 
hopelessly complicated and perplexing. If he 
means to say that the question has roused much 
bitterness and passion, that it is almost impos- 
sible to obtain reliable facts and statistics, then 
M. Huret is no doubt right. But if he means 
to suggest that the arguments for and against 
the Prussian policy are so evenly balanced that 
it is impossible to say which side is right, then 
we contend that M. Huret's statement cannot be 

* See the Italian work, Borgese's, " Nuova Germania." 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 219 

accepted. We submit that the Polish question, so 
far from being complicated, is tragically simple. 
It is not necessary to be a statesman to see the 
main issue, and it was not necessary to be a 
statesman to foresee the event. The most igno- 
rant citizen versed in the alphabet of political 
science must clearly see why the Polish experi- 
ment failed, and can draw the political and moral 
lessons implied in the failure. 

The Prussian argument has already been out- 
lined, and can be summed up in a few clauses. 
The Poles have an instinctive hatred for the 
Prussians, and cannot be assimilated by any 
conciliatory methods. As they increase much 
more rapidly than the Prussians, as, indeed, 
to use the expression of Prince von Bulow, 
they breed like rabbits, some means must 
be used to check the Polish advance. It is 
essential to the integrity and preservation of 
the empire that the eastern and south-eastern 
frontiers shall not fall into the hands of a dis- 
affected race. In case of a war with Russia 
the disaffection of the Poles might determine 
the issue of the campaign. In the case of a 
revolution in Russia there might be a rebellion 
in Prussian Poland, the Prussian Poles might 
be induced to join their Russian brethren and 
attempt the reconstruction of the old Polish 
kingdom. 

The scheme of the Colonization Commission 



220 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

is claimed to be the only possible one that 
can ward off a great national danger. It is 
necessary for Prussia. It is also beneficial to the 
Poles. For any means, however unpleasant 
at first sight, which can hasten the assimilation 
of the two races, is to be commended in the 
interest of the Poles themselves. They are an 
inferior race. They are not a Kulturvolk. 
It is a blessing to them to be compelled to 
adopt the higher culture of Germany. They 
have already prospered exceedingly under the 
firm but just rule of Prussia. They speak a 
dialect which isolates them from the civilization 
of the world, and it is a blessing to them to be 
compelled to speak the language of Goethe ! 
As they are children, and ungrateful children, 
they must be treated like children ; and no 
methods of mere persuasion, no methods short 
of actual compulsion, will achieve the desirable 
consummation. 

The argument which justifies the oppression 
of the Poles in the name of a higher civilization 
is the old argument which in all ages and in all 
countries has been used to justify the appeal to 
brute force. In the name of* a higher civilization 
the English in former days oppressed the Irish. 
In the name of a higher civilization the Russians 
to-day persecute the Jews and the Finns. In 
the name of a higher civilization the Magyars 
oppress the Croatians and the Roumanians. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 221 

To any patriot the culture of his own country 
must needs be superior to that of any other. 
Above all, to a German there could only be one 
higher culture. Has not the emperor pro- 
claimed that he is "the salt of the earth"? — 
" Wir sind das Salz der Erde." 

Through the whole Polish controversy runs 
one Leitmotiv — the supreme contempt of the 
Prussian ruler for the Polish subject. And so 
persistently have the Poles been maligned, so 
entirely are we depending even for the bare 
facts of Polish history on the authority of their 
oppressors, that it is difficult to give an impartial 
statement of the Polish side of the case. But, 
if we try to rid ourselves of preconceptions, it is 
obvious that the Poles have been more sinned 
against than sinning. We do not believe in any 
inherent incapacity of the Poles to govern them- 
selves. The Polish nation never had a chance. 
Poland was hemmed in on three sides by three 
mighty Powers. The anarchy of Poland has been 
the unavoidable consequence of its geographical 
position and of historical fatalities. Any strong 
Polish government, any drastic reform of the 
Liberum Veto Constitution, was impossible, 
because neighbouring kingdoms were interested 
in maintaining Polish misgovernment, and in 
fishing in its troubled waters. Religious peace was 
impossible, because neighbouring kingdoms were 
doing their utmost to sow religious dissension. 



222 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

And if the Polish nation made grievous mis- 
takes, no nation has paid more dearly for them, 
or has retrieved them more heroically. No 
nation has been greater in misfortune. If the 
Poles do not deserve to be called a Kultur- 
vo/ky we confess we do not know what are the 
criteria of a cultured people. Surely a nation 
which has produced great men in all branches 
of human activity, which has produced a 
Kopernic, a Sobieski, a Kosciusko, a Mickiewic, 
and a Chopin, is not a nation of mere barbarians. 
A nation which for a hundred and fifty years has 
asserted itself against overwhelming odds has 
proved its right to live. Although Prussian 
journalists are apt to indulge in an unworthy 
pun, to associate the " Slav " and the " slave," 
a nation which by heroic rebellion or passive 
resistance has driven back the three most mighty 
military empires of Central Europe is not a 
nation of slaves, but a race of free men. The 
Prussian may have conscientious scruples against 
rebellion, he may passively submit to the dicta- 
tion of the Junkers, and boast of his love of 
order and authority ; but there are impartial 
observers who would not be prepared to admit 
that the submissiveness of the Prussian is 
necessarily a criterion of a higher civiliza- 
tion. Rather would they be inclined to 
admit that the Pole who rebels against op- 
pression and injustice stands, at least politically, 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 223 

on a higher level than the Prussian who accepts 
them. 

It is therefore impossible to agree with the 
argument of the claims of a higher civilization. 
Nor is it possible to agree with the argument 
drawn from the instinctive hostility of the Pole. 
If the Pole enjoyed the benefits of a just and 
free government, the probability is that he 
would not hate his rulers. We are told that 
the Poles deserve to be persecuted because they 
are disaffected. Rather would we be prepared to 
argue that they are disaffected because they are 
persecuted, and that they will become every day 
more hostile as the persecution becomes more 
persistent and more brutal. 

But even assuming the Prussian culture to be 
superior, even assuming the Poles to be ani- 
mated with an instinctive hatred for their 
oppressors, the whole argument would still be 
irrelevant. The question is not whether the 
Pole hates the Prussian nor why he hates him, 
the question is not whether the oppressor is 
superior to the oppressed, the question is not 
whether the increase of the Polish population 
imperils the safety of the Prussian State, the 
ultimate question is whether the policy of op- 
pression has been successful or can be successful. 
Surely it ought not to be necessary to remind 
Prussian publicists who pride themselves on 
being Realpolitiker — practical politicians — that 



224 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

a policy can only be judged by its results. 
Let pedantic doctrinaires and university pro- 
fessors argue ad infinitum on the justice or in- 
justice of the case, on the merits of the Prussians 
and the demerits of the Poles, on the justifica- 
tion of the means or the sacredness of the end, 
the ultimate question is : Even assuming both 
the means and the end to be justified, are those 
means conducive to the end in view? 

Alas ! the facts answer with crushing elo- 
quence. The persecution has defeated its pur- 
pose. It has failed, and was bound to fail. 
The Prussian Government have aimed at taking 
away their land and their language from a 
people passionately attached to both. They 
have misunderstood the temper of the subject 
race. They have shown a total lack of sym- 
pathy and imagination. They have ignored 
moral forces. They have appealed to sordid 
interest. They have ignored sentiment and 
instinct. A liberal policy would probably, in 
course of time, have won over the Poles. At 
any rate they would have learned that a know- 
ledge of German is more important than a 
knowledge of Polish, just as the Boers have 
been taught that English is more important 
than Dutch. By prohibiting the Polish lan- 
guage they have made a love of the native 
language a matter of patriotic duty. By try- 
ing to deprive the Polish peasant of the land 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 225 

they have only made the native land dearer 
to him. 

The Englishman who studies the Polish 
question involuntarily thinks of Ireland. In 
both cases we meet with the same opposition of 
race and of religion. In both cases we find the 
same arguments used against a just and liberal 
policy. The Irishman had to be oppressed 
because the safety of Great Britain demanded 
it, because the Saxon was superior to the Celt, 
because the Catholic was inferior to the Prot- 
estant. In both cases the same errors have 
been visited with the same punishment. But 
in comparing the two situations the English 
observer must remember that the parallel exists, 
not between the Prussian methods of to-day 
and the English methods of to-day, but between 
the Prussian methods of to-day and the English 
methods of the eighteenth century. So far are 
English and Prussian methods to-day from 
being in the least similar, that nothing illustrates 
more eloquently than Ireland and Poland the 
difference of English and Prussian politics, and 
the enormous advance made by the English 
people in the science of government. 

For the methods used by the English in 
Ireland are to-day exactly the opposite of those 
used by Prussia in Poland. The English 
Government also have established "a Coloniza- 
tion Commission." But instead of using public 

15 



226 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

money to deprive the Irish peasantry of their 
land, as the Prussians have done, the English 
Government have made an enormous sacrifice 
to expropriate the English landlord and to trans- 
fer the soil to the Irish people. And the success 
which has attended the agrarian Irish policy 
initiated by Gladstone, and carried out by the 
Conservative Government, is the best proof of 
its wisdom, even as the failure which has at- 
tended the policy of the Prussian bureaucrats is 
the best proof of its folly. 



Ill, 



Although apparently of purely local and 
technical interest, the Polish question deserves 
special and careful study, both for its far-reach- 
ing practical importance and for its profound 
philosophical interest. 

In practical politics the problem remains for 
German statesmen the insoluble riddle of the 
Sphinx, and although the Polish opposition only 
represents a small fraction of the Reichstag, yet 
those twenty members constitute a material 
addition to an already predominant Centre 
Party, and contribute to the maintenance of its 
supremacy. In the event of a future war with 
Russia, or in the more probable and more 
immediate contingency of a change of political 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 227 

methods in the empire of the Czars, the 
Polish difficulty would become the vital ques- 
tion in the governance of the German Empire. 
If the concession of autonomy to Russian 
Poland, which was a favourite scheme of 
Alexander the First, were one day to be granted 
— and it must be granted if constitutional 
government is ever to become a reality — then 
the pressure for Home Rule in the Eastern 
Marshes would become irresistible, the union 
or the federation between Prussian Poland and 
Russian Poland would be achieved, and the 
old kingdom of Poland would be reconstituted. 
There lies the secret of the intimate solidarity 
and freemasonry between the despotism of 
Berlin and the despotism of St. Petersburg. 
There is the reason why William stood loyally 
by Nicholas the Second in his hour of trial. 
There also is one of the reasons why the Russian 
struggle for political freedom failed in 1 905. Any 
volcanic outburst in the empire of the Romanovs 
would shake the throne of the Hohenzollern. 

But important as the Polish question is in 
the internal and foreign policy of the German 
Empire, to the foreign student it is mainly 
interesting because of the vivid light it throws 
on the methods of Prussian government. 
Better than any other concrete illustration, it 
reveals the political conceptions of the German 
people, it reveals the fundamental differences 



228 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

between the English ideals and the German 
ideals of empire. It reveals the Prussian belief 
in force and in authority, the superstition of 
the State, the disbelief in human freedom, the 
disregard of the rights of other nationalities. 

And better than any other study the Polish 
policy explains the failure of Germany as a 
colonizing Power. For colonization means 
sympathy and imagination, elasticity and the 
capacity of adaptation, and above all the capacity 
of assimilating alien elements. The German 
absolutely lacks that capacity. Whilst he is 
easily assimilated, whether he emigrates to 
France or to the United States, whilst he con- 
stitutes splendid ethnical material, he is incapable 
of assimilating himself. He has not succeeded 
in absorbing either the Dane or the Pole or the 
Alsacian. A patriotic historian, Professor 
Lamprecht, admits this fatal weakness, but he 
admits it only for the Northern German, and 
he considers that it has been and will be more 
and more the historic mission of the Austrian 
German to assimilate alien races and gain them 
over to the Deutschtum. Whoever has taken 
the trouble to study the conflict of nationalities 
in the Austrian Empire, which is called the 
"whirlpool of Europe," will refuse to admit 
the theory of Professor Lamprecht. No more 
than the North German has the Austrian Ger- 
man assimilated the Magyar, or the Tchech, or 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 229 

the Pole, or the Ruthenian, or the Italian, or the 
Roumanian, or the Croatian. The struggle of 
nationalities is as bitter and as hopeless in the 
empire of the Habsburg as in the empire of the 
Hohenzollern. 

This conclusion, if justified by the facts, is of 
decisive importance for the future of Europe. 
If the Germans do not possess the capacity of 
colonizing — that is to say, of assimilating other 
races — the sooner they give up their Imperial 
ambitions the better for them. For these ambi- 
tions can only land in disastrous failure. The 
Germans have proved that they are a great 
people. But they have also proved that 
they are not an Imperial people. The Pan- 
German ideal is a delusion. The present 
German Empire has already reached its utmost 
capacity of expansion. The annexation of any 
new nationality would be like the inoculation 
of a poison into the German body politic. The 
conflicting ideals of Poles and Danes, Alsacians 
and Hanoverians, of Protestant and Catholic, 
of North and South, already renders it increas- 
ingly difficult to carry on the business of govern- 
ment, and the unity of the empire can only be 
maintained artificially by autocracy and bureau- 
cracy. Any further annexation, any further 
move in the direction of Pan-Germanism would 
bring about the disintegration and absorption 
of the German Empire, 



THE FIRST GERMAN GRIEVANCE. 

Has England taken Germany s place in the Sun ? 

I. 

It is to-day a commonplace universally accepted 
in Germany that England has deliberately 
checked German expansion, or, to use a meta- 
phor which has become of daily use in the 
popular Press, that " she has taken Germany's 
place in the sun." 

This accusation obviously cannot apply to 
the commercial expansion of Germany. So far 
from being checked by England, German com- 
mercial expansion has been immensely stimu- 
lated by the liberal policy pursued by England. 
English Free Trade has been one of the most im- 
portant contributory causes of German prosperity. 
England has been Germany's best colony ; and 
not only has England thrown open her own 
markets to a rival whose competition in early 
days was not always fair and legitimate, but she 
has enabled Germany to trade on equal terms 
with practically every part of the British Empire. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 231 

This indebtedness of Germany to English 
Free Trade is admitted, however reluctantly, 
by all German economists who have made a 
study of the subject. Professor von Schulze- 
Gaevernitz concedes that if England had re- 
pudiated Free Trade : if she had adopted 
Protection, or, rather, Fair Trade : if Mr. 
Chamberlain's policy, or even Mr. Balfour's 
policy, had triumphed, German trade would 
have received a formidable set-back. In the 
face of this admission by leading German 
economists, it is all the more strange how 
entirely the facts are distorted by the average 
German journalist ; it is all the more strange 
that to-day the man in the street, forgetting 
what English Free Trade has done for the 
Vaterland, still considers England as the im- 
placable enemy of German commercial and 
industrial development. 

If England has not checked German com- 
mercial expansion, but, on the contrary, has 
furthered it, can it be asserted that she has 
arrested her colonial expansion ? In Germany 
it is universally assumed that she has, and the 
assumption is now becoming part of the politi- 
cal creed of the average Teuton. We are told 
that every other great nation but Germany has 
been allowed to build up a colonial empire. 
Vanquished France has been magnanimously 
allowed by the victor to acquire most of her 



232 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

vast colonies since 1870. Russia has expanded 
in the Near East and in the Far East, and, 
although she has met with formidable disasters, 
she continues steadily to advance. In recent 
years England, although she declared herself long 
ago to be satiated and saturated, has annexed 
the South African Republics. Even so the 
United States have picked a quarrel with Spain 
in true Anglo-Saxon fashion, they have annexed 
Cuba, the Philippines, and Panama, and they 
are now coveting the mastery of the Pacific. 
Germany alone has been left with only a few 
outlying regions of the planet neglected by the 
other empires. She has had to be content 
with " light African soil " and with tropical 
marshes. And this iniquitous treatment of 
Germany is due, it is contended, mainly to 
the persistent hostility with which England has 
opposed the most legitimate colonial aspirations 
of the German people. 

Generally there is a large element of truth in 
any widely spread popular preconception, but 
in the present case there is not one atom of 
reason in the German grievance. As we pointed 
out in the Preface of this book, England cannot 
have checked the colonial aspirations of Ger- 
many, for the simple reason that until quite 
recently those German aspirations did not exist. 
So little did colonial expansion bulk in the policy of 
the country that it was only in the beginning of the 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 233 

twentieth century that an independent German colonial 
office was instituted. Few outsiders realize that 
the first colonial secretary, Dr. Dernburg, was 
only appointed five years ago ! 

It is true that for the last twenty years 
Germany has tried to make up with feverish 
haste for the centuries she has lost, and that 
since she has suddenly awakened to the possi- 
bilities of a colonial empire she has been con- 
fronted everywhere with the conflicting claims 
of England. But that is not because England 
is hostile to German expansion, but simply 
because England was already everywhere in 
possession, because England had had more luck, 
and probably also because England had shown 
more energy, more enterprise. Whilst German 
expansion begins with the beginning of the 
twentieth century, English expansion began at 
the end of the sixteenth — an advance of more 
than three hundred and fifty years. Surely 
it is unfair to the English people to accuse 
them of hostility to the German people merely 
because in the sixteenth century Sir Walter 
Raleigh, Sir Francis Drake, and the immortal 
mariners whose exploits we read of in Hakluyt's 
"Voyages" had the luck or the pluck to lay 
the foundation of Greater Britain, the " Oceana " 
of future ages. 

There is a tide in the affairs of nations as 
there is in the affairs of individuals. Some 



234 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

nations come too early in the field. Thus 
Portugal and Spain conquered their colonies in 
an age of political fanaticism and economic 
ignorance, and they lost their empire by their 
lust and their greed, their intolerance and their 
cruelty. 

Some nations, again, like England, have ap- 
peared in the nick of time. They have been 
favoured by historical circumstances as well as 
by their geographical position. England was 
able to learn from the failures of others. Her 
first colonizers were free men accustomed to 
self-government. She was allowed definitely 
to consolidate her empire whilst scientific dis- 
coveries were transforming the world. She 
was left almost alone in the field whilst a 
political revolution diverted and absorbed for 
a quarter of a century the other Powers of 
Europe. 

And, again, there are nations who have come 
too late. Of this fact there is no more striking 
instance than the tardy appearance of the Ger- 
man Empire. Although a far-sighted German 
pioneer, like Frederick List, who had served 
his political apprenticeship in the United States, 
clearly pointed the way seventy-five years ago, 
Germany was unable to enter in the race for 
empire because she was not ready. 

What makes the case of Germany more tragic 
is that the German people cannot be allowed 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 235 

to blame destiny alone or untoward circum- 
stances. They must also blame themselves, 
and that is what few Germans to-day are pre- 
pared to admit. Even after 1870 Germany 
might still have built up a magnificent empire, 
but she let the opportunity slip, and the oppor- 
tunity will never recur again. Even after 1870 
Germany might have carved for herself exten- 
sive possessions in Africa and Asia. She was 
the paramount Power in European politics, and 
she might easily have achieved what France, 
what even little Belgium, were enabled to 
achieve. The Conference of Berlin which in 
1884 partitioned Africa might have registered 
a German colonial triumph, as the Treaty of 
Berlin in 1878 registered her political triumph. 
Germany surrendered the Congo Free State 
without foreseeing its future. She surrendered 
lndo- China and Madagascar to France. In 
the 'eighties German emigrants were still 
leaving the Vaterland in hundreds of thou- 
sands. If at that time the tide of German 
emigration had been systematically directed 
towards South Africa, the South African Com- 
monwealth to-day would have been German. 
It is a fact that at the end of the nineteenth 
century the ambitions of the German Empire 
definitely turned to the Dutch Republics, 
and the late German Ambassador in London, 
Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, declared, as 



236 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

German Foreign Secretary, that the independ- 
ence of the Transvaal was a German interest. 

How, then, shall we account for this extra- 
ordinary blindness to the possibilities of the 
future in so ambitious and intelligent a race as 
the German people ? How shall we explain 
the contrast between their splendid commercial 
success and their colonial failures ? 

The reasons are manifold, and we would 
suggest the following as specially worthy of 
consideration. It will be found that none of 
these reasons for German failure in coloniza- 
tion have anything to do with English hostility. 

In the first place, German Imperialists ought 
to lay the responsibility upon German states- 
men, and especially upon their favourite hero, 
Bismarck. The more we critically examine Bis- 
marck's achievements, the more we realize that 
he was a statesman of the old school, the school 
of despotism, the school which believed in 
brute force and not in the display of the free 
individual energies of man. Bismarck was a 
realist and a materialist. He had much less 
imagination than he is often credited with. He 
did not indulge, like Talleyrand, in visions of a 
distant future, in dreams of a German Oceana. 
To him sufficient for the day were the struggles 
thereof. So little did he believe in any colonial 
policy that he deliberately induced France once 
more to embark in the race for empire. He 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 237 

tempted her to go to Tunis, to Morocco, to the 
Far East. If a considerable part of the French 
Empire in Africa and Asia has not become 
German, the Germans ought not to blame the 
greed of the French people, but rather the 
short-sightedness of the great Chancellor. 
Bismarck lost the reality for the shadow. 
Bismarck's ambition was, to control the 
Continent, to establish a Napoleonic Empire in 
Europe, with the result that to-day all the non- 
German Powers of the West are leagued against 
the Vaterland. 

There is a second political reason for the 
colonial failure of Germany. At the critical 
time when England, France, and Russia were 
building up and consolidating their colonial 
empires, Bismarck and the German people were 
still absorbed by religious struggles and by civil 
dissensions, and were paying the penalty of a 
blundering home policy. The Iron Chancellor 
was hurling his Jesuiten Gesetz against the Ultra- 
montanes, and his Sozialisten Gesetz against the 
Labour Party. Mighty moral and economic 
forces were being set free, and Bismarck, who 
did not believe in moral forces, fondly imagined 
that the old brutal methods would be sufficient 
to hold them in check. He fondly imagined 
that he would triumph over Catholicism and 
Socialism by throwing into prison a few hundred 
old monks and a few thousand miserable 



238 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

working men. For ten years after the Franco- 
German War, Bismarck was engaged in a deadly 
conflict with the "black international" of the 
priests, and the " red international " of Social 
Democracy. At this distance of time we can 
see that those conflicts were a lamentable waste 
of national energy, and that if Bismarck had 
pursued a systematic colonial policy, in grossem 
Sti/ y for instance in South Africa, he might on 
the one hand have relieved the political pressure 
of the Vaterland ; and on the other hand 
he might have secured the co-operation of the 
Roman Catholic Church, and of their wonderful 
missionary organization. 

There can be no doubt, therefore, that 
Bismarck was partly accountable. He let great 
opportunities pass by unheeded. But again we 
cannot impute the blame to one statesman, 
however powerful, no more than we can make 
blind fate responsible, and this brings us to a 
third reason accounting for Germany's failure. 
The final responsibility must be traced to the 
political and moral shortcomings of the German 
people themselves. After all, successful colon- 
ization, as distinguished from the old predatory 
Imperialism, is the fruit of political freedom, of 
individual initiative, of a spirit of adventure and 
enterprise, and until recently the German people 
were lacking in every one of those qualities. 

We often hear it said that England has both 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 239 

colonies and colonists, that France has colonies 
but no colonists, and that Germany has colonists 
but no colonies. The general statement that 
Germany is a country rich in colonists is only 
partially true. Germany is not really a nation 
of colonists in the exact sense of the word, 
for a colonist is a man who settles in a new land y 
and a man who settles in a new land must be a 
pioneer and an adventurer. Now the German 
does not like to settle in a new land ; he is so 
accustomed to passive obedience that he does 
not succeed in those new countries where 
initiative is the first quality required. He 
generally prefers to go to old settled countries, 
like the United States, or Brazil, which have 
already an organized government. The typical 
German is no Robinson Crusoe. He is even 
less of a pioneer than the Frenchman. Although 
France in popular estimation is supposed not to 
produce human material for colonies, as a matter 
of fact she has produced, even in our generation, 
a far more abundant crop than Germany of 
explorers and adventurers. 

In this connection it would be interesting to 
compare what has been done by Germany and 
what has been done by France and England in 
the exploration of our planet. I have no doubt 
that a searching and impartial investigation 
would prove that in the long and glorious roll 
of Polar, African, and Asiatic explorers, Germany 



2 4 o THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

only occupies a secondary place. Neither 
Stanley nor Livingstone, Nansen nor Shackleton, 
Bonvalot nor Przejalski, Lamy nor Marchand 
belong to the Vaterland. 

We would suggest a fourth reason, mainly 
economic, of German failure, and it is so 
obvious that we need not dwell upon it. 
Modern colonization, with its vast schemes, its 
building of railways, demands very considerable 
risk, and an abundant supply of capital. 
Unfortunately, even after the Franco-German 
War, and notwithstanding the French millions, 
Germany was still comparatively poor, and 
wanted all her available capital to develop her 
industries at home. Although it is universally 
assumed that the war enriched the Germans, as 
a matter of fact, three years after the annus 
mirabilis the new empire found itself on the 
verge of national bankruptcy. And it is not to 
be wondered at, that in those early days of her 
industrial expansion Germany should not have 
risked her scanty resources in any of the great 
ventures which were opening new continents to 
Western civilization. 

And last but not least, we would suggest as a 
fifth reason that colonization demands consider- 
able political experience, and demands especially 
that kind of experience which is acquired by a 
long historical tradition, and by the practice of 
free institutions. It is this political experience 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 241 

in which Germany was and still is to-day 
signally deficient. And it is this experience 
which has largely made the success of English 
colonization. That experience has been acquired 
by England at the cost of persistent and 
disastrous failures. It was because England 
treated the American colonies harshly and 
unjustly that she lost the United States. But 
in the course of generations England learnt her 
lessons, and it is because she did learn from her 
own bitter experience the wisdom of a generous 
and liberal policy that she saved French 
Canada in the nineteenth century, and that in 
our own days she saved Dutch South Africa. 



II. 



It is in the light of the foregoing considera- 
tions that we must form our judgment on the 
German colonial grievance. After what has 
been said, we need look for no extraneous 
reasons to account for the breakdown of German 
colonization, and we shall cease to wonder if a 
nation, otherwise so eminently successful in 
developing her trade and industry, should have 
done so little in " bearing the white man's 
burden." 

It is not necessary to make more than a 
passing reference to German enterprise in the 

16 



242 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Cameroons, in South- West and in East Africa, 
because that enterprise has been mainly a 
fiasco. The " dark continent " has verily been 
to the Germans an ill-fated continent. The 
ruinous wars with the Herreros, the disclosures 
in the Reichstag on East African mismanage- 
ment, the failure and prosecution of two famous 
explorers, tried before the German High Court 
for alleged atrocities, are only a few of the many 
unpleasant episodes in the history of the African 
dependencies. And it can hardly be said that 
the recent concessions obtained in the French 
Congo are an adequate compensation for the 
vanished dream of a Greater Germany under 
the Southern Cross. 

Other German schemes of colonial expansion 
have not been more successful. Germany 
had set her hopes on a new empire in China. 
It was that prospect which induced her to 
join with Russia in preventing the Japan- 
ese from getting a footing on the Chinese 
continent after the Chino-Japanese War, and 
which also induced her to defend the integrity 
of China. And having guarded against Japan 
the integrity of China, Germany initiated the 
partition and established herself at Kiao-Tcheou 
in the Shantung. This fateful step led to all 
the later complications and catastrophes. It led 
to the occupation of Wei-hai-wei by England, 
and of Port Arthur by Russia. It led directly 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 243 

to the Boxer rising against the foreign invader. 
It led indirectly to the Russian expansion in 
Manchuria, and to the Russo-Japanese War. 

Many significant incidents indicated at the 
time of the Boxer rising the importance which 
Germany attributed to her Chinese schemes. 
German publicists proclaimed that the future 
of Germany lay in China. The German 
Emperor preached a national crusade de- 
nouncing the Yellow Peril, presumably to 
conciliate the Chinese people. The German 
Government took the lead in repressing the 
rebellion. The Emperor dispatched his own 
brother as well as his favourite soldier, Marschall 
von Waldersee. It was Waldersee who assumed 
the Command-in-Chief of the European con- 
tingents. And also presumably in order to con- 
ciliate his future Chinese subjects, the Kaiser 
gave solemn instructions that the Chinese rebels 
were to be given no quarter. German hopes 
ran high during those eventful months, and the 
German Government seemed determined to 
make the most of the assassination of its 
ambassador. The breaking up of China seemed 
imminent. The unexpected happened, Japan 
forestalled both Russia and Germany, and the 
triumph of the Japanese armies put an end to 
German ambitions. And since Moukden and 
Tsusima, another formidable competitor has 
arisen in the Pacific, more favourably situated, 



244 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

and with greater chances of success. Whether 
the United States will eventually control the 
Western Pacific shores, and divide China into 
spheres of influence, or whether the prize will 
fall to Russia or Japan is uncertain. But one 
fact is certain : Shantung will never become the 
nucleus of a German dependency. 

Together with China, South America at the 
end of the nineteenth century attracted German 
ambitions, and, so far, Southern Brazil has been 
the most successful field for German coloniza- 
tion. The degenerate, half-caste Brazilian is 
not a match for the energetic Teuton, and the 
country is immensely wealthy, and offers in- 
finite possibilities. Although the semi-tropical 
climate does not seem favourable to a North- 
ern race, several hundreds of thousands of 
German colonists have settled in the South- 
ern provinces, and when one considers that the 
French-Canadians were only fifty thousand in the 
eighteenth century, and are now two millions, 
a patriotic German may reasonably hope that 
the present settlement might eventually have 
grown into a vigorous Teutonic offshoot. 

But here again the fatal word " too late " 
is written on the wall. The Monroe doctrine 
opposes an insuperable obstacle to German 
expansion. The German Government may 
have thought at one moment of challenging 
the doctrine, and the significant fact that already 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 245 

in 1902 Germany put in a claim for a harbour 
on the west coast of Morocco (Mogador, or 
Agadir) may have been connected with ulterior 
designs on South America. But in the mean- 
time Admiral Mahan and Roosevelt had con- 
verted the Yankee to a policy of aggressive 
Imperialism, and to-day, with the imminent 
opening of the Panama Canal, the risks have 
become too great for any European Power to 
interfere with the United States and South 
America. A war with the American Common- 
wealth would be too heavy a price to pay for a 
German colony in Brazil, for even if successful 
it could not be ultimately retained against both 
North and South Americans. And therefore 
Germany must be resigned to leave the United 
States in undisputed control of the American 
continent. 



III. 



From whatever point of view we examine 
the subject, we find that the accusation that 
England has checked German colonial ex- 
pansion is totally unfounded. There may have 
been diplomatic complications, but considering 
the enormous surface of possible friction, and 
considering that England was everywhere in 
possession, the astonishing fact is, that the 
differences should not have been more numerous 



246 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

or more serious. And certainly there has been 
no ill-will on the part of England, nor any 
disposition to hinder the settlement of out- 
standing difficulties, whether in the case of 
Heligoland, in East Africa, in West Africa, 
or in Samoa. And the causes which we have 
analyzed at the beginning of this chapter are 
amply sufficient to account for the comparative 
failure of German ambitions, without making 
it necessary to assume any Machiavelian plot- 
ting of English diplomacy. The sooner the 
German people realize those simple facts the 
better it will be for the promotion of a more 
cordial understanding with her English rivals. 
The sooner they realize their shortcomings, 
and the sooner they " put their house in order/' 
the better will be the prospects of her present 
colonial possessions. 



THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY AND 

GERMAN EXPANSION IN 

THE NEAR EAST.* 

I. 

Most readers who have followed us in our 
brief examination of the various attempts of 
German colonization in South America, in 
South Africa, and in China, and who compare 
the paucity of the results with the greatness of 
the effort, and especially with the magnitude 
of the aspirations, will no doubt have joined 
us in our conclusion, shared by the Germans 

* The present chapter is largely based on personal investigations 
pursued during two recent journeys in the Near East and in the 
Balkan States. A vast literature has sprung up on the Baghdad 
Railway, testifying to the large place it holds in the preoccupa- 
tions of European diplomacy. I would specially draw attention 
to the works of Valentine Chirol, " The Middle East ; " Dr. 
Rohrbach, " Die Bagdad Bahn ;" Rudolf Martin, ibid. ; the works 
of Charles Loiseau, " L'Equilibre adriatique ; " Ren6 Henry, 
"La Question d'Orient ; " " Des Monts de Boheme au Golfe 
Persique ; " and last, but not least, to the remarkable volumes of 
Andr6 Cheradame, who, although too much of an alarmist, has 
done more than any man living to open the eyes of European 
opinion to the dangers of German policy. (See also articles by 
Dr. Dillon in the Contemporary, and by Mr. Garvin in the Fort- 
nightly.) 



248 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

themselves, that, on the whole, German coloni- 
zation has been a failure. But that historical 
generalization demands a very important quali- 
fication. For in passing in review the history 
of German colonial enterprise, I have purposely 
left out one vast region where, if not German 
colonization, at least German expansion has 
been a conspicuous success. Indeed the achieve- 
ments of Germany in that region have been so 
momentous, opening up such far-reaching 
visions of world empire, that they more than 
counterbalance her disappointments in other 
parts. And for that reason, when we estimate 
the final and aggregate results of thirty years 
of German colonization, it would be as absurd 
to speak of German failure as it would be to 
speak of the failure of English colonization in 
the eighteenth century. It is true that in the 
eighteenth century England lost the United 
States, but she gained Canada and India. In 
the twentieth century Germany lost China and 
Morocco, but she gained Asia Minor ; she 
has gained the Protectorate over the Turkish 
Empire. 

In tracing the development of German ex- 
pansion in Asia Minor, we shall find one 
additional proof of the absurdity of the German 
grievance which we discussed in a previous 
chapter, that England has pursued a policy 
systematically hostile to Germany. We shall 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 249 

see that in the case of the Baghdad Railway 
not only have the Powers of the Entente Cordiale 
done nothing to oppose Germany, but that 
French statesmen have again and again pro- 
moted German claims, and that England in 
her desire to conciliate her neighbours has 
betrayed some vital Imperial interests, and 
has allowed Germany to assume a formidable 
position, threatening both Egypt and India, 
a position from which she is not likely to 
retreat, and yet from which she will have to 
retreat if an armed conflict is to be avoided. 



II. 

When the history of the latter part of the 
nineteenth century comes to be written, few 
events will prove to have had greater in- 
trinsic importance and to have produced more 
far-reaching results than the conventions of 
November 27, 1889, and of January 16, 
1902,* between his Imperial Majesty the Sultan 
of Turkey and the German company of the 
Anatolian railways, granting to the aforesaid 
company an extension of their railways from 
Konia to the Persian Gulf. That convention 

* See Ch£radame, p. 29. The text of that secret convention 
has been first published by M. Che>adame, and translated by the 
Novoic Vretnya (see CheVadame, p. 69). 



250 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

marks a new era in the foreign policy of the 
German Empire. By that convention all the 
other great Powers were . gradually to be 
eliminated from the Near East ; by that con- 
vention Germany has secured by one stroke 
of the diplomatic pen what England and 
Russia have striven for generations to attain — 
and a great deal more! By that concession, 
not only was Germany destined to obtain in 
the near future a complete economic control 
over the Turkish dominions, which must sooner 
or later lead to a political protectorate ; not 
only did Germany add to her sway the ancient 
empire of Semiramis and Nebuchadnezzar, of 
Cyrus and Haroun al Raschid, but there was 
also created thereby a situation fraught with 
permanent danger to the peace of Europe, a 
constant menace to all the Powers interested in 
those vast and wealthy regions, and, eventually, 
a complete readjustment, in favour of Ger- 
many, of the balance of world power.* 

That a mere engineering undertaking like 
the Baghdad Railway should be pregnant with 
such momentous consequences can only be 
strange to those who are ignorant of the 
political geography of Asia Minor, and who 
are not conversant with the enormous part 
played by railways in the colonial and foreign 

•See the brilliant paper of Dr. Dillon on the " Germanization 
of Europe" in the Contemporary Review, April 1906. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 251 

policy of our age. There was a time when 
the occupation and penetration of a foreign 
country took place by slow and peaceful 
steps — first the missionary, then the trader, 
then the consul, then the flag. Those were 
the antiquated British methods. To-day the 
railway engineer seems to be more and more 
the deus ex machina of colonization, and the 
soldier is almost certain to follow in his wake. 
Whether we consider the Chinese railways or 
the trans-Caspian or the trans-Siberian railways, 
colonization does follow the lines of communi- 
cation ; and the lines of communication are 
not merely commercial, but mainly political 
and strategical. Nor must we forget that in 
a semi-barbarous State like Asia Minor or 
Turkey, where there are few cities and where 
other routes are unsafe, the railways, by means 
of rates and freights and tariffs, practically 
regulate the whole trade and control the whole 
finances of the country. 

We have just mentioned the trans-Siberian 
railway, and we have done so advisedly. It is 
impossible to consider the Baghdad Railway 
without thinking of Mr. Witte's great achieve- 
ment. There is a most striking analogy between 
them. The German undertaking is, like the 
Russian, on a scale of such magnitude that 
it must inevitably create a situation which it 
is almost beyond the power of statesmanship 



252 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

to control. Both undertakings are instruments 
of penetration into regions which are within 
the sphere of influence of the great Powers of 
Europe. As in the famous poem of Goethe, 
in both cases forces have been set loose which 
no spell of the political magician can set at 
rest again. The trans-Mesopotamian railway, 
when it is completed, and if Germany succeeds 
in her policy, will play in the Near East the 
same ominous part which the trans-Siberian 
played in the Far East ; with this important 
difference, however, that whilst the Far Eastern 
conflict only involved one European Power 
and one Asiatic Power, the Near Eastern 
conflict, if it breaks out, must needs involve 
all the European Powers, must force the whole 
Eastern Question to a crisis, and, once begun, 
cannot be terminated until the map of Europe 
and Asia shall be reconstructed. 

This, and nothing less, is implicitly contained 
in the Baghdad Railway. The sooner our earnest 
attention is concentrated on the mountain 
ranges of the Taurus, and the valleys of the 
Tigris and the Euphrates, the better it will be 
for the peace of the world. Dark clouds are 
gathering over the ruins of Nineveh and 
Babylon, which may burst into a political storm 
and cataclysm such as the world has not seen 
since Napoleonic times. Hitherto England has 
followed, with regard to the Baghdad Railway, 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 253 

the most dangerous of all policies, the policy 
of "drift." The critical moment is drawing 
near when the Baghdad Railway will emerge 
from the tunnels of the Taurus Mountains 
and will work south towards the Persian 
Gulf and the British sphere of influence. 
Let England study the situation calmly and 
coolly whilst it is time ; she will then be 
prepared to speak with no uncertain voice 
and to make a determined attempt in order 
to ward off the consequences. 



III. 



We were perhaps not quite correct in stating 
that the Baghdad Railway concession marks a 
new era in the foreign policy of Germany. 
It marks rather an end than a beginning. It 
is the successful termination of a long series 
of diplomatic moves, the accomplishment of 
long-cherished ambitions. For forty years 
Germany had been seeking an outlet for her 
teeming population and her expanding in- 
dustries. Hitherto emigration had seemed to 
be a sufficient outlet and a sufficient source of 
strength. But as Germany was becoming more 
and more the controlling power of the Continent, 
she refused to be contented with sending out 
millions of her sons, who, as mere emigrants to 



254 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

foreign countries, were lost to the Vaterland.* 
How different would the power of Germany have 
been, German Imperialists were ever repeating, 
if the 20,000,000 Teutons who have colonized 
the United States, or Brazil, or Argentina, and 
have been absorbed and Americanized and 
Saxonized, had settled in territories under the 
Imperial flag. 

And thus Pan-Germanists have been looking 
towards every part of the horizon. They have 
first looked to the north and the north-west, 
and they have reflected that the Rhine ought 
to belong to the Vaterland ; that Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, and Antwerp are the natural 
German harbours ; that Denmark, Holland, 
and Flemish Belgium are the outposts of 
Germany for the transit commerce of Europe, 
and that all these outposts ought to be included 
either in an economic Zollverein or in a 
political confederation.f 

But Germany wisely realized that those 
northern ambitions would meet with absolute 
resistance on the part of other Powers, that 
she was not yet strong enough to defy that 
resistance, and that this fulfilment of her 
aspirations must be postponed until she was 

* To-day the immigration into Germany exceeds the emigration. 

fin Justus Perthes's widely scattered " Alldeutscher Atlas," 
edited by Paul Langhans, and published by the Alldeutscher 
Verband, both Holland and Flemish Belgium are considered and 
" coloured " as an integral part of the future German Empire. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 255 

prepared to fight for the mastery of the sea. 
In the meantime, she contented herself with 
peacefully annexing the commerce of the Flemish 
and Dutch ports, with building up a mercantile 
and a war navy, with advocating the historical 
maritime philosophy of Captain Mahan, and 
with repeating on every occasion the famous 
note of warning : " Unsere Zukunft ist auf dem 
IVasserT Biding her time, and following the 
line of least resistance, Germany for the last 
twenty years therefore extended steadily to- 
wards the south and towards the east. Towards 
the south she saw two decaying empires, Austria- 
Hungary and Turkey, which seemed to be a 
natural prey for her political and commercial 
ambitions : two conglomerates of hostile races 
which are waiting for a master. Towards the 
east she saw one of the most ancient seats of 
human civilization, a huge and rich territory, 
which is the one great country, in close prox- 
imity to Europe, which is still left unoccupied 
and undeveloped. On those three empires 
Germany set her heart, and with the method 
and determination which always characterize 
her she set to work. And with an equally 
characteristic spirit this gigantic scheme of com- 
mercial and political absorption of three empires, 
from the Upper Danube to the Persian Gulf, 
was being explained away and justified by an 
all comprehensive watchword : the " Drang 



256 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

nach Osten." It was only in response to 
this irresistible call and impulse, this Drang 
and pressure, it was only to obey a historical 
mission, that the Teuton was going to regenerate 
the crumbling empires of Austria, of Turkey, 
and of Asia Minor. 

In the first place, let us consider for one 
moment the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. It 
is now fifty years since, through the battle of 
Sadowa, Austria-Hungary was ousted from the 
German Confederation. The same reasons which 
impelled Protestant Prussia to drive Catholic 
Austria from the Germanic Confederation are 
still in large measure subsisting to-day, and I 
do not think that the Hohenzollern has any 
intention of forcing the Habsburg into the 
confederation again, merely to obey the behests 
of the Pan-Germanists. Prussia has no interest 
whatever in reopening the ancient dualism of 
North and South, in re-establishing the two 
poles and antipodes, Berlin and Vienna. zAs a 
matter of 'a fact, ever since 1870, Austria-Hungary 
has been far more useful to German aims in hey 
present dependent condition than if she were an 
integral part of the Confederation. In continental 
politics as well as in colonial politics, a disguised 
protectorate may be infinitely preferable to vir- 
tual annexation. The protectorate of Tunis 
has given far less trouble to France than the 
colony of Algeria. And for all practical interests 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 257 

and purposes, Austria-Hungary has become a 
German dependency. She has been drawn into 
the orbit of the Triple Alliance. She follows 
the political fortunes of the predominant partner. 
She almost forms part of the German Zollverein, 
in that her tariffs are systematically favourable to 
her northern neighbour. But above all, Austria- 
Hungary renders to Germany the inestimable service 
both of " civilizing" — that is, of " Germanizing" — 
the inferior races, the Slavs, and of keeping them in 
check. It is a very disagreeable and difficult task, 
which Germany infinitely prefers to leave to Austria 
rather than to assume herself And it is a task 
for which, as Professor Lamprecht, the national 
historian, is compelled to admit, the Austrian 
German seems far more qualified than the 
Prussian German. And Germany can thus 
entirely devote herself to her world ambitions, 
whilst Austria is entirely absorbed by her racial 
conflict — for the King of Prussia ! 

For the last twenty-five years the process of 
Germanizing has been going on without inter- 
ruption. A bitter war of races and languages is 
being waged between the Austrian German and 
the Magyar, between the Teuton and the Slav. 
Of the Slav, the Austrian Teuton wants to 
make his political slave. To him "Slav" and 
" slave " are synonymous words ; and when we 
consider that the Slavs are disunited in language 
and religion, and that they hate each other 

17 



258 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

almost as cordially as they hate the Niemets ; 
and when we further consider that behind the 
ten millions of Austrian Germans there will be 
sixty-five millions of other Germans to support 
them, whilst the Catholic Tcheches and Poles 
can only fall back on the support of abhorred 
and heretical Russia, there is every reason to 
fear that the Slav must eventually come under 
the economic and political control of the Austrian 
Germans — that is to say, ultimately under the 
influence of the German Empire. 

But it is not only the Slavs of the Austrian 
Empire that are threatened by German ab- 
sorption ; that absorption has rapidly extended 
to the Slav States of the Balkan Peninsula. On 
the south as well as on the north of the Danube, 
Austria has been used as the " catspaw," or, to 
use the more dignified expression of Emperor 
William, as the "loyal Sekundant" of the 
Hohenzollern. The occupation of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, in defiance of the Treaty of Berlin, 
was the beginning of that Austrian "Drang 
nach Osten" policy, the next object of which 
is the possession of the Gulf of Salonica, and 
the ultimate object of which is the control of 
Constantinople. 

In a striking article published in the Nine- 
teenth Century, 1905, Sir Harry Johnston gave 
definite expression to the Eastern aspirations of 
the Hohenzollern, and the political programme 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 259 

he outlines is to-day the programme of the 
majority of thoughtful and far-seeing Germans : — 

"The German Empire of the future will be, or should 
be, a congeries of big and little States, semi-dependent in 
many respects, bound together by allegiance to a supreme 
emperor, by a common customs union, an army and 
navy for the defence of their mutual interests. This 
empire will include the present German kingdoms, 
duchies, principalities, and republics, and, in addition, 
a kingdom of Hungary, kingdoms of E.oumania, Servia, 
Bulgaria, principalities of Croatia, Montenegro, Mace- 
donia, a republic of Byzantium, a sultanate of Anatolia, 
a republic of Trebizond, an emirate of Mosul, a de- 
pendency of Mesopotamia ; the whole of this mosaic 
bound together by bands and seams of German cement. 
Wherever there is vacant land and a suitable climate 
German colonies will be established, as they have been 
in Transylvania and Syria (as also in Southern Russia 
and in the Caucasus). The territories of this German 
League would thus stretch from Hamburg and Holstein 
on the Baltic and on the North Sea to Trieste and the 
Adriatic, to Constantinople and the ^Egean, to the Gulf 
of Alexandretta, to the Euphrates and the frontiers of 
Persia. 

" There might still be a Sultan of Turkey, but he would 
reside at some appropriate capital in Mohammedan Asia 
Minor, with a German resident at his court, and, at first, 
with Germans to teach him sound finance and good 
government. In joining this German League, Austria- 
Hungary, Bohemia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia, Mon- 
tenegro would enjoy the same freedom and independence 
as are attributed at the present day to the kingdom of 
Saxony or the kingdom of Bavaria. The emperor of this 
great confederation might be a German and a Hohen- 
zollern, and he might fix his residence at Berlin or at 



260 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Vienna ; but that would be merely because at the present 
day the kingdom of Prussia is superior in population and 
power to any one of the States mentioned as forming part 
of this League. 

"Perhaps the beneficent work of Rome, which was 
shattered by the uprising of Mohammed, may be again 
rebuilt upon a surer basis. Britain and Ireland, France, 
Italy, Spain, and Portugal may band together to do the 
work of the Western empire; while Germany and her 
Magyar, Slav, Ruman, and Greek allies restore the edifice 
which Constantine founded at Byzantium. Some of my 
readers may live long enough to see William the Second 
or Frederick the Fourth crowned in Saint Sophia, Emperor 
of the Nearer East." 

To pave the way to the realization of these 
glorious aspirations, Austria has used every 
means to justify her intervention ; she has 
consistently followed the traditional principle of 
the Habsburg monarchy of " divide ut imperes" 
She has prevented all understanding between 
Servia and Bulgaria. With regard to Servia it 
is not too much to say that, politically as well as 
economically, she is completely in the grip of 
her Austrian neighbour, and any one conversant 
with the history of contemporary Servia knows 
that Austrian intrigues are at the root of all the 
internal troubles of that distracted country. I 
remember the present King of Servia, whilst 
discussing with me in 1905 the Austro-Servian 
relations, saying in a tone of melancholy resigna- 
tion : " Que voulez-vous ; nous devons passer sous 
les fourches caudines de I'Autriche" Austria 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 261 

has exploited for her own ends the dynastic 
quarrel between the Obrenovitch and the Kara- 
georgevitch. King Milan openly followed the 
Austrian policy which was the cause of his fall. 
It was Austria that made him declare a fratricidal 
war against Bulgaria. It has been, and still is, 
the systematic policy of Austria to prevent any 
railways being built by Servia, which might 
provide outlets for her trade — for instance, on 
the Adriatic Sea — and which would make her 
independent of Austria. At present, as eighty 
per cent, of Servian exports must go into 
Hungary, Servia is absolutely at the mercy of 
her northern neighbour, as recent events have 
only too clearly shown. In the year of grace 
1906 Servia and Bulgaria concluded a Zoll- 
verein : as a preliminary step to that future 
federation desired by all far-sighted patriots in 
the Balkans, and as a preliminary step to an 
entente cordiale on the Macedonian Question. 
As soon as this Zollverein was declared, Austria 
broke off the negotiations for a renewal of the 
Treaty of Commerce with Servia. There came 
a deadlock. Servian farmers were threatened 
with ruin. Servia had to submit to the terms 
of the Austrian Government, which compelled 
her to buy her chief imports, including guns 
and ammunition, in the Austrian markets, and 
which made Servia more than ever into a vassal 
State of the Austrian Empire. 



262 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

It may be objected that the triumph of 
Austrian Germany, acting as the vanguard and 
"loyal Sekundant" of the Hohenzollern, and 
bringing under Teutonic control all the Slav 
races on both sides of the Danube, must still 
take many years for its realization. That ma^ 
be so ; but certainly the same objection cannot 
be made with regard to Turkey. The absorption 
of Turkey is not a distant dream, it is very 
nearly an accomplished fact. Twenty-five years 
ago Germany declared she had no political stake 
in the affairs of Turkey. As recently as the 
'seventies, Bismarck proclaimed in Parliament 
that the Eastern Question was not worth the 
loss of one Pomeranian soldier.* 

To-day Germany is wellnigh supreme on the 
Bosphorus. She started by sending military in- 
structors, amongst whom was the famous general 
Von der Goltz Pasha, and by reorganizing the 
Turkish army on the German model. She 
then sent her travellers, absorbing the commerce 
of the country. She then sent her engineers, 
obtaining concessions, building railways, and 
practically obtaining the control of the so-called 
" Oriental " line. Finally, she became the self- 
appointed doctor of the " sick man." Whenever 
the illness of recent years came to a crisis — after 

* As recently as March 19, 1903, Prince von Bulow also 
declared : " Germany does not practice in the East any active 
policy." Such is the language of diplomacy, intended not to express 
our thoughts and to reveal our intentions, but carefully to hide them. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 263 

the Armenian and the Macedonian atrocities, 
after the Cretan insurrection — Germany stepped 
in and paralyzed the action of Europe. It was 
Germany that not only enabled Turkey to crush 
Greece and to restore her military prestige, it 
was Germany that enabled her to reap the fruits 
of victory. 

For ten years Lohengrin appeared as the 
temporal providence, the protector of Abdul 
Hamid. The Holy Roman Emperor appeared 
as the saviour of the Commander of the Faith- 
ful. A Power which did not have one Moham- 
medan subject claimed to protect two hundred 
million Mohammedans. And when, in 1897, 
Emperor William went on his memorable 
pilgrimage to Jerusalem, this latter-day pilgrim 
entered into a solemn compact with a sovereign 
still reeking from the blood of 200,000 Chris- 
tians. The Cross made an unholy alliance with 
the Crescent. 

This alliance, coinciding with the journey 
to Jerusalem, marked a further step in the 
forward movement, in the " Drang nach Osten " 
policy. It was the third and the last stage, 
and by far the most important one. It was 
obvious that, on the European side of the 
Bosphorus, Germany could not make much 
further progress for some years to come. The 
times were not ripe. International jealousies 
might be prematurely roused, all the more so 



264 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

because neither the German Kaiser nor his 
subjects have the discretion and modesty of 
success. But on the Asiatic side there extended 
a vast Asiatic inheritance, to which, as yet, there 
was no European claimant ; to which already, 
forty years ago, German patriots like Moltke, 
German economists like Roscher and List 
had drawn the attention of the Vaterland — a 
country with a healthy climate and with infinite 
resources as yet undeveloped. This was to be 
in the immediate future the field of German 
colonization. On his way to Jerusalem the 
German Emperor pressed once more his 
devoted friend the Sultan for an extension of 
German enterprise in Asia Minor. The con- 
cession of the railway to Baghdad was granted, 
and a new and marvellous horizon opened 
before the Hohenzollern. 



IV. 



The Baghdad Railway will connect Haidar 
Pasha, one of the Asiatic suburbs of Constant- 
inople, with one of the harbours conceded to 
Germany on the Persian Gulf. And already 
German engineers are planning to connect the 
Asiatic terminus, by means of an underground 
tunnel, with the European side of Constantinople 
and with the European railway which is already 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 265 

under German management. At the one end a 
German company will control the quays and 
eventually the customs, and at the other end she 
will have the ports of Baghdad, Bassorah, and a 
harbour still to be determined on in the Persian 
Gulf. 

The original plan of the Anatolian company 
had been to follow the northern route via 
Angora, Shivas, Djarbekir, following almost 
exactly the imperial road of the Romans, 
avoiding the mountainous ranges of the Taurus, 
passing through flourishing cities and entering 
by a gentle slope the plain of Nineveh. This 
route was both the quickest, the most con- 
venient, and the cheapest. But Russia opposed 
her veto.* This northern line would have been 
a standing menace to her Armenian and Trans- 
caucasian possessions. In case of a war between 
Turkey and Russia, the railway would have 
been a splendid strategic line to quickly mobilize 
the Turkish army and to pour troops into 
Transcaucasia. 

The Anatolian company had therefore to 
follow the southern line, taking during the first 
part the route followed by Cyrus and the Ten 
Thousand in one of the most famous expedi- 
tions of antiquity. Every English public- 
school boy who reads his "Anabasis" can there- 
fore follow the general direction of the German 

* Convention of 1900. 



266 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

engineers ; first the valley of the Meander, then 
the ascent and the descent of the Taurus, then 
the plains of Mesopotamia. The ascent and 
the descent of the Taurus involves consider- 
able engineering difficulties and an enormous 
expenditure, estimated at five or six millions 
sterling. 

But not only has the German company re- 
ceived the concession of the trans-Mesopotamian 
highway, but it has also secured practical control of 
most of the branch railways already in existence. 
Two of these, and the most important, were in 
the hands of the French, and they were bought 
up : one line, Smyrna to Afium-Karahissar, being 
the direct trade route with Smyrna ; the other, 
Mersina to Adana, giving access to the Gulf of 
Alexandretta. By an irade of 1910 the Baghdad 
Railway Company has obtained the concession 
of the port of Alexandretta, which will even- 
tually become one of the most important com- 
mercial centres of the Mediterranean. 

And finally, the German company has 
obtained the concession of the enormous line 
which it is proposed to establish between 
Aleppo, Damascus, and Mecca — the line which 
will be taken by all the pilgrims to the city 
of the Prophet. Et nunc erudimini gentes ! 
Even the Holy Land will become a German 
province. The network of German railways 
will radiate from Mecca to Constantinople, and 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 267 

from Smyrna to the Persian Gulf. One terminus 
will be within twelve hours of Egypt, another 
terminus will be within four days of Bombay ! 



V. 



But perhaps the most important political 
consequence of the Baghdad scheme remains 
still to be noticed. The Baghdad line must ulti- 
mately mean the strengthening and the tightening 
of the German protectorate over European Turkey. 
In any case, the commercial control of Asia 
Minor must lead to a political control, and the 
political control of Anatolia, the cradle and 
centre of Turkish power, must sooner or later 
place Turkey at the mercy of Germany. But 
there are in the different agreements between 
the Turkish Government and the Baghdad Rail- 
way Company special financial provisions which 
must precipitate this undesirable consummation. 
There are clauses which must produce results 
which it is impossible to calculate, and the 
gravity of which it is impossible to over- 
estimate. 

These clauses are to the effect that the 
Turkish Government will guarantee to the 
railway company a sum of 16,000 francs per 
kilometre. Now the most hopeful calculations 
only promise a return of 4, 000 francs per kilo- 



268 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

metre. Some calculations reach as low a figure 
as 1,000 francs. It is not necessary to enter here 
into the details of the financial arrangements 
and of the " kilometric " guarantees secured by 
the German company. One thing is certain, 
that those arrangements and guarantees will 
prove for many years a considerable drain on 
the Turkish Treasury. No doubt, after thirty 
or forty years, when the mineral resources of 
Asia Minor will have been tapped, when the 
agricultural resources of Mesopotamia will have 
been developed by irrigation, the country may 
yet become one of the richest tracts of the 
world, as it is naturally one of the most fertile. 
It may again become what it has repeatedly 
been in antiquity and in the Middle Ages — 
"a garden where the bird can fly from tree to 
tree from Baghdad to the sea." But in the 
meantime large tracts of garden are turned into 
a desert ; others are infested by hordes of 
Kurds, who plunder the Turkish officials after 
they have finished murdering their Armenian 
victims. This plague of brigandage is such that 
the German Consul-General, sent to investigate 
on the spot, has declared that it would require 
two army corps to guard the line of railway* 

There can be no doubt also that under wise 
management the Turkish Government would 

* What splendid opportunities this may eventually afford for 
military intervention. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 269 

be able to recover the millions spent on the 
German railway. But whoever knows anything 
about Turkish finances and their state of chronic 
bankruptcy, knows that the Turkish Treasury 
may be placed in a position where it will be 
unable to pay the annual guarantee. To pay 
herself eventually the German company has 
obtained sureties. These sureties put the 
Turkish Government in bondage. In a very 
few years Turkey will find herself in the position 
of a bankrupt who has surrendered all her sub- 
stance to a usurer. Turkey will find herself in 
the same position in which Egypt found her- 
self before 1880 — with this important difference, 
that in Egypt all the Powers had the financial 
control, whilst in Turkey Germany alone would 
rule supreme. In fact, the Sultan of Turkey 
will become a vassal of Germany. Already 
under Abdul Hamid the Turkish Government 
took its orders from the German ambassador. 
Abdul Hamid reigned, but Baron Marschall von 
Bieberstein ruled. It was thought that the 
Young Turks educated in London and Paris 
would shake off the yoke of Berlin. As a 
matter of fact, under the new militarist regime, 
the alliance between the two Governments is 
closer than before. 

When Emperor William undertook in 1897 
the journey to Jerusalem which was to secure 
to the Vaterland such a political triumph, 



270 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

when his fertile imagination was first haunted 
by that glorious vision which, once realized, 
would make the Hohenzollern — the Holy 
Roman Emperor — more powerful than Charle- 
magne or Napoleon, did he expect that less than 
fifteen years would see the realization of that 
vision, and that the establishment of a virtual 
German Protectorate would be the great achieve- 
ment of his reign ? 

VI. 

The more we examine the political aspects ot 
the Baghdad problem, the more we wonder at the 
extraordinary rapidity with which Germany has 
overcome what might have proved insuperable 
obstacles, the more we realize that the so-called 
systematic opposition on the part of France and 
England is a mischievous legend, fabricated by 
German publicists in search of a grievance. 

It is easy enough to see how the Sultan of 
Turkey should have been persuaded to grant 
the concession. During his reign Abdul Hamid 
was surrounded on all sides by implacable 
enemies, and he naturally turned to the pro- 
tection of the great military Power of the West. 
Moreover, in Turkish eyes, the danger of the 
future was still Russia ; and in case of a conflict 
with Russia, the network of railways conceded 
to Germany might be utilized for strategic 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 271 

purposes : they would immensely strengthen 
the military position of Turkey. 

It is also easy enough to see why the Rus- 
sians, after securing that the Baghdad Railway 
should not take a northern direction, and follow 
the line of least resistance vid Angora, Shivas, 
Djarbekir, and into the Mesopotamian plain, 
should cease to interfere, and should let Germany, 
France, and England fight out their differences. 

But it is not easy, indeed it is impossible, to 
understand how France and England without 
a protest should have allowed Germany to take 
possession of a country where the English had 
vital political interests, over which the French 
had exerted a religious protectorate for many 
centuries, in which they had universities and 
schools, and which indeed had come to be called 
the "France of the Levant/'* 

With regard to France, not only did she not 
make a firm stand to defend legitimate claims 
and an established position, but she actually 
offered to lend her own money and her political 
influence to further the schemes of her rivals. 
The German people were not prepared to 
sink vast sums in the Baghdad scheme, as the 
French people had sunk hundreds of millions 
for Suez and Panama. The German millions 
were urgently wanted at home, and if the 

* See M. Etienne Lamy's striking volume, " La France du 
Levant." 



272 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Baghdad Railway was to be built it would have 
to be built mainly with foreign money. The 
German Concessionaires had insuperable diffi- 
culty in finding the indispensable working 
capital, and they induced French financiers to 
subscribe part of the money. The French had 
to accept for themselves all the financial risks. 
The Germans reserved to themselves all the 
advantages, all the securities, and the sole 
economic and political control ! A German 
railway largely built with French money — 
this is what the Germans call the systematic 
opposition of France ! When the secret 
history of the Baghdad Railway is revealed, 
it will become obvious that the interests of 
France were betrayed mainly by M. Rouvier 
and his syndicate. We have it on the 
authority of M. Cheradame that M. Rouvier, 
before becoming French Minister of Finance 
and Prime Minister, controlled a private bank 
which had extensive dealings with the omnipo- 
tent Deutsche Bank, and which was financially 
interested in the great German railway scheme. 
Indeed, M. Rouvier, a French Minister of Fi- 
nance and Prime Minister, appears as the finan- 
cial agent and mandatory of the Deutsche Bank.* 

* " All the leading men whom I have met in Turkey, French- 
men or foreigners — and amongst these many consuls and members 
of the diplomatic body — consider M. Rouvier as the very active 
collaborator of German policy in Turkey, nay, the word has been 
used to me, as the agent of the Deutsche Bank." Cheradame, p. 275. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 273 

Hence the efforts of M. Rouvier to further the 
policy of Germany. Hence the systematic sup- 
port of the French Ambassador, M. Constans, 
acting under the instructions of M. Delcasse. 
Hence the official denials of M. Delcasse in the 
French Chamber, notwithstanding undoubted 
facts.* Hence the extraordinary entente cordiale 
between France and Germany on a scheme 
which was to make Germany supreme, which 
was to give the death-blow to French influence, 
and which would be a constant menace to 
Russia, the loyal ally of the French Republic. 

The history of French foreign policy for the 
last twenty years is not always pleasant reading ; f 
but I do not know of any sadder page in that 
history than the staggering negotiations between 
the German Concessionaires and the French 
financiers and diplomats. In the French 
Chamber the scheme was branded as a new 
"Panama." 

Perhaps we may find a more charitable ex- 
planation than the one suggested by M. Chera- 
dame. It is true that our explanation would 
exonerate those responsible from the accusation 
of dishonesty, but it would only do so by laying 
them open to the charge of imbecility. The 
Germans, it was contended, were bent on having 

* See Jourtial Officul> p. 1,468, parliamentary debate of March 
24, 1902. 

t See the admirable and illuminating recent volume of Rene 
Millet, with preface by M. Hanotaur. 

18 



274 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

their concession ; they could not possibly be 
ousted from the field ; their influence was 
supreme with the Sultan. Why should the 
French not have made the most of a hopeless 
situation ? Why should they not at least claim 
a share in the building of the railway ? By 
contributing forty per cent, of the capital to the 
Baghdad Railway, might they not reasonably 
expect to exert a proportional influence and 
control over the undertaking ? 

If M. Rouvier or M. Constans or M. Del- 
casse ever honestly did entertain these hopes, 
they have been sadly deceived. And they 
ought to have been warned by the unrest and 
indignation which the Franco-German entente cor- 
diale excited amongst their allies the Russians.* 
The French investor would no doubt have a 
proportional risk in the railway, and before it 
was built many millions of French money would 
be lost in the plains of Babylon ! But the 
management and control was, and will remain, 
German. The Germans themselves meant this 
to be clearly understood, and cannot be accused 
of any double dealing. They did not even 
trouble to conceal their game. 

The original plan of the financiers of the 
Deutsche Bank, the great instrument of German 



* See the comments of the Novou Vremya at the time when 
M. Constans was trying his best to carry through the unification of 
the Ottoman Debt. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 275 

penetration in Turkey, was only too clear. 
The financial co-operation of France was indis- 
pensable. The French investors, with their 
usual gullibility, and coaxed by M. Rouvier 
and his friends, would have taken up fifty, or 
perhaps seventy or eighty per cent.* of the 
shares at a very high figure. From the necessity 
of the situation and the inevitable incipient 
difficulties in the construction of the railway, 
the shares would very soon fall very low. The 
German syndicate would then have bought up 
the whole stock, and thereby would have made 
the financial scheme possible for the Ger- 
man banks. The Baghdad Railway with the 
Deutsche Bank would have exactly repeated the 
history of the Ottoman railways with M. de 
Hitsch. 

Whatever may be the true explanation of the 
Franco-German entente on the Baghdad Railv/ay, 
it will probably be considered by future histo- 
rians as the most extraordinary chapter in the 
history of contemporary French diplomacy. 
And this Franco-German episode seems to me to be 
the true key to the Moroccan crisis. In the Baghdad 
Railway affair Germany had had an excellent 
opportunity of studying the strange influences at 
work in French foreign policy. Germany saw 
how easily she had ousted France from Asia 

* Eighty per cent, was the figure given by M. Etienne, the 
former War Secretary and leader of the French Colonial Party. 



276 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Minor, where French claims were so strong. 
Why should she not easily oust her neighbours 
from another sphere of influence ? In both 
cases German diplomacy, if unscrupulous, was 
successful, and, as against French diplomacy^ de- 
served to be successful. In both cases France was 
lamentably led astray by those in control of her 
foreign policy. In both emergencies — and that 
is the real explanation of the bewildering blun- 
ders and inconsistencies of French diplomacy — 
France was too much distracted by her internal 
quarrels and by the vital question of the separa- 
tion between Church and State to give any 
heed to her international position. 



VII. 

In her Near Eastern policy English diplomacy 
has not been influenced by the sordid motives 
which have influenced French diplomacy. There 
have been no secret combinations and syndicates 
of politicians and financiers working against the 
interests of their country. Yet in the end the 
interests of England have been betrayed quite 
as effectually by English statesmen as by French 
statesmen, and those English interests are in- 
comparably more important. For the Baghdad 
Railway threatens the Imperial future of Britain 
on at least two vital points. The south-eastern 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 277 

section between Baghdad and the Persian Gulf 
threatens India, the south-western section be- 
tween Aleppo, Damascus, and Mecca threatens 
Egypt. 

German publicists, of course, will tell us that 
these dangers are purely imaginary, and that 
those suspicions only prove the hostile feelings 
of those who make them. But we have, alas ! 
too many and too convincing proofs that the 
danger is very far from being imaginary. The 
following statement by Dr. Paul Rohrbach tells 
its own tale and needs no commentary, and is all 
the more singular when it is remembered that 
Dr. Rohrbach is one of the most authoritative 
exponents of German foreign policy, that he is 
a man of moderate opinions and what is called 
a " sound " man, and a regular contributor to 
Radical as well as National-Liberal periodicals. 

" One factor and one alone will determine the possibility 
of a successful issue for Germany in such a conflict : 
whether or not we succeed in placing England in a 
perilous position. A direct attack upon England across 
the North Sea is out of the question ; the prospect of a 
German invasion of England is a fantastic dream. It is 
necessary to discover another combination in order to hit 
England in a vulnerable spot — and here we come to the 
point where the relationship of Germany to Turkey and 
the conditions prevailing in Turkey become of decisive 
importance for German foreign policy, based as it now is 
upon watchfulness in the direction of England . . . England 
can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from 
Europe only in one place — Egypt. The loss of Egypt 



278 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

would mean for England not only the end of her 
dominion over the Suez Canal, and of her connections 
with India and the Far East, but would probably entail 
the loss also of her possessions in Central and East 
Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan 
Power, like Turkey, would also imperil England's hold 
over her sixty million Mohammedan subjects in India, 
besides prejudicing her relations with Afghanistan and 
Persia. Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering 
Egypt until she is mistress of a developed railway system 
in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress 
of the Anatolian Railway to Baghdad, she is in a position 
to withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia. 
The Turkish army must be increased and improved, and 
progress must be made in her economic and financial posi- 
tion . . . The stronger Turkey grows, the more dangerous 
does she become for England . . . Egypt is a prize which 
for Turkey would be well worth the risk of taking sides 
with Germany in a war with England. The policy of 
protecting Turkey, which is now pursued by Germany, has 
no other object but the desire to effect a?i insurance against 
the danger of a war with England." * 

At the beginning of this chapter I stated that 
England, so far from opposing German ex- 
pansion in the Near East, had betrayed some 
vital interests of the empire in her desire to 
conciliate her German neighbours. Those who 
have taken the trouble to follow the argument 
contained in these preceding pages, those who 
will give careful consideration to the weighty 
utterances and admissions of Dr. Rohrbach, and 
those who, apart from any such admissions, 

* Rohrbach's "Die Bagdadbahn," pp. 18, 19. Berlin, 191 1. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 279 

merely think out the necessary trend of German 
politics and the logic of events, will be little 
inclined to accuse me of any exaggeration. 
And certainly if British public opinion is not 
enlightened as to the true nature of German 
expansion in the Near East, it will not be for 
lack of due warning on the part of our German 
rivals. For it must be confessed that, with all 
their shortcomings, there is one reproach from 
which they are singularly free, and for which 
they are often most unjustly accused — namely, 
the reproach of deceitfulness. German diplomacy 
may be contradictory and jerky, but it certainly 
is not deceitful. So far from working in the 
dark, the German politician trumpets his 
schemes, blurts out his intentions, and by 
forewarning his competitors gives them ample 
opportunity to forearm themselves. In the 
case of the Baghdad Railway, the forewarnings 
have been so numerous that the neglect to 
profit by them would be inexcusable. If, 
indeed, as Dr. Rohrbach tells us, the ultimate 
aim of German policy in the Near East is 
not peaceful penetration and commercial ex- 
pansion, but the building of strategic railways, 
and the threatening of Egypt and India, then 
obviously the bounden duty of English states- 
men is not to advance any further in the 
path of concession, but to speak out with no 
uncertain voice ; to call a halt, to demand the 



280 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

neutralization of Mesopotamia to the south 
of Baghdad, and generally to oppose a vigorous 
non possumus to the political control of those 
parts of Asia where England has vital Imperial 
interests. 



THE SECOND GERMAN GRIEVANCE. 

Has England hemmed in Germany ? 

We are now coming to the second German 
grievance against this country. It is contended 
that England has tempted and seduced the 
friends and allies of Germany ; that she has 
stirred up Europe against her ; that she has 
hemmed her in, encircled her, isolated her ; 
that Edward the Seventh was the arch-plotter 
in the diplomatic drama ; that England has been 
the disturbing factor in international politics, 
and that in the Concert of Europe she has 
wrested the conductor's baton from the hands 
of the Kaiser. 

It is certain that the position of Germany in 
191 1 is not what it was in 1871. For thirty 
years Germany was the one supreme power in 
Europe. To-day the equilibrium has been 
restored, and Germany has fallen from her 
high estate. But can it be said that England 
is responsible for the new grouping of Powers, 
and is that new grouping directed against 
Germany, or inspired by any hostility to the 



282 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

German people ? A brief history of the inter- 
national relations since 1871 will place the facts 
in their true light, and will dispose of the mis- 
chievous myth of an anti-German conspiracy 
initiated and led by England. In 1871 France 
was standing alone in the wilderness. She was 
humiliated and paralyzed, and at the mercy of 
any German attack. Germany's supremacy was 
unquestioned. She was the umpire of the 
Continent. She dictated her own terms to the 
other Powers, or acted as the " honest broker " 
in settling their differences, and the brokerage 
which she claimed for her services was a heavy 
one. 

The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 was the high- 
water mark of German influence. In appearance 
it was a triumph for England, and Beaconsfleld 
was acclaimed by the London mob when he 
brought back " peace with honour " ; but in 
reality the Treaty of Berlin was a triumph for 
Germany. After a victorious campaign Russia 
had obtained nothing. Without striking a blow 
Austria, as the German ally, had obtained 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was the beginning of 
the Eastern policy, of the "Drang nach Osten " of 
the Habsburg monarchy. The possession of a 
Mediterranean outlet became henceforth the aim 
of Austrian policy ; and whereas the gates of 
Constantinople seemed closed for ever against 
Russia, the gates of Salonica were half opened 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 283 

to Austria, and allured her from the distance. 
And whilst Austria was preparing to reduce 
Servia to vassalage, Germany was demanding 
payment for her services from Turkey, whom 
she had saved from Russian ambitions. The 
early 'eighties marked the beginning of German 
penetration in the Near East. The German 
Emperor was preparing to become the Supreme 
Protector of Mohammedanism. 

What the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 had been 
in Continental politics, the Conference of Berlin 
in 1884 proved to be in colonial politics. The 
Conference of Berlin once again proved the 
supremacy of Germany in European diplomacy, 
and it also proved how entirely Germany was 
determined to concentrate all her energies on 
retaining that supremacy. It is true that 
Bismarck accepted a few tropical and sub- 
tropical regions in different parts of the world 
to satisfy a noisy minority, but it cannot be 
sufficiently emphasized that he remained in 
principle hostile to colonial expansion. Let 
France waste her energies and rind a safety- 
valve for her restless spirit in oversea adven- 
ture ; let her get embroiled with Italy in the 
Mediterranean and with England in every part 
of the world. She would become all the more 
harmless in Europe. As for Germany, she 
would not let herself be deluded by the mirage 
of the African desert, and sacrifice the substance 



284 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

for the shadow. Perhaps Bismarck was har- 
bouring afterthoughts. Perhaps he was only 
opposed to a colonial policy because he thought 
it premature. Does not experience show that 
colonization in its preliminary stages is always 
ruinous ? If in course of time French colonial 
expansion were to prove remunerative, Ger- 
many could always step in and pluck the tropical 
fruit when it was mature. Whether Bismarck 
had those afterthoughts or not it is difficult 
to say. He has not revealed them in his 
" Reminiscences. ,, And whatever his ultimate 
motive in the meantime, he certainly thought 
that the real historical mission of Germany was 
on the Continent, and her highest ambition to 
direct the politics of the Old World. 

But at the very moment when Bismarck was 
sacrificing a colonial empire to the control of 
European politics, that control was beginning 
to slip from his grasp. The Iron Chancellor 
had made an irretrievable mistake in 1878, and 
alienated for ever the Russian people. He had 
been scared, like England, by the imminence of 
the Russian danger. He had treated a victorious 
ally as if he had been a vanquished enemy. 
The hereditary hatred between the Slav and 
the Teuton revived, and would have led to an 
immediate conflict between the two Powers if 
at that critical moment, immediately after the 
Turkish War, the Russian Government had not 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 285 

been paralyzed by the great Nihilist crisis which 
culminated in the assassination of the Czar. 

After the Treaty of Berlin a Franco-Russian 
understanding was unavoidable. France and 
Russia were drawn together by common griev- 
ances and common interests. 

Bismarck realized his mistake when it was 
too late, and he devoted the last years of his 
rule to a determined attempt to restore the 
understanding between Germany and Russia. 
In order to prevent the Franco-Russian Alliance 
he was even prepared to sacrifice the alliance 
with Austria. But what had been done could 
not be undone. Popular feeling in Russia was 
such that even Alexander the Third had to give 
way. That the most reactionary Government 
which Europe had seen since Nicholas the First 
— that the regime of PobiedonostsefF should ally 
itself with a revolutionary republic — that a Czar 
whose father was the martyr of Nihilism, and 
who himself was a bigoted Orthodox Churchman, 
should conquer his most inveterate religious and 
political prejudices and accept an alliance with a 
nation of rebels and anti-Clericals — proved how 
irresistible was the pressure of public opinion 
in the Russian Empire, and how profound the 
hatred of Germany. The Franco-Russian de- 
monstrations at Cronstadt and Toulon evoked 
equal enthusiasm in the autocratic monarchy 
and in the radical republic. 



286 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

But however uneasy Germany might be 
about Russia, she felt easy and reassured about 
England. The conclusion of the Franco- 
Russian Alliance only seemed to consolidate 
the entente of England with Germany. Those 
were the days when England, always anxious 
about the Russian advance towards India, was 
proclaiming that the oasis of Merv was the 
a key " of India, and when the English people 
had periodical fits of " Mervousness." On the 
other hand, Bismarck had succeeded only too 
well in embroiling France and Italy, and France 
and England. The old colonial rivalry which 
marked the eighteenth century also disturbed 
the end of the nineteenth, and was soon to 
culminate in Fashoda. As the alliance between 
France and Russia was consolidated by the 
common fear of Germany, the entente between 
England and Germany was assured by a common 
distrust of France and Russia. 

The Anglo-German entente was still further 
consolidated by dynastic ties, and it continued 
undisturbed for nearly a quarter of a century. 
Mr. Chamberlain was as loyal to it as Lord 
Salisbury, and Lord Rosebery supported it 
as enthusiastically as Mr. Chamberlain. The 
cession of Heligoland in 1890 proves how 
absolute was the trust in the friendship of 
Germany. Little did English statesmen of the 
day foresee that Heligoland would soon be 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 287 

fortified into a formidable naval base against 
England. The famous Leicester speech of 
Mr. Chamberlain in 1899 was the programme 
of a union of the three branches of the Teutonic 
stock, the Triple Alliance of the future. 

But when Mr. Chamberlain made his famous 
declaration of 1899, clouds were already gather- 
ing and threatening the Anglo-German friend- 
ship. The feeling of the English people towards 
the German people had never been heartily 
reciprocated. Any student of German political 
literature will be edified on that point ; but 
hitherto the German Government had been 
co-operating with the British Government. 
From the early 'nineties the parallel lines began 
to diverge, and ambitions were being awakened 
which could only be realized in opposition 
to England. The Kruger telegram of 1896, 
supposed to have been drawn up by the late 
German Ambassador, Marschall von Bieberstein, 
as Foreign Secretary, clearly indicated in which 
direction the German mind was moving and 
the German wind was blowing, for the tele- 
gram was not an " impulsive " act of the 
Kaiser ; it was deliberate, and Emperor 
William was only the spokesman of German 
public opinion. The outbreak of the Transvaal 
War and the checks suffered by England were 
the occasion of a wild outburst of anti-British 
feeling which continued all through the duration 



288 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

of the war, and which has never ceased to 
manifest itself since. The German people were 
convinced that the end of the British Empire 
was in sight, that England was an effete Power, 
and that Germany was destined to be in the 
near future the universal legatee of the British 
Empire. 

One fact is certain : the end of the Transvaal 
War marks the beginning of the German 
JVeltpolidk on a grand scale. Germany put 
in claims on every continent, and set herself 
with feverish haste to develop her naval power 
to support her claims. The new Naval Bill 
was passed in 1900. In 1902 Germany nego- 
tiated with France for a harbour and a naval 
base on the west coast of Morocco. In 1902 
she made a naval demonstration against Ven- 
ezuela. Obviously Germany was determined to 
lose no time in building up her world empire. 

The anti-British feeling and the aggressive 
spirit which animated the German people at last 
opened the eyes of England. She realized the 
danger which threatened Europe from German 
supremacy and England from German naval 
ambitions. The Transvaal War had revealed 
the weak spots of British military organization, 
and the pressing demand for drastic social 
reforms severely taxed financial resources, 
which would otherwise have been devoted to 
the expansion of the army and navy. Eng- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 289 

land could not afford to retain the "splen- 
did" isolation which had characterized her 
recent policy. It was all the more necessary to 
draw nearer to France and Russia, and to join 
the international system, because Russia had 
been weakened by the Japanese disasters, 
and was temporarily paralyzed by a protracted 
civil war, and France was not strong enough 
to oppose single-handed the solid bloc of the 
Triple Alliance. 

It was the pressure of those circumstances 
and the consciousness of a national and Euro- 
pean peril which dictated the policy associated 
with Edward the Seventh, and which the Ger- 
mans themselves have called the ^ Edwards che 
Politik" That pressure imposed the necessity 
of a system of understandings which would be a 
sufficient counterpoise to German omnipotence. 
Such a pressure alone could have rendered 
possible, a few years after Fashoda, an Anglo- 
French entente and could have put an end to the 
old colonial rivalry of the two countries. Such 
a pressure alone could have brought together 
and reconciled, a few years after the Japanese 
Alliance, three Powers which had opposed 
each other for nearly a century. 

The "Edwardian Policy" marks a new era 
in the history of European diplomacy. Both 
the aim and the methods were equally novel. 
For the object in view implied the rupture of 

19 



290 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

a long-standing friendship, and the close co- 
operation with two hereditary enemies ; and 
the methods were little short of a revolution. 
The personal policy of Edward the Seventh, 
and the fact of a British monarch becoming his 
own Foreign Secretary, were contrary, if not to 
the spirit of the British Constitution, at least to 
the traditions of the British Foreign Office ; but 
the necessity was so urgent and the personal 
diplomacy was so successful that English democ- 
racy accepted the accomplished fact. 

Whilst the Triple Entente was thus con- 
solidated, the Triple Alliance was gradually 
becoming dislocated. France and Italy had 
quarrelled on the question of Tunis. They 
were reconciled on the question of Tripoli. 
Popular feeling in Italy was becoming increas- 
ingly hostile to the Austro-German Alliance. 
Italian democracy looked with misgiving at an 
understanding with Prussia, which was the main- 
stay of reaction, and Italian nationalism looked 
with distrust at an understanding with Austria, 
which was holding Trieste in defiance of Italian 
aspirations. 

The Triple Alliance, therefore, had virtually 
been transformed into a Dual Alliance. In 
case of war Germany could only fall back on 
Austria. But even here Germany was not 
without anxious doubts as to the future. It is 
true that Austria had given a qualified support 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 291 

to Germany at the Algeciras Conference, and 
Germany rewarded her "loyal Sekundant" by 
supporting her in the annexation of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. But would Germany always be 
able to rely on the co-operation of the Dual 
Monarchy ? Might not a fatal course of events 
in the near future relax the union of the two 
empires ? For the Austrian Empire is a federa- 
tion, and a federation in which the Germans are 
only a small minority. Hitherto the minority 
have ruled, not because of their intrinsic supe- 
riority, but because of the racial and religious 
differences which separated the majority. The 
Austrians are clamouring for expansion in the 
Near East. But might not this cry defeat its 
own purpose ? They have secured Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. But the more they expand into 
non-German territory, the more the German 
population will be outnumbered by the Slavs. 
And if Austria did reach Salonica — if Servia were 
annexed to the Habsburg Empire — would not 
the balance of power be definitely transferred to 
the Slav races ? 

Nor must we forget, in trying to understand 
German anxieties about the future, that the 
advance of Bulgaria was creating a new factor in 
the Balkans, and that the recent revolution of 
Young Turkey might prove in the end a severe 
blow to German power. For had not the 
recent revolution been accomplished against 



292 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Germany by reformers who, on the one hand, had 
received their political education in England and 
France, and who, on the other hand, were 
aggressive Nationalists ? And would not the 
new regime be a reversal of the old Turkish 
regime, controlled by German advisers ? Prud- 
ence might no doubt compel the Young Turks 
to humour the Hohenzollern, but the intimate 
union of the two Governments which prevailed 
under Abdul Hamid — had this not come to an 
end, and perhaps for ever ? And the Young 
Turks might be all the less inclined to favour 
German influence because they dreaded her 
expansion in Anatolia and Mesopotamia. And 
might it not be the policy of Turkey for the 
next generation to play off the different Powers, 
the one against the other ? 

Surveying, then, the whole European situation 
and the new constellation in the political hori- 
zon, many changes have happened of a nature 
to make the Germans uneasy. The Algeciras 
Conference was a dramatic demonstration of the 
changed position of Germany in Europe. To 
realize the change, we have only to compare an 
account of the Conference of 1905 with an 
account of the Congress of Berlin in 1878. In 
1878 the European Powers received their 
mandate from Bismarck. At Algeciras Germany 
almost stood alone. Algeciras was a solemn 
protest of Europe against German hegemony. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 293 

Since 1905 Germany has made unceasing 
efforts to break the Triple Entente. At 
Algeciras she failed to drive a wedge between 
England and France. She failed even more 
signally in 191 1, after the coup of Agadir. 
Through one of those sudden changes in the 
kaleidoscope of diplomacy, she seems to have 
been more successful with Russia at Pots- 
dam. But the Potsdam agreement is only the 
temporary understanding of two reactionary 
Governments. It is not the entente of two 
nations. The interests of the German and of 
the Russian people as well as their tempera- 
ments continue to be irreconcilable, and the day 
is drawing near when Russia — which in 1930 
will number two hundred millions of people — 
will block the way of German expansion in the 
East. 

But whatever the future may hold in store 
for Germany, the foregoing analysis shows that 
the new grouping of Powers, which has reduced 
Germany from a position of sole supremacy to a 
position of equality, is not the result of any 
artificial combinations of diplomacy. Still less 
is it the result of a conspiracy, inspired by 
English envy and English hatred. It was not 
initiated by Edward the Seventh. It has survived 
his death. To assume that England would have 
been capable of isolating Germany by her own 
single efforts, and in order to serve her own 



294 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

selfish purposes, is to attribute to England a 
power which she does not wield. If there has 
been a conspiracy, France, Italy, Russia, and 
the United States, inhabited by twenty million 
citizens who are German by birth or by descent, 
have all been willing accomplices. The Triple 
Entente has been a spontaneous revolt of 
Europe against German aggressiveness and 
German militarism. 

England has not attempted to isolate Germany. 
She has only herself emerged from her isolation. 
If she can be accused of having made a grievous 
mistake in her foreign policy, it is that of 
having been blind for so long to the perils 
which threatened European liberty. Since 1870 
she has submitted for twenty-five years to Ger- 
man predominance, because she had to oppose 
the colonial ambitions of France in Africa and 
the ambitions of Russia in Asia. To-day 
England has returned to her ancient traditions. 
She has never suffered for any length of time, 
and will never suffer as long as she remains a 
first-class Power, from the exclusive predomi- 
nance of any one Continental nation. She has 
ever fought for the maintenance of the balance 
of power. She defended that balance against 
Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second in 
the sixteenth century, against Louis the Four- 
teenth in the seventeenth, against Napoleon, 
against Nicholas the First, and Alexander the 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 295 

Second in the nineteenth century. She defends 
it to-day against William the Second. But she 
is no more the enemy of Germany to-day than 
she was the enemy of France or Russia ten 
years ago. And if the equilibrium of Europe were 
threatened to-morrow by Russia, as it is threatened 
to-day by Germany, England would become to- 
morrow the ally of Germany. 

It may be contended, no doubt, that in 
opposing the supremacy of another empire on 
land, she is only defending her own supremacy 
on the sea. But the history of four hundred 
years convincingly shows that England in 
defending her own interests has always been 
fighting the battles of European liberty. And 
to-day more than ever, when Europe is trans- 
formed into an armed camp, when might has 
become the criterion of right, when all nations 
are living in perpetual dread of a European 
conflagration, the strict adherence of England to 
her old principle of the balance of power 
remains the best sanction of international law 
and the surest guarantee of the peace of the 
world. 



IS GERMAN SOCIALISM MAKING 
FOR PEACE? 

It is becoming a commonplace to assert that 
the advent to power of the German Socialists 
will usher in a new era in the international 
relations of Europe. It is true that the Prussian 
monarchy is warlike by tradition. It is true 
that the Junkertum have a professional interest 
in war. It is true that the industrial magnates, 
the Krupps and the Thyssens, have a vested 
interest in the military industries, in the manu- 
facture of guns and Dreadnoughts. But the 
power of Kaiser and Junkertum is dwindling. 
The army of democracy is advancing. If 
the rural elector did not possess ten times 
the voting power of the labouring masses 
of the big cities — if the electoral districts were 
divided in proportion to population — the 
Socialists with the Radicals would already have 
a large majority in the Reichstag. Even under 
the present iniquitous system the elections of 
January 19 12 have given the Social Democrats 
a formidable accession of strength. Another 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 297 

effort, another ballot, and political power will 
pass into the hands of the masses. Germany 
will have its Socialist ministers as France has 
its Millerand and its Briand. When that de- 
sirable consummation happens, peace will be 
assured. Redeunt Saturnia regna. 

Certainly the Socialist vote has enormously 
increased, and with the single exception of the 
set-back of 1907, when the Social Democrats 
suffered a crushing defeat and when Prince 
von Billow succeeded in forming against them 
a Liberal-Conservative bloc^ the increase has 
been steady and automatic. And extraordinary 
though it seems, the increase has been inevitable, 
and it will cease to startle us if we remember that 
German industry has been born since 1870, and 
that every increase of the industrial population 
has necessarily meant a corresponding increase 
of Socialism. It is only since, and it is only 
because, Berlin has become a huge industrial 
metropolis that the capital of the Hohenzollern 
has been captured by the Socialist Genossen. 

But there is one thing which Is even more 
astounding than the phenomenal growth of 
Socialism, and that is its impotence. The very 
contrast between its numerical power and the 
paucity of its achievements reveals the inherent 
weakness of the party. It is admirably organ- 
ized ; it is characterized by splendid loyalty 
and discipline. The German Social Democrat 



298 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

pays his subscription liberally and regularly. 
But he gives us once more a striking proof that 
neither numbers nor organization nor financial 
resources are the decisive factors of victory. 
After the Franco-German War, Bebel, intoxicated 
by the first triumphs of his party, prophesied 
that by 1896 the social and political revolution 
would have triumphed in Germany, and that 
Communism would be established. In 1912 
Communism has not prevailed, and Prussian 
reaction is stronger than ever. 

And yet the prophecy of the Socialist leader 
seemed justified. If in France or Italy there 
were one hundred Socialist deputies in Parlia- 
ment, the machinery of government would cease 
to work, once those hundred deputies had made 
up their minds that it should not work. In 
France a party with four millions of followers 
would either have accomplished momentous 
reforms or produced a tremendous upheaval. 
In Germany Social Democracy has accomplished 
very little ; it has delivered speeches innumer- 
able ; it has issued manifestoes ; it has organized 
processions several miles in length, whenever 
the man with the peaked helmet chose to allow 
such processions. But the history of German 
contemporary Socialism does not count a single 
historical day like the Berlin days of 1 848, when 
even Frederick the Fourth had to give way to 
the democratic demands. The mighty Social 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 299 

Democratic Party has not achieved one big 
strike like the railway strike or the coal strike 
in England, although Prussian railwaymen or 
coal miners could easily have exerted pressure on 
the Government because the majority of Prussian 
railways and a large number of Prussian mines 
are owned by the State. The Prussian Govern- 
ment may put itself above the law, and it does 
put itself above the law ; it may violate the 
spirit of the Constitution and make it a dead 
letter ; the Kaiser may break his most solemn 
pledges ; but all provocation notwithstanding, 
the Socialist remains a law-abiding citizen, and 
trusts to the inevitable agency of natural laws 
and to the working of economic evolution. 

It will be objected that important Socialist 
measures have been passed by the German 
Reichstag, and that the German Government 
may claim the merit and credit of having set an 
example in social legislation to all other civilized 
countries. By all means let due honour be given 
to German statesmen for initiating their insur- 
ance legislation ; but, as we already pointed out, 
those laws were passed by Bismarck long before 
Socialism existed as a party. And they were 
passed largely on the principle that "prevention 
is better than cure," and because the Govern- 
ment were still afraid of the phantom of 
Socialism. To-day the Prussian Government 
have ceased to be afraid. Socialism has be- 



300 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

come a reality, its supporters are counted by 
millions, and nothing is changed in the king- 
dom of Prussia. 

In explanation of the impotence of German 
Socialism it may be urged that in any insur- 
rection against a tyrannical government the 
Socialists would run a terrible risk — that they 
would have the majority of the army against 
them. And there is a great deal of truth in 
that explanation. It is one of many false notions 
current about our Continental neighbours that 
the German army is essentially a national army, 
a citizen army, a universal service army. As a 
matter of fact, hundreds of thousands of German 
youths are not called upon to serve, and that 
not for financial reasons but for political reasons. 
They are not called upon to serve because the 
Government have not sufficient confidence in 
their loyalty. The majority of the military 
contingent ought to come from the cities, which 
represent the majority of the population. As a 
matter of fact, the majority come from the 
country, which represents the minority of the 
population. The Government prefers to rely 
on the loyalty of the rural recruits, even as the 
Russian Government in an emergency prefers 
to rely on the Cossacks. 

But the main reason why German Socialism 
does not possess the dynamic power which it 
possesses in England and France does not lie in 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 301 

the Government. Rather does it lie in the 
nature of the Socialist doctrine and in the 
temperament of the German people. Why 
should the German Social Democrat make a 
sacrifice for his ideal or make a resolute stand 
against despotism, when the Marxist doctrine 
tells him that the new era will come auto- 
matically, mechanically, and that all the forces 
of the times are working for him ? And how 
can we expect the German artisan to rebel 
when centuries of oppression have inured him 
to passive obedience ? In this connection we 
ought to remember once more that German 
Social Democracy is organized exactly on the 
same military and despotic principle as the 
German Government. King Bebel demands 
as implicit obedience as Kaiser William. Iron 
discipline and unquestioning submission are 
perhaps greater in the army of labour than in 
the army of reaction. 

And not only is German Socialism not as 
strong ; neither is it as pacifist as is generally 
supposed. Outsiders take it for granted 
that in the event of a conflict between France 
and Germany there would be solidarity be- 
tween the French and the German artisans. 
They assume that Socialism is essentially inter- 
national. And in theory such an assumption 
is quite legitimate. But many things in Germany 
are national which elsewhere are universal. And 



3 02 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

in Germany Socialism is becoming national, 
as German political economy is national, as 
German science is national, as German re- 
ligion is national. Therefore the political 
axiom that German Socialists would neces- 
sarily come to an understanding with their 
French and English brethren has been falsified 
by the event. German Socialists have, no 
doubt, shown their pacific intentions ; they 
have issued pacific manifestoes and organized 
pacific processions ; they have filed of? in 
their hundreds of thousands in the streets of 
Berlin to protest against the war party ; but 
when the question of peace or war has been 
brought to a point in Socialist congresses — when 
their foreign brethren have moved that in the 
case of an unjust aggression the German Social 
Democrats should declare a military strike — 
German Socialists have refused to assent. The 
dramatic oratorical duel which took place be- 
tween the French and the German delegates at 
the Congress of Stuttgart illustrates the differ- 
ences between the national temperament of 
the Frenchman and the German. When called 
upon to proclaim the military strike, the German 
Socialists gave as an excuse that such a decision 
would frighten away from the Social Democrat 
Party hundreds of thousands of middle-class 
supporters. This excuse is an additional proof 
of the moral and political weakness of Social 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 303 

Democracy. It illustrates its moral weakness ; 
for the Socialist leaders sacrifice a great prin- 
ciple for the sake of an electoral gain. The 
leaders know that nationalist feeling runs high 
in the middle classes ; they know that any anti- 
militarist policy would be unpopular. And they 
have not the courage as a party to face unpopu- 
larity. And the arguments used at Stuttgart 
also illustrate the political weakness of German 
Socialism ; for they show that the Socialist vote 
does not possess the cohesion and homogeneity 
with which it is credited : they show that hun- 
dreds of thousands of citizens who record a 
Socialist vote are not Socialists at all. To vote 
for Socialism is merely an indirect way of voting 
against the Government. There is no organized 
Opposition in Germany. The Socialists are the 
only party who are " agin the Government." 
And all those German citizens who are dis- 
satisfied with conditions as they are, choose this 
indirect and clumsy method of voting for the 
Socialists in order to express their dissatisfaction 
with the present Prussian despotism. 

It is therefore not true to say that Socialism 
in Germany is a decisive force working for 
peace. It would be more true to say that 
it is a force working for war, simply because 
it is a force working for reaction. Prussian 
reaction would not be so strong if it were not 
for the bugbear of Social Democracy. If Social 



3o 4 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Democracy attracts a considerable section of the 
lower middle class, it repels and frightens the 
bulk of the middle classes as well as of the 
upper classes. Many Liberals who would 
otherwise oppose the Government, support it 
from horror of the red flag, and they strengthen 
unwillingly the power of reaction. And therefore 
it would scarcely be a paradox to say that the 
nearer the approach of the Socialistic reign, the 
greater would be the danger to international 
peace. German contemporary history illus- 
trates once more a general law of history, that 
the dread of a civil war is often a direct cause of 
a foreign war, and that the ruling classes are 
driven to seek outside a diversion from internal 
difficulties. Thus political unrest ushered in 
the wars of the Revolution and the Empire ; 
thus the internal difficulties of Napoleon the 
Third brought about the Franco-German War ; 
thus the internal upheaval of Russia in our days 
produced the Russo-Japanese War. 

It may be true that power is slipping away 
from the hands of the Prussian Junkertum 
and the bureaucracy, although Prussian re- 
action is far stronger than most foreign 
critics realize. But whether it be strong or 
weak, one thing is certain : a power which 
has been supreme for two centuries will not 
surrender without a struggle. The Prussian 
Junkers may be politically stupid, but they 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 305 

have not lost the fighting spirit, and they 
will not give way to the "mob." Before 
Prussian reaction capitulates, it will play its 
last card and seek salvation in a European 
conflagration. 



20 



THE GERMAN KAISER. 

To write a book on German politics which 
would ignore the German Kaiser would be like 
playing Hamlet whilst leaving out the character 
of the Danish prince. For the Kaiser meets us 
at every turn. In the words of Victor Hugo, 
speaking of Napoleon : " Toujours lui y lui 
partout." It may be found on close examina- 
tion that his influence on the political drama 
is far less decisive than appears at first sight, 
even as in Shakespeare's masterpiece Hamlet 
has little influence on the actual development 
of the plot. It may be that the Kaiser's part is 
more spectacular than dramatic. But whether 
we like him, whether we believe in him or not, 
we cannot avoid his august presence. 

And even if his absorbing personality did not 
force itself upon our attention, its study would 
still present to us a most fascinating problem. 
For the Kaiser is essentially complex and per- 
plexing, elusive and stimulating, explosive and 
incalculable. With him it is the unexpected 
that always happens. He is a bundle of contra- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 307 

dictions. He is the war lord of Europe ; yet 
he has been nicknamed by the German war 
party, "William the Peaceful." He is a Ger- 
man of the Germans ; yet he professes to be the 
friend of England. He is intensely religious, 
and claims to be the Anointed of the Lord ; 
yet in many respects he is a materialist, mainly 
trusting in brute force. He is picturesquely 
mediaeval, and the Hohenzollern seems to be 
ever anxious to model himself on the Hohen- 
staufen ; yet he is pre-eminently modern. He 
shocks us as offensively theatrical ; yet he is 
unmistakably sincere. 

Any one who attempts to write on the 
German Emperor must solve those glaring 
contradictions. And he will only succeed in 
doing so if he carefully dissociates the various 
elements which have entered into his composi- 
tion. He will only succeed if he separates what 
the Kaiser owes to his ancestry, and what he 
owes to his education ; what he owes to his 
inmost personality ; what he owes to his im- 
mediate surroundings and to the age he lives 
in. It is for want of making those necessary 
distinctions that so many publicists who have 
given us biographies and character sketches of 
the Kaiser have failed to reveal him. 

And after all, when every fact has been con- 
scientiously sifted and analyzed, even the most 
careful student cannot be sure of having hit the 



3 o8 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Imperial likeness. It seems as if the Kaiser each 
time he sits for his portrait not merely dons a 
different uniform, but puts on a different moral 
physiognomy. On three occasions I have made 
an attempt to draw a pen portrait of Emperor 
William, and each sketch was different from 
the other ; each subsequent judgment contra- 
dicted my previous estimate. I do not, there- 
fore, pretend in the present instance to give a 
final definition of the German autocrat, for the 
simple reason that it is not possible to give a 
final definition. It must be left to the reader 
to exert his own judgment and to compare my 
estimate of Emperor William with the estimate 
of those who have written before us. 



I. 

The Hohenzollem Influence. 

First in importance is the Hohenzollem 
influence. 

Few royal families in history possess a more 
marked individuality. Each member of the 
dynasty may differ widely from his predecessor 
or successor. The cynical man of genius, 
Frederick the Great, is not like the feeble 
voluptuary, Frederick William the Third, who 
again is very unlike the romantic and mystical 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 309 

dreamer, Frederick the Fourth. And yet as 
rulers they all have a certain common type. 
They have created a definite European State, 
and they themselves have been moulded by that 
State. 

1. Considering the enormous part they have 
played in history, and how closely the Hohen- 
zollerns have been identified with the fortunes 
of Prussia, it is natural that their first character- 
istic should be an overweening dynastic pride. 
No Bourbon or Habsburg has ever believed 
more firmly in his Divine Right to govern or 
misgovern his people. A Hohenzollern may 
condescend to employ men of genius to assist 
him in his providential task, but he will only 
consider those men of genius as tools to work 
out his own ends, and he will discard those tools 
whenever they have served their purpose, or 
whenever they have ceased to be pliable instru- 
ments. 

William possesses in the highest degree the 
pride of his race. Every tourist can judge from 
one of the most interesting and most impressive 
monuments of Berlin, the Sieges Allee^ what is 
William's practical conception of German history. 
In that symbolical avenue all the glories of the 
past have been enlisted as liegemen of the 
Hohenzollern. The most petty Prussian mar- 
grave assumes colossal proportions, whilst giants 
like Luther and Kant only appear to the right 



3 io THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

and to the left as the humble servants and 
Handlanger of their princes. We may smile 
at such a travesty of German history and at the 
glorification of royal nonentities, and we may be 
justified in thinking that the statues of the 
Sieges Allee have no more historical reality 
than the mythical portraits of the kings of 
Scotland in Holyrood Palace. And German 
writers may be right in ridiculing the Kaiser for 
this debauch of statuary. Personally I do not 
agree with those writers. I am convinced that 
the conception of the Sieges Allee, which entirely 
belongs to the Kaiser, is by far the cleverest 
thing which he has ever done, and also the most 
political. The national history which the statues 
inculcate may be fictitious, but the Kaiser knew 
that this fictitious history is the only one which 
millions of Germans would be ever likely to 
get, and the only one that would seize hold of 
their imagination. 

And the same historical lesson which William 
has taught through his statues he is trying to 
teach through his speeches. The exaltation of 
the Hohenzollern is their one Leitmotiv, and 
especially the exaltation ot his immediate pre- 
decessors, and, above all, of William "the Great/' 
of William " the Saint." Every schoolboy knows 
that William was an honest, conscientious, well- 
meaning ruler, and not devoid of judgment, 
whose great merit was to efface himself before 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 311 

his Chancellor, and to give way to Bismarck's 
policy even when he did not approve of it. 
Every schoolboy knows that William's rela- 
tion to Bismarck was very much that of Louis 
the Thirteenth to Richelieu. But here again 
the Kaiser has changed our interpretation of 
history. To him the real creator of the new 
empire is neither Bismarck nor Moltke nor 
Roon. William the Second, indeed, may gra- 
ciously condescend to speak of his grandfather's 
" Paladins " as we speak of the Knights of the 
Round Table, or of the Twelve Peers of Charle- 
magne, but they are only mentioned collectively 
and anonymously, and it is significant that for 
many years the name of Bismarck has been 
taboo in the Kaiser's orations. 

And in the light of this fact, and of the 
Kaiser's conception of what ought to be the 
relation between a ruler and his ministers, we 
understand why Bismarck was brutally dismissed. 
It is now generally admitted that the dismissal 
of the Iron Chancellor was the first great political 
blunder of the Emperor. Even Louis the 
Fourteenth waited for the death of Mazarin, 
and dared not dismiss him. And Mazarin was 
not Bismarck. Certainly it would have been an 
invaluable education to William if he could have 
availed himself for a few years of his Chancellor's 
experience and statesmanship. But it is also be- 
lieved that the dismissal was inevitable, because 



312 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

two such strong temperaments could not have 
worked together. We do not think that this 
is the true explanation of the catastrophe ; we 
do not think that it was pre-eminently a case 
of one strong will pitted against another. Rather 
would we infer from what has been said before, 
that the dismissal was largely an illustration 
of that dynastic pride and jealousy to which 
we have just referred. William's objection to 
Bismarck was not his Chancellor's masterful 
temper — it was mainly that the servant was 
eclipsing the glory of the dynasty in the eyes 
of the people. It was urgently necessary that 
the servant should render unto Caesar what 
belonged to Caesar, that he should be put in his 
proper place, that the German people should 
realize from a dramatic illustration that even 
the greatest statesman is nothing except through 
the favour of his prince, and that the Hohen- 
zollern should once more control the destinies 
of the State. 

2. Even as their dynastic pride, so is the 
absolutism of the Hohenzollern bred in the 
bone, and transmitted with the traditions of 
Prussian history. A Hohenzollern impatiently 
submits to constitutional checks. Most of the 
political difficulties and anomalies referred to in 
previous chapters are due to this one cause. 
Bismarck, in order to win over all the nations 
of the empire to Prussian hegemony, made an 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 313 

appeal to popular opinion, used universal suffrage 
as a lever to break down dynastic and partic- 
ularist opinion in the service of the absolute 
monarchy of the Hohenzollern. But universal 
suffrage, once it had served its purpose as a 
plebiscite, was made innocuous, and became a 
mockery. The absolute monarchy alone re- 
mained a reality. 

All the Hohenzollern rulers have shown the 
same absolutist instinct ; but Frederick the 
Great is perhaps a better illustration of this 
despotic temper than any other Prussian king. 
His despotism may have been abler and more 
enlightened, but still it was despotism. Every 
one of his acts, public and private, illustrates his 
despotic temper. Take his relations to Voltaire. 
Frederick the Great felt a boundless admiration 
for Voltaire ; he was imbued with Voltaire's 
spirit from early youth, and a correspondence 
of forty years, which was only terminated by 
death, proves how complete was the intellectual 
sympathy which united the two men ; the 
king induced the poet by every promise and 
flattery to leave his country and to make his 
residence at Potsdam : yet when Voltaire dared 
to indulge the irrepressible freedom of his genius 
and to criticize one of the favourites of his 
master, the friendship was brought to an 
immediate rupture, and the king treated with 
the most revolting indignity the very man 



314 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

whom he himself called the greatest genius of 
his age. 

Or take Frederick's relations to his mistresses. 
Frederick had more complete control over his 
feelings than most rulers, and certainly few 
kings have been less addicted to the tender 
passion ; yet when he deigned to confer his 
favour on an Italian ballet-girl he was more 
unscrupulous than any Bourbon, as tyrannical 
as an Oriental potentate in the satisfaction of his 
desire. In vain did the Barberini claim the pro- 
tection of her husband, a Scottish nobleman ; 
in vain did she seek shelter in the Republic of 
Venice : Frederick compelled the Doge and 
Senate to surrender the object of his passion. 
The husband and wife were separated, and the 
lady was brought under military escort to the 
Palace of Sans Souci. 

William the Second possesses in its integrity 
the despotic temper of his ancestors. From the 
beginning of his reign he has shown himself 
impervious to criticism : " I go my way ; it is 
the only right one " — "Whoever shall prove an 
obstacle to the realization of my purpose, I shall 
shatter " — den zerschmettere ich. 

Under the difficult conditions of a modern 
German Government a wise ruler would have 
welcomed free speech, both as a safety valve for 
popular discontent and as an indication of pop- 
ular feeling ; but William deprecates free speech 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 315 

and ignores it. Merely to discuss his policy is 
to be branded as a ndrgler. If he could, he 
would prosecute his critics. They would be 
condemned for lese-majeste^ as poor Professor 
Geffcken was sent to prison by Bismarck 
merely for having criticized the policy of the 
omnipotent Chancellor. 

One might have expected that the amazing 
indiscretions of the Daily Telegraph interview 
and the hurricane which they roused would 
have sobered for ever the Imperial orator. For 
the hurricane seemed to shake the throne to 
its foundations : even the Conservative leaders 
seemed to give up the Emperor. Under the 
pressure of public opinion, and on the advice 
of his Chancellor, William was prevailed upon 
to make a statement to the effect that in 
future he would be more reserved in the 
expression of his opinions. But as if to prove 
how light he made of that promise, whilst the 
political tempest was raging in the Reichstag, 
the Emperor went off to the Bavarian highlands 
on a shooting-party and a round of amuse- 
ments and cafes-chantanty and spent one of the 
busiest and one of the gayest holidays of his 
reign. After a few months the Konigsberg 
speech asserted more emphatically than ever his 
belief in absolutism, and in his Divine Right to 
rule his subjects without the interference or the 
control of a refractory Parliament. 



316 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

3. There are many different forms of absolute 
government. It may be tyrannical and force 
itself upon an unwilling people, or it may be 
acceptable to the people, like the rule of the 
Russian Czar, the "little father" of one hundred 
and fifty million moujiks. Again, it may be 
obscurantist, or it may be enlightened. It may 
be direct and personal, or it may be indirect and 
delegated. The absolutism of most wise rulers 
is of the latter kind. Even thus William the 
First chose to exert his authority through trusty 
advisers. William the Second, although never 
tired of extolling his grandfather, does not 
imitate him in this respect ; rather does he 
prefer to imitate Frederick William the Fourth. 
And, like Frederick William the Fourth, he may 
eventually come to grief, if his reign lasts long 
enough for the consequences of his policy to 
mature. The Kaiser is convinced that any 
delegation of his power would amount to a 
surrender and limitation. He therefore insists 
on discharging his Imperial office directly — 
" Uetat cest moi ! " Since Napoleon the First 
and Nicholas the First of Russia the world has 
not seen another example of a personal regime 
so consistent, so continuous, extending over the 
most minute details of government. 

It is needless to say that with such a despotic 
temperament William the Second is not likely 
to draw on the highest political capacity of the 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 317 

State. No statesman with a strong personality 
could submit to serving under such a master. 
William, therefore, is necessarily dependent on 
mediocrities, on favourites, for the first quality 
requisite is a supple and pliable character. He 
may have had able courtiers to assist him, but 
he has had few independent advisers. Count 
von Caprivi, the successor of Bismarck, was a 
soldier, accustomed to obedience ; Prince von 
Hohenlohe was a broken old man of eighty : 
both were overthrown by the occult influ- 
ence of the Camarilla and Round Table of 
Liebenberg. In Hohenlohe's successor the 
Kaiser was singularly fortunate, for the fourth 
Chancellor, Prince von Billow, if he was not a 
strong man, was at least a man of extraordinary 
gifts, a virtuoso of diplomacy, who understood 
both the Kaiser and the people, and who for ten 
years maintained himself in unstable equipoise 
with the dexterity of a rope-dancer. Since 
Billow was swept away in the tempest which 
followed the Daily Telegraph interview, William 
the Second has availed himself of the services 
of a respectable bureaucrat who can be trusted 
to obey. The fifth Chancellor, von Bethmann- 
Hollweg, is still an unknown quantity, but he 
will certainly neither eclipse his Imperial master 
nor overrule his will ; and he has already pro- 
claimed in the Reichstag that he does not believe 
in anything so absurd as parliamentary govern- 



318 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

ment for the German Empire even in the most 
remote future. 

4. As a general rule, even as nations have 
the government they deserve, so dynasties in the 
long run deserve the influence they have. And 
it must be admitted in fairness to the Hohen- 
zollerns that the predominant position they 
have achieved and the loyalty they evoke are 
partly justified by the services they have rendered 
to the Prussian State. The Hohenzollern 
monarchs have been traditionally distinguished 
by a high sense of duty. The motto of Fred- 
erick the Great, " Ich Dien" is characteristic of 
that tradition, and the definition of the Prussian 
king as " the first servant of the State " has 
become a household word wherever the German 
language is spoken. 

William the Second has inherited the high 
sense of duty of his ancestors. He is fully alive 
to the formidable responsibility entailed by his 
exalted office. As nothing must happen in 
Europe without the consent of Germany, so 
nothing must happen in Germany without the 
knowledge of the Kaiser. He is a strenuous 
worker, omnipresent, omniscient. Whether his 
work is always profitable is another question 
which the reader will have to settle for himself 
after reading the present chapter. 

5. We have already pointed out in a pre- 
vious chapter that the Hohenzollerns are 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 319 

upstart princelings. They are the parvenus 
and arrivistes amongst royal dynasties. Not- 
withstanding the mythical history and the fan- 
tastical statuary of the Sieges Allee^ they are 
but of yesterday compared to the Bourbons 
or Habsburgs. Their phenomenal ascent from 
an obscure margraviate to Imperial power was 
accomplished in half a dozen generations. This 
extraordinary success must be largely attributed 
to their practical qualities of common-sense 
and judgment, which their very obscurity and 
poverty made a necessity. With the exception 
of one or two episodes displaying the heroic 
fortitude of Frederick the Great and of Queen 
Louise, after a crushing defeat, there is little 
which is tragic or romantic, or even picturesque, 
about the Hohenzollern family. They are all 
T{ealpolitiker y and they have pushed their for- 
tunes by the same processes by which a clerk 
or artisan works his way upwards to become a 
manager or captain of industry ; and Samuel 
Smiles, the author of " Self-Help," could have 
chosen no better illustration to point his utilita- 
rian and bourgeois morality. 

In this respect, again, William the Second, 
with all his spurious mysticism, is a true Hohen- 
zollern. He is also a realist, with an eye to the 
main chance, and he has never been embarrassed 
in the pursuance of his policy by any cumbersome 
chivalrous scruples. He appreciates every man 



320 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

and every idea according as that man or that 
idea may be made subservient to his policy. 
Even moral and spiritual forces, like art, litera- 
ture, and religion, must be utilized for dynastic 
purposes. Art must be patriotic — that is to 
say, it must glorify the royal house ; education 
must train good Prussians and good soldiers ; 
religion must preach submission and loyalty 
to the prince. 

And because he is a realist, he is also an 
opportunist. He seems to change sides as 
easily as he changes his uniforms, according as 
occasion or necessity directs. And his meander- 
ing and tortuous statesmanship is all the more 
striking because he is so entirely unconscious 
of it. We see him in turn encouraging Kruger 
in his resistance to England at a time when 
resistance seemed likely to succeed ; and after 
the lapse of a few years, we see him almost 
brutally refusing to receive the ex-President in 
the hour of disaster, as if he could have ingra- 
tiated himself with the British public by such 
mean conduct towards a broken and suppliant 
old man. We see him at one and the same 
time a pious pilgrim and crusader, and the 
intimate friend of Abdul Hamid, the butcher 
of Christian nationalities. It never seemed to 
occur to him that the way to Jerusalem does 
not pass through Constantinople, and that the 
same ruler cannot be the self-appointed protector 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 321 

of the unspeakable Turk and the protector of 
the Holy Sepulchre. 

6. There remains to point out in connection 
with the Kaiser's political characteristics the 
most important trait of the Prussian dynasty, 
which we have emphasized in a previous chap- 
ter. We saw that the Hohenzollern is by 
tradition and education a militarist. It is the 
army which has made both the nation and its 
rulers. Other German princes might try to 
gain consequence whilst achieving bankruptcy, 
by appearing as patrons of art and literature, 
by mimicking the splendour of Versailles. But 
the Prussian dukes first rose into political sig- 
nificance by making it worth while for other 
princes to seek their military support. They 
invested all their available resources in armies 
and armaments, and no investment ever proved 
more remunerative. To the Great Elector, to 
the Sergeant-King, to Frederick the Great, the 
army was the first concern of the State, and the 
military expenditure was out of all proportion 
to the resources of the people. It kept the 
subjects groaning under the burden of taxation, 
it arrested for generations the economic develop- 
ment of the country, but it amply repaid the 
rulers. 

The Prussian army has suffered no diminution 
under William the Second. It remains the first 
pillar of the throne and the first concern of the 

21 



322 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

prince. In hours of doubt and suspicion, when 
a disloyal Opposition asserts itself in the Reichs- 
tag, William delights in escaping to Pomerania 
and to the eastern marches, to be strengthened 
by the devotion and allegiance of his Junkers. 
He knows that if it came to a conflict between 
King and Parliament he would find tens of 
thousands amongst his Ost-Elbier who would 
rally round the throne, and who would act on 
the policy of the energetic Herr von Oldenburg 
and disperse an unruly assembly at the point of 
the bayonet. And if the orators of the Opposi- 
tion were to become too unpleasantly noisy 
and critical, the Emperor would emphatically 
remind them that Prussia and the German 
Empire were not created by eloquent speeches, 
but by the heroism of German soldiers. 



II. 

The Personal Idiosyncrasies of the Kaiser. 

We have tried to set out in full relief the 
impress of the Hohenzollern tradition and 
heredity. But it would be to convey an entirely 
wrong idea of the Kaiser to represent him as a 
mere replica of a general type. Whether he is 
a strong man or not, it will be for the reader 
to judge. One thing is certain, that he is a 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 323 

personality, that he has a decided originality, 
and that his individual idiosyncrasies are so 
striking that they sometimes almost seem to 
obliterate the family likeness. 

1 . The first trait we associate with the Kaiser 
is that of an impulsive and irrepressible sover- 
eign. He is rash, spirited, and impatient of 
control. This trait is partly the result of his 
temperament. It is the result of his virtues as 
much as of his defects. It is the result of the 
sincerity and spontaneity of his disposition. 
But it is also the outcome of circumstances. 
In consequence of the tragic death of his father 
he was unexpectedly called to the throne in 
early youth. He was not compelled to serve a 
long apprenticeship as heir-apparent, like his 
father or his grandfather, or like his uncle, 
Edward the Seventh. Nor was he compelled, 
like Frederick the Great, to disguise his inmost 
feelings. He was free to indulge to the full 
the tendencies of his nature at an age when 
passions are strongest, and he had not sat on 
the throne for two years when his dismissal of 
Bismarck removed the last obstacle to his 
imperious will. 

2. The impulsiveness of the Kaiser expresses 
itself equally in his words and in his deeds, in 
his indiscretions and in his tactlessness. The 
distinction between his words and his deeds is 
perhaps more formal than real, because every 



324 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

word of the Emperor is equivalent to a deed. 
The most insignificant of his utterances may 
bind or compromise the nation in whose name 
he speaks. It is unnecessary to point out that 
the indiscretions of William have been innumer- 
able. He is the irresponsible talker and speech- 
maker on the throne. There has hardly been a 
crisis in contemporary German history which 
cannot be traced to one of the "winged words " 
of William, and their consequences have often 
been incalculable. They partly explain the 
failure of German foreign policy ; they explain 
how in recent years, with every trump card in 
her hand, Germany has on the whole achieved 
few substantial results. 

3. The Kaiser has a restless temperament. 
He seems to be perpetual motion incarnate, and 
his restlessness at times almost assumes a 
morbid character, and has often been connected 
with the hereditary nervous complaint from 
which the Kaiser suffers. One of his earliest 
critics, Professor Quidde, in the famous 
u Caligula " pamphlet, of which five hundred 
thousand copies were circulated in a few weeks, 
drew a parallel between William and the 
degenerate Roman Emperor, and emphasized 
the pathological nature of his case. 

Certainly the travelling habit in William the 
Second amounts to a mania. No European 
sovereign is so constantly on the move by 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 325 

sea and by land. Whilst William the First 
has been defined the " Greise Kaiser" whilst 
Frederick the Third has been called the 
" Weise Kaiser" William the Second has been 
nicknamed the " Reise Kaiser" His perpetual 
displacements may be partly explained by his 
keen intellectual curiosity and his genuine love 
of the sea, but they are mainly the result of a 
constitutional disposition. They certainly are 
not justified by political necessity. Political 
reasons may explain some of his journeys, but 
more frequently political necessity would 
urgently demand his remaining in the capital. 
Considering how much Germany is a centralized 
government, and how much depends on the 
personal presence of his Majesty, it is not easy 
to imagine how the policy of the German 
Empire can have been directed for twenty-five 
years by an absentee ruler, issuing his commands 
from the North Cape or the Mediterranean or 
the Adriatic. 

4. The Kaiser's restlessness is not only 
physical but it is also mental, and one of the 
forms which it takes is his abnormal versatility. 
As he is unable to remain in the same spot for 
two days on end, so he is unable to concentrate 
on the same topic. He changes his interests 
from day to day. He claims universal 
competency. His authority is not confined to 
the sphere of government, to matters of the 



326 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

army or navy or foreign policy. Every problem, 
human and divine, comes within his ken. He 
is an architect and an artist, and has drawn the 
famous cartoons illustrating the Yellow peril. 
He has given his support to, or withheld it from, 
various schools of painting or literature. He 
has assisted Direktor Bode in deciding which 
works of art are genuine and which spurious. 
He has appeared as a Biblical critic, and has 
lectured Professor Delitsch on the Bible-Babel 
controversy. He has pronounced his verdict in 
the great battle between classical and modern 
languages, and he has declared in favour of a 
modern education. He has appeared as an 
authority on aeronautics, and has proclaimed 
Count Zeppelin the greatest German of the 
century. 

5. In the sphere of politics the Kaiser's 
versatility has brought in its train political 
instability. His changeableness is not that of 
the realist and opportunist who adapts him- 
self to circumstances ; rather is it that of 
the despot who follows the inspiration of the 
moment. No ruler has so often altered his 
opinions on persons and events. Again and 
again he has withdrawn his favour from states- 
men or advisers who hitherto had enjoyed his 
absolute confidence. When a man has served 
his purpose he discards him. And as he is 
constantly changing his personal interest in 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 327 

men, so he is constantly shifting his political 
point of view. He has been in turn Anglophile 
and Francophile, Turcophile and Russophile. 
He has no guiding principles in foreign policy, 
and he has imparted to German diplomacy that 
incoherence which has been its main weakness 
in the last generation. 

6. It is extraordinary that after all the mis- 
takes he has made, and all the disappointments 
he has suffered, he should not have been 
sobered by events, and that his checkered reign 
should not have made him into a cynic and 
a sceptic. But the Kaiser remains an optimist. 
He hates and despises pessimists. He has 
enthusiasms rather than enthusiasm. He is 
always speaking in superlatives ; and he con- 
tinues to be brimful of youth. He makes 
us forget that he has ruled the empire for a 
quarter of a century. We still think of this 
father and grandfather of a patriarchal family, 
sufficiently numerous to fill all the thrones of 
Europe, as if he were a young man. And, in 
fact, he still possesses all his early juvenile 
exuberance. 

7. His optimism may be due to his super- 
abundant vitality, but it is due even more to his 
healthy and superb egotism, to his unshaken 
belief in himself. He has no misgivings ; he 
is not addicted to introspective moods. He is 
not like the Danish prince, " sicklied o'er 



328 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

with the pale cast of thought." Even though 
the whole of Germany were of one opinion, 
once William has made up his mind he would 
continue to think that he was right ; always 
reserving to himself the privilege of changing 
the right opinion of to-day into the wrong 
opinion of to-morrow. He is not in the least 
likely to commit suicide, as Frederick the 
Great threatened to do after a severe defeat. 
Nor is he likely to abdicate, as William the 
First threatened to again and again. When 
Maximilian Harden demanded his abdication, 
after the Daily Telegraph crisis in 1908, the 
famous journalist only proved how little he 
understood either the temper of the Kaiser or 
that of his people. 

8. The Kaiser's egotism, which might have 
been dangerous to himself and might have in- 
duced the fate of Louis the Second of Bavaria, 
is tempered by his delightful vanity. All those 
who have approached him agree that it is vanity 
rather than pride which characterizes the Kaiser. 
Vanity may be the characteristic of a weak man, 
yet to a ruler like William the Second vanity is 
rather a source of strength than a cause of 
weakness. For the proud man is satisfied with 
his own approval. Pride would have isolated 
William on the pinnacle of power. The vain 
man depends on the applause of others. The 
Kaiser's vanity has brought him nearer to his 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 329 

subjects, has made him more human and more 
sociable. 

But there is one evil consequence of the 
Kaiser's unbounded vanity — namely, that it 
places him at the mercy of unscrupulous 
flatterers. All despots are exposed to that 
danger, but strong characters and enlightened 
rulers, like Frederick the Second, realizing the 
danger, deliberately invite criticism, and 
surround themselves with able advisers. 
William the Second has generally been sur- 
rounded with courtiers and sycophants. Billow 
stated at the time of the Harden-Moltke trial 
that a " camarilla in Germany was unthinkable, 
that it was a poisonous exotic growth which 
could never thrive on German soil." Impartial 
students of contemporary German history know 
that it has thriven only too luxuriantly. All 
the Kaiser's independent biographers agree in 
emphasizing the fact that flatterers alone have 
a chance at the Court of Berlin, and that as no- 
body dares criticize the Kaiser's opinions, and as 
everybody is compelled to indulge his whims 
and prejudices, the field is left clear for courtiers 
of the Eulenburg and Waldersee type. 

9. The boundless egotism combined with the 
despotic temper, the vanity of a comparatively 
weak and amiable and sociable sovereign de- 
pending on applause, have been indulged for so 
many years that in the course of time they have 



330 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

degenerated into megalomania. In a Wittels- 
bach prince such megalomania would have led 
to madness. In the Hohenzollern it has only 
resulted in extravagance. That extravagance 
expresses itself in a thousand ways, especially in 
such striking manifestations as his fifty resi- 
dences or his three hundred uniforms. It is 
characteristic of the Kaiser's total absence of 
humour that with his extravagant habits he 
is constantly preaching the simple life. It would 
have been well for him if he had practised a 
little more what he preaches, and if he had 
followed a little more the example of his 
ancestor, Frederick the Great, for he would have 
escaped the financial worries which have been 
his lot from the beginning of his reign. The 
Kaiser ought to be the richest man in his 
empire — his civil list has been repeatedly 
increased — yet William finds himself in an 
almost chronic state of bankruptcy, and his close 
relations with American millionaires and Jewish 
financiers have not sufficed to relieve him of 
his anxieties. 

10. The Kaiser's megalomania also explains 
the theatrical aspects of his personality. All 
sovereigns love to surround themselves with 
the pomp and circumstance of the throne. 
Without it half of their prestige would vanish, 
and only giants like Frederick the Second or 
Napoleon could afford simplicity of dress and 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 331 

manner. But there is in the Kaiser something 
more than the ordinary love of splendour. 
There is something almost histrionic and 
Neronian in his composition — qualis artifex I 
The Kaiser loves to astonish, to dazzle his 
subjects. His appearances and his poses are 
those of an Imperial actor, and are always 
studiously calculated to produce a sensation. 
Hence his surprise visits, his startling appear- 
ances in regimental barracks in the dead ot 
night or in the early morning ; hence his 
Eastern journeys ; hence, especially, the extra- 
ordinary importance he attaches to the ritual 
of dress and uniform. William the Second is 
obviously a believer in the clothes philosophy 
of Carlyle's " Sartor Resartus." No man will 
understand the Kaiser who does not attach as 
much importance to this side of his character 
as he does himself. It has been said that the 
Kaiser has such a nice perception of the fitness 
of things in this matter that when he visits an 
aquarium he thinks it necessary to put on the 
uniform of an admiral, and that when he eats 
an English plum pudding he thinks it necessary 
to don the uniform of the Dragoon Guards. 
Certainly the three hundred uniforms of Kaiser 
William will become as legendary in German 
history as the simple threadbare coat of Frederick 
the Great. 

11. The love of the sensational and the 



332 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

theatrical also explains the so-called romanticism 
of William. Although he has often been com- 
pared to Lohengrin, his is by no means the 
romanticism of Wagner. He makes no appeal 
to the emotions or to the imagination, but 
only appeals to the senses. He may not be 
impervious to certain aspects of poetry : some 
of his utterances, like the speech on Drake 
and the Pacific, are distinctly poetical. But 
as a rule William's romanticism is mainly a 
certain Sinn fur das Atissere — a love for external 
splendour. 

The same superficial romanticism explains his 
love of the past. It is not the outcome of any 
settled principles, of any theoretical medievalism; 
it is not the love of the good old times, when a 
prince could act as he pleased. William finds 
himself perfectly at home in the present times, 
and he probably realizes that a German emperor 
to-day has more power than he would have had 
in the Middle Ages ; for in the Middle Ages 
he would have had to divide his power with the 
Pope, and he would have found his abbots 
and prelates less pliable than his Excellency 
Professor von Harnack or the Most Reverend 
Dr. Dryander. Still, the Middle Ages with 
their burgraves and margraves are decidedly 
more picturesque than our commonplace latter 
days. And the Kaiser loves to think that the 
Hohenzollern is the lineal successor of the 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 333 

Hohenstaufen and of the Holy Roman Empire 
of Charlemagne. 

12. "Tell me what a man believes, and 1 
shall tell you what he is," is an often quoted 
saying of Carlyle. We may safely apply this 
criterion to the psychology of the Kaiser. For 
his religion is part of his personality, and, like 
his personality, it has often been misunderstood. 
We are continuously told that he is a Christian 
mystic. But, indeed, there is in his disposition 
little of the Christian and still less of the mystic. 
It is true that he delights in preaching sermons 
because he has a natural gift of speech, but he 
delights in preaching just as he delights in 
yachting, drawing, and painting. He has none 
of the Innerlichkeity none of the sense of mystery, 
which characterizes the genuine mystic. And 
he has as little of the humility and of the sense 
of sin which characterizes the genuine Christian. 
The Kaiser's Christianity is essentially political ; 
it is that of most despots who have used religion 
for political purposes. Christianity is useful to 
fight the enemies of the empire, and in these 
days of social unrest the altar is the necessary 
prop of the throne. 

" I believe that to bind all our fellow-citizens, all our 
classes together, there is only one means, and that is 
Religion — not, indeed, religion understood in a narrow, 
ecclesiastical, and dogmatic sense, but in a wider, more 
practical sense, with relation to life." (August 31, 1907,) 



334 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

11 1 expect from you all that you will all help me, 
priests and laymen, to maintain religion in the people. 
Whoever does not establish his life on the foundation 
of religion is lost, and therefore I will pledge mysetf 
to-day to place my whole empire, my people, my army, 
symbolically represented through this staff of command, 
myself and my family, under the Cross and its protection" 
(June 19, 1902.) 

His religion is a religion of authority. It 
is political and social. Religion, indeed, is 
the sanction of all political authority and 
citizenship. 

" Nobody can be a good soldier if he is not at the 
same time a good Christian. The recruits who have 
given the oath of allegiance to myself, as to their earthly 
lord, must above all preserve their allegiance to their 
heavenly Lord and Saviour. As the crown is nothing 
without the altar and the crucifix, so the army is nothing 
without the Christian religion." (November 1896.) 

The title of Bossuet's famous treatise, " Poli- 
tics based on Holy Scripture," might sum up 
the Emperors political creed. Politics must be 
based on religion ; they are bound up with 
it. The Kaiser believes in an ever-present 
Providence, and he believes that Providence 
has chosen the German people as His people, 
and has chosen the Hohenzollern as His 
rulers. He has never doubted that he is 
the vicegerent appointed by God Almighty 
to carry out His will. Never did mediaeval 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 335 

Pope believe more absolutely in his divine 
mission : — 

" ... in a kingdom by the grace of God, with its 
responsibility to the Creator above, from which no man, 
no minister, no parliament can absolve the sovereign." 
(August 1897.) 

" I see in the people and in the country that I have 
inherited a talent entrusted to me by God, which it is 
my duty to increase." (March 1890.) 

" In our house we consider ourselves as . . . appointed 
by God to direct and to lead the nations over which it 
has been given us to rule to a higher state of well-being, 
to the improvement of their material and spiritual 
interests." (April 1890.) 

" You know that I consider my whole office and duty 
as imposed on me by Heaven, and that I have been 
called in the service of the Highest, to whom I shall have 
to render one day an account of my trust." (February 
1891.) 

The best proof that the Kaiser's religion is 
mainly political is that in matters of religion 
his tolerance verges on laxity. In matters 
political — that is to say, in matters where men 
generally are tolerant — he is narrow and intoler- 
ant. On the contrary, in matters religious, where 
a deeply religious mind is almost inevitably 
narrow, the Kaiser is marvellously broad- 
minded. Ex officio he is a Lutheran ; he is the 
defender of the Lutheran faith. At the same 



336 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

time his sympathies are Catholic, and he has 
never missed an opportunity of expressing his 
admiration for a religion which stands for 
authority and discipline. He also combines 
a profound sympathy for Mohammedanism. 
Being thus equally and impartially sympathetic 
to Lutheranism, Catholicism, and Moham- 
medanism, like a very Nathan the Wise, or 
like a modern indifferent sceptic, he only 
happens to be intolerant of the one form of 
Christianity which does not favour his despotic 
policy. In the famous speech against Stocker 
he expresses his abhorrence for democratic 
Christianity and Christian Socialism. Yet who 
can doubt that Christian Socialism is one of 
the most genuine forms of Christianity, and 
that Pastor Stocker, whom William so fiercely 
denounces, is on the whole a more fervid 
Christian than the official court chaplains of 
his Majesty? 

111. 

William the Second and the Tendencies of the Age. 

We have said enough to convince the reader 
that the Kaiser is an extraordinarily interesting 
and complex personality, and that even had he 
been born a private man he would certainly not 
have been lost in the crowd. But however 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 337 

much he may appeal to our curiosity as an in- 
dividual, even more interesting to us is the 
practical question : What is the Kaiser's relation 
to his people and to his age ? 

Certain characteristics of his seem to be em- 
phatically in opposition to the age we live in, 
and in many respects the Kaiser strikes us as 
a living anachronism. And this fact might 
explain the frequent opposition he has roused. 
If that be so, the problem arises : Does 
this opposition express the substance of his 
character, and will that opposition not gather 
strength as the German people more fully 
realize how entirely their government is out of 
date and ill-adapted to the requirements of the 
times ? And is the Kaiser indeed against the 
times ? Is he, if I may use the expression of 
Nietzsche, " Unzeitgemaess " ? Is the Kaiser the 
strong man of Ibsen, who dares to stand alone, 
and, like a Titan, resists the onslaught of 
democracy ? 

If we were to believe the Kaiser's own inter- 
pretation of himself we would have to answer 
in the affirmative. Again and again he has 
thrown out a challenge to German democracy. 
" I follow my own course, it is the right one" — 
"There is only one who is master in the empire, 
and that is 1 ; I shall brook no other " (May 
1 891) — are the burden of many a speech. But 
if our diagnosis of the Kaiser's characteristics 

22 



338 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

is correct, and if our analysis of the political 
situation is accurate, such an interpretation 
would be entirely misleading. The Kaiser is 
not the Titan who stands in solitary grandeur 
and who waits until the tide of democracy over- 
whelms him. He lacks the essentials of the 
strong man. The strong man is characterized 
by self-restraint, and we have seen that the 
Emperor remains incurably impulsive. A strong 
man is characterized by calmness and repose, 
and the Emperor is always agitated. A strong 
man is characterized by wisdom, and the Emperor 
is again and again carried away by his passions. 
A strong man is reticent, and the German 
Emperor is indiscreet and tactless. On the 
other hand, it is not true that he stands 
alone. He only leads when he is sure to have 
a large following. And when it is necessary 
he is himself content to follow. He is pliable 
and impressionable and sensitive to every 
passing mood of public opinion, and he has 
an almost morbid craving for applause and 
popularity. 

So far from being a mediaeval Holy Roman 
Emperor he is the most modern of rulers. He 
is possessed with the ambition of his people 
and the aspirations of his age, and his political 
wisdom is directed not towards the past but 
towards the future. 

t. In the first place he incarnates the Im- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 339 

perialistic materialism of the latter-day German. 
This sovereign so often described as mediaeval is 
almost American in his tastes and sympathies. 
He delights in receiving African and Yankee 
millionaires like Cecil Rhodes and Mr. Pierpont 
Morgan. He delights in associating with 
captains of industry like Krupp, and in hon- 
ouring Jewish bankers, much to the disgust of 
his Prussian Junkers. He refuses to accept, 
as American ambassador, Mr. Hill, simply 
because, although rich in mental gifts and 
in a world-wide fame, the diplomat is not, 
in the opinion of the Kaiser, sufficiently rich 
in the material goods of this world worthily 
to represent his countrymen at a magnificent 
court like the Court of Berlin. 

So thoroughly is the Kaiser steeped in mate- 
rialism that intellectual and moral values count 
very little with him. He has made many 
a speech in Konigsberg, but he has never 
mentioned the most illustrious citizen of 
Konigsberg, Immanuel Kant. He has glorified 
Count Zeppelin as the greatest German of the 
nineteenth century, but I do not remember 
that he has ever mentioned the name of Goethe. 
It is true that he sent a telegram of sympathy 
to Mr. Rudyard Kipling during his illness in 
America ; but then he sympathizes with Mr. 
Kipling not because he is a great writer and 
poet, but because he is an Imperialist. 



340 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

No modern ruler except King Leopold or 
Belgium has more constantly kept in view the 
material interests of his subjects. Where his 
speeches do not deal with his own august 
personality, they deal largely with the commer- 
cial expansion of the empire. When he is not 
concerned about the needs of the fighting navy, 
he is concerned with the needs of the merchant 
service. 

The Emperor may certainly claim a large 
share in the promotion of the naval expansion of 
modern Germany. It might almost be said that 
although love for the army is traditional in his 
house, that love is even surpassed by his love 
for the navy. It seems as if there were something 
more personal and more intimate in the Kaiser's 
attachment to the navy. It is the love of the 
parent for the child. The army he has inherited 
from his ancestors. The navy, on the contrary, 
is his own creation. Naval expansion dates 
from his reign. It was he who first told the 
Germans that their future was on the water : 
" Unsere Zukunft ist auf dem JVasser" It was he 
who first offered them new oceans to conquer. 
The water seems to be the Kaiser's favourite 
element. He is an indefatigable yachtsman ; 
he travels by sea even more than by land ; 
he has advocated naval expansion more con- 
sistently and more passionately than any other 
cause. Again and again he has proclaimed that 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 34 1 

" a prosperous development of the Vaterland is 
not conceivable without a continuous reinforce- 
ment of its sea power" (December 1902). 

2. We have dwelt on the megalomania of 
the Kaiser. But his countrymen are not as 
unpleasantly impressed by this aspect of the 
Kaiser's character as we are ourselves, because 
his megalomania is often only the expression 
of that of his people. A Hungarian writer, the 
late Dr. Emil Reich, has written a book on 
" Germany's Swelled Head," and there can be 
no doubt that the German people in the last 
generation have become intoxicated with their 
political and commercial triumphs. When the 
Kaiser says : " The ocean proves that with- 
out Germany and without a German Kaiser no 
great discussion shall henceforth take place. 
I am not inclined to think that our German 
people have fought and vanquished thirty-three 
years ago, under the leadership of their princes, 
merely to be shoved aside in the great issues 
of a world policy," such utterances send a 
thrill through every jingo heart. 

3. In the same way his egotism and self- 
assertion and his brutality, offensive as they may 
appear to us, only reflect the self-assertion and 
aggressiveness of the latter-day Teuton. When 
he shakes the mailed fist, when he warns his 
enemies, when he goes to Tangier or to Con- 
stantinople, he has the hearty and unanimous 



342 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

support of his subjects, with the exception of 
the Socialists. 

And, generally speaking, it is because the 
Kaiser is so thoroughly modern and so 
thoroughly German that he has received in 
such an ample measure the applause for 
which he craves. He may be unpopular with 
the educated upper ten thousand, who read 
the political satires of Simp/icissimus, but he 
is popular with the millions who read Die 
JVoche, He is popular because he is repre- 
sentative of the modern German people. He 
may often have blundered, but he understands 
the soul of the mob. He may be self-willed 
and indulge his impulses, but those impulses 
generally are also the impulses of his subjects ; 
and it must be said in justice to the Kaiser 
that too often he has been blamed for the in- 
discretions of the German people. 

There can be no doubt as to the enormous 
influence and popularity of the Kaiser. But 
there have been many misunderstandings be- 
tween him and his subjects. The most serious 
was no doubt that which followed the publica- 
tion of the Daily Telegraph interview. Any out- 
sider who would have formed his judgment 
mainly from the speeches delivered in the 
Reichstag on that occasion would have been 
justified in predicting an imminent revolution. 
He would have concluded that the Emperor 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 343 

had, like a reckless spendthrift, squandered 
the rich inheritance of loyalty and devotion 
handed down from his ancestors, and that there 
remained nothing for him to do but abdicate. 
Fortunately for the Kaiser, political speeches in 
Germany have not the same significance and do 
not carry the same weight as in England, and 
the storm which swept over Germany in 1908, 
so far from being an argument proving the 
decline of the Kaiser's power, only tested and 
attested his strength. Surely a formidable storm 
is the best criterion whether a tree is firmly rooted 
in the soil. And a power which stood the hur- 
ricane of 1908 will stand almost anything. A 
ruler who emerged from that crisis more popular 
than ever can look confidently to the future. 

It must be carefully noted that that popu- 
larity has not been bought or maintained at 
the sacrifice of one jot or tittle of his Imperial 
claims. Prince von Bulow may have made 
platonic concessions, but the Kaiser maintained 
his Imperial prerogative undiminished, and in 
no previous utterances has he asserted his Divine 
Right more emphatically than in the speeches 
which followed the crisis of 1 908. After twenty- 
five years of reign, and after grievous mistakes, 
the Kaiser finds himself to-day stronger than 
when he ascended the throne in 1888. After 
twenty-five years he is a greater force in world 
politics than any other statesman or ruler living. 



344 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 



IV. 



Is the influence of the Kaiser making for 
Peace or for War ? 

We must now approach the final problem 
which presents itself to our consideration : Is 
the tremendous power and popularity of the 
Kaiser exercised in the direction of peace or in 
the direction of war ? 

To an Englishman the Kaiser's devotion to 
military pursuits, his frequent brandishing of 
the sword, his aggressive policy of naval expan- 
sion, seem to be in flagrant contradiction with 
his no less persistent protests of both his 
sympathy for England and of his love for 
peace. We are reminded that Napoleon the 
Third also delighted to express his love for 
peace — " U Empire cest /apaix" — yet he brought 
about the most disastrous war in French history. 
We are reminded that Nicholas the Second of 
Russia also started his reign as the peacemaker 
of Europe, the initiator of the Conference of 
The Hague, yet he brought about the most 
bloody war in Russian history. Are the 
Kaiser's pacific protests as futile, are his sym- 
pathies as hollow, as those of a Napoleon or 
a Nicholas ? 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 345 

With regard to his sympathies for England we 
can only say that there are no reasons to doubt 
his sincerity. His upbringing has been largely 
English, and his mother, Empress Frederick, 
was nicknamed the "English Woman." The 
most pleasant reminiscences of his childhood 
are associated with his visits to his grand- 
mother at Windsor or at the Isle of Wight. 
And he has retained his English tastes, his 
love for sport, his love of the sea. He has 
not confined himself to expressing platonic sym- 
pathies for England. Those sympathies have 
often been supported by active demonstrations, 
and by demonstrations which have demanded 
no small measure of courage. We may blame 
the Kaiser for the Daily Telegraph interview, 
we may all agree in considering it a masterpiece 
of indiscretion, yet we must admire the moral 
courage with which the Kaiser dared to support 
the unpopular cause. 

And similarly, with regard to the Kaiser's 
protests of peace we have no reason to doubt 
that he is perfectly genuine. We ought to 
believe him, if for no other reason than this, 
that a peaceful policy is in the obvious interest 
of the Kaiser and his dynasty. Whatever may 
be the future policy of German jingoism, the 
Kaiser certainly does not want war. For he 
has nothing to gain from war, and everything 
to lose. The tragedy of the Russo-Japanese 



346 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

War has taught him the terrible chances of the 
battlefield. It would be senseless for him to 
jeopardize, with a light heart, the magnificent 
empire inherited from his ancestors. And if 
any one were inclined to wonder at the strange 
combination of militarism and pacifism in the 
Kaiser's mind, he has only to remember that 
one of the most original kings of Prussia also 
combined an almost morbid passion for soldiers 
with an inveterate love for peace. The Sergeant- 
King, the father of Frederick the Great, who 
collected tall grenadiers as others would collect 
art treasures, retained all through life a whole- 
some dread of war, because he would not expose 
himself to the risk of losing or damaging the 
splendid army which he had spent his lifetime 
in organizing. 

Unfortunately, if the Kaiser's protests of peace 
are supported by many of his utterances, and 
sanctioned by the interests of his dynasty, they 
are contradicted not only by many other utter- 
ances, but, what is more serious, they are contra- 
dicted by his personal methods, and, above all, 
by the whole trend of his general policy. 

Very few observers have pointed out one 
special reason why the personal methods of the 
Kaiser will prove in the end dangerous to peace 
— namely, that they have tended to paralyze or 
destroy the methods of diplomacy. 

I am not by any means enamoured of the 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 347 

toneand spirit of the present diplomatic profession. 
The diplomatic service to-day in most countries 
is largely recruited from the upper ten thousand : 
it is largely composed of grandees imbued 
with the pride of caste. Its members are chosen 
not for their intellectual or moral qualities, but 
mainly for their social position. The diplomatic 
service is the stronghold of reaction : it is 
steeped in the vapid atmosphere of " society " : 
it is anti-national and anti-patriotic : it con- 
stitutes an international freemasonry of cynical 
and sceptical reactionaries. 

But little as we may like the personnel 
of legations and embassies, strongly as we dis- 
approve of the methods by which they are 
recruited, urgent as is the reform of the Foreign 
Office, it remains no less true that the function 
of diplomacy is more vital to-day than it ever 
was in the past. For it is of the very purpose 
and ration d'etre of diplomacy to be conciliatory 
and pacific. Its object is to achieve by per- 
suasion and negotiation what otherwise must 
be left to the arbitrament of war. It is a 
commonplace on the part of Radicals to protest 
against the practices of occult diplomacy. In 
so far as that protest is directed against the 
spirit which animates the members of the diplo- 
matic service, it is fully justified. But in so far 
as it is directed against the principle of secret 
negotiation the protest is absurd. For it is of 



348 THE ANGLO-GERMaN PROBLEM. 

the very essence of diplomacy that it shall be 
secret, that it shall be left to experts, that it 
shall be removed from the heated atmosphere 
of popular assemblies, and that it shall substitute 
an appeal to intellect and reason for the appeal 
to popular emotion and popular prejudice. 

For that reason it is deeply to be regretted 
that the personal interferences of the Kaiser 
have taken German diplomacy out of the hands 
of negotiators professionally interested in a 
peaceful solution of international difficulties, and 
have indirectly brought diplomacy under the 
influence of the German " patriot " and the 
jingo. An ambassador need not depend on 
outside approval, his work is done in quiet and 
solitude. The Kaiser, on the contrary, conducts 
his foreign policy in the glaring limelight of 
publicity ; and whenever he has been criticized 
by experts, his vanity has only too often been 
tempted to appeal to popular passion and to 
gain popular applause. For that reason, and 
entirely apart from his indiscretions, the bare 
fact that the Kaiser has become his own Foreign 
Secretary has lessened the chances of peace. 

Nor has the whole trend of his domestic 
policy been less injurious to the cause of peace. 
In vain does the Kaiser assure us of his pacific 
intentions : a ruler cannot with impunity glorify 
for ever the wars of the past, spend most of the 
resources of his people on the preparations for 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 349 

the wars of the future, encourage the warlike 
spirit, make the duel compulsory on officers and 
the mensur honourable to students, place his 
chief trust in his Junkers, who live and move 
and have their being in the game of war, foster 
the aggressive spirit in the nation, and hold out 
ambitions which can only be fulfilled by an 
appeal to arms : a ruler cannot for ever con- 
tinue to sow the dragon's teeth and only reap 
harvests of yellow grain and golden grapes. 

For those reasons also English public opinion 
is fully justified in distrusting the policy of the 
Kaiser. After all, like any ordinary mortal, 
his Majesty must submit to being judged 
not merely by his words, or his sympathies, 
or his platonic intentions, but by his deeds, 
by his spirit, and by his ideals. And 
neither those deeds, nor that spirit, nor those 
ideals, representative as they are of those of his 
subjects, are calculated to inspire us with any 
excessive confidence in the future. 



CONCLUSION. 

There are many types of political fatalism, 
represented by many different temperaments 
and proceeding from many different attitudes to 
life, and yet conducing in the end to very similar 
results. 

There is the fatalism of the optimist. It may 
be the optimism of the cynic, of the easy-going 
and listless man of the world, or it may be the 
optimism of the idealist, of the religious en- 
thusiast. They will all agree in telling us 
that war is impossible ; that it is a monstrous 
anachronism ; that we need not divert our at- 
tention from our peaceful avocations to ward 
off a danger which may be purely imaginary, 
and may only exist in the brain of scaremongers 
and alarmists ; that sufficient for the day is the 
evil thereof, and that the pressing evils or to-day 
are our social and political sores — that those must 
have a first claim on our attention ; that we ought 
to leave a delicate subject alone, and that in the 
very interests of peace the less we think about 
war the better. They tell us that God in His 
providence will help us, and that we somehow 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 351 

shall muddle through ; that, at anyrate, there 
can be no harm in letting things drift. For 
must not the drift and tendency of twentieth- 
century civilization be towards progress and 
peace and the brotherhood of nations ? 

On the other hand, we are confronted with 
the political fatalism of the pessimist, which 
must necessarily be less varied and more 
definite than that of the optimist. Whereas 
the one tells us that war is impossible, the 
other proclaims that war is inevitable, that 
things have gone too far, that all the forces 
of to-day — the " will to power of a hundred 
million German people believing in the pro- 
vidential mission of their race and dreaming 
the noble dream of a Greater Germany con- 
trolling the destinies of continental Europe, 
the personality of the Kaiser, the professional 
interests of the military caste, the vested in- 
terests of the industrial class, the perverted 
patriotism of the jingo, the dread of Socialism — 
that all those forces, the noblest as well as the 
basest, are working for war. We are told that 
it is no use struggling against the inevitable, 
and that the boldest and most heroic course 
is also the safest ; that we must look the danger 
full in the face ; that if war is to come, and 
because war is certain to come, it is best to 
anticipate it and to fight at our own time and 
on our own ground. 



352 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Considering the present international situation 
and the temper of the German people and the 
policy of the German Government, one might 
be tempted to accept the premises of the pessi- 
mist, if history had not again and again given 
the lie to previous prophecies, if experience did 
not show us that again and again wars have 
been declared to be inevitable which yet have 
been avoided by the goodwill and common-sense 
of the people. Within living memory, France 
and England, France and Germany, England 
and Russia have in turn repeatedly prepared to 
plunge into war, because those nations mutually 
accused each other in their metaphorical phrase- 
ology of stealing one of the numberless " keys " 
which unlocked one of the numberless "gates " 
which opened on those nations' possessions — 
keys of India, keys of Egypt, gates of the 
Mediterranean, gates of the Black Sea, gates of 
the Pacific. According to the political prophets, 
England was doomed to wage war against France, 
the " hereditary enemy," about Siam, or about 
Fashoda, or about West Africa. Similarly 
England was doomed to wage war against 
Russia, who was also the " hereditary enemy," 
because the Russian advance in Asia threatened 
India, because Russia had occupied near the 
Persian frontier the barren oasis of Merv, which 
induced periodical fits of " Mervousness " in the 
British public. Let any reader consult news- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 353 

paper files of the last twenty years, and he 
will find that they teem with such scares and 
alarms and prophecies of war. Yet none of 
those wars so confidently prophesied have come 
about, and for forty-two years Continental 
Powers have lived in peace with each other. It 
is true that the peace has been lamentably pre- 
carious — that it has been a truce of menacing 
hosts transforming Europe into a huge armed 
encampment ; but still even an armed truce 
with all its burdens is better than actual war 
with all its horrors. 

We must therefore be careful before we 
accept the premises of the pessimistic fatalist. 
And even if those premises were correct, his 
practical conclusions would not be justified. 
To say that war is unavoidable does not suffice 
to prove that it is for us to declare it. As long 
as there is the remotest chance of avoiding war, 
it would be criminal to transform a dread 
probability into a grim certainty. And even 
the argument that the attack would, strategically, 
be more favourable than the defence cannot be 
accepted ; for the awful responsibility of initiat- 
ing a fratricidal war would not in the long run 
be found to be a source of strength, and the 
odium incurred by the aggressor would more 
than counterbalance the strategic advantages of 
the offensive. On the one hand, the attacked 
nation would thereby be animated with the 

23 



354 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

energy of despair, and, on the other hand, the 
attacking nation would forfeit the moral support 
of the civilized world. 

It may be true that the present outlook is so 
gloomy as to justify the worst anticipations of 
the pessimist. We would even go so far as to 
say that war is actually unavoidable, if the 
present forces continued to be operative ; if the 
world continues to be given over to territorial 
greed and overweening pride, to national selfish- 
ness, to perverted patriotism, and to imbecile 
ignorance. But, then, those forces making for 
war may be neutralized, those motives may 
be altered, for they are based, to use the ex- 
pression of Mr. Angell, on an "optical illusion ; " 
for the whole fabric of military Imperialism rests 
on groundless assumptions. Let us prove to 
the man in the street the reality of that illusion, 
the baselessness of those assumptions, and the 
nightmare of war must vanish. 

War can be avoided, but on those terms 
alone, and not on any other. War cannot be 
avoided merely by the tactics of diplomacy, by 
the time-honoured and time-worn devices of 
secret negotiations. The repeated " conversa- 
tions " between England and Germany have 
invariably led, and must inevitably have led, to a 
deadlock. War cannot be avoided unless for 
the military ideals of the past we substitute the 
new ideals of our industrial civilization. War 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 355 

cannot be avoided so long as both the people 
and their rulers believe that war may be a fruit- 
ful source of material and moral blessings, that 
it is not in itself evil, that it calls out the 
noblest traits of human character, and that 
it is to a successful war rather than to industry 
and honest hard work that a nation must look 
in order to reach the pinnacle of prosperity. 

Nothing could well be more shallow, more 
dishonest and contradictory, and therefore more 
futile, than the arguments of the average Eng- 
lish journalist controverting our German neigh- 
bours ; nothing could be more dishonest, 
because the English journalist denounces the 
new German Imperialism of Mr. Houston 
Stewart Chamberlain, whilst in the same breath 
extolling the old English Imperialism of Mr. 
Joseph Chamberlain — because he tells the Ger- 
man public that " Greater Germany " is bad, 
whilst at the same time he tells the English 
public that " Greater Britain " is good and Little 
Englandism high treason ; nothing could be 
more dishonest, because from the point of view 
of the old Imperialism it is surely unfair to deny 
to the German people that very expansion and 
supremacy which the Englishman claims for his 
own race ; and, finally, nothing could be more 
futile, because any German reader of average 
intelligence must see through such flagrant 
contradictions, and all our English arguments 



356 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

against German expansion must fall on deaf 
Teutonic ears. 

Let us once more pass in review some of 
those hackneyed arguments, and let us try to 
look at the whole problem with the eye of a 
German patriot. 

The English diplomatist proposes a reduction 
of armaments — that is to say, he demands from 
Germany that she shall recognize the " two- 
power " standard ; he demands from Germany 
that she shall accept for ever, not the equality, 
but the supremacy, of England. But we naturally 
ask, Why should Germany recognize the absolute 
necessity of English supremacy and submit to it 
as if it were a providential law ? In vain do we 
tell the Germans that such a maritime supremacy 
is necessary to the security, nay, to the very 
subsistence, of the English people. Again, why 
should the Germans be specially concerned about 
the threatened security of the English people, 
especially if the Germans think that a powerful 
navy will do for them what a powerful navy 
has done for England — if, as Admiral Mahan 
contends, England owes her greatness, not to 
her freedom, not to her sterling moral and 
intellectual qualities, not to her coal and her 
iron, but mainly to her sea power ? 

And even if Germany, for the sake of peace, 
were to consent to the principle of a reduction 
of armaments, how could such an agreement be 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 357 

carried out in practice ? For what is proposed 
is obviously not merely a reduction in the 
quantity of vessels, but in their quality and 
fighting power. Will it, therefore, be for- 
bidden to the Germans under the agreement to 
improve that fighting power, to build more 
formidable battleships, to "out-Dreadnought" 
the Dreadnoughts ? Is Germany to give due 
warning of every new invention which increases 
the destructive capacity of her navy ? 

And, what is even more important, how is 
it possible to keep the relation between the 
English and German navies a fixed quantity 
when the relations of all the other navies to each 
other and to England and to Germany are con- 
stantly changing ? * Is it not obvious that neither 
England nor Germany can only build with refer- 
ence to each other, and ignore the navies of other 
countries ? If England and Germany came to 
a naval agreement, England, no doubt, would be 
safe as against Germany. But would Germany 
be safe as against the navies of the United States, 
of Japan, of Russia, of France ? On the one 
hand, how could such an agreement be effective 
unless it were to include all the other navies ? 
and, on the other hand, how could Germany 
accept such an agreement with England unless 
it were converted into an actual alliance ? 

* I need only refer to the formidable new fleet which Russia is 
building, and which may threaten Germany in the Baltic. 



358 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

Again, the English diplomatist objects to 
German expansion, say, in Belgium or Holland, 
or in Turkey and Asia Minor, because such 
expansion would disturb the balance of power 
and ensure German supremacy on the European 
continent. But the Germans legitimately reply 
— and we saw that General von Bernhardi is 
very emphatic on that very point — that they 
refuse to accept the antiquated and unfair 
doctrine of the " balance of power." And from 
the German point of view, who would dare 
to say that the Germans are wrong ? England 
claims supremacy on sea : why should not 
Germany claim supremacy on land ? English- 
speaking nations actually do control between 
them four out of the five continents of our 
sublunary world — they control America and 
Australia, Asia and Africa — and they are justly 
proud of this world expansion or one race. 
Why, then, should it be forbidden to the 
German-speaking nations to aim at controlling 
the fifth continent of Europe, and at establish- 
ing on that continent a federation of German- 
speaking people ? In any case, one race must 
some day control the European continent, and 
as the day of the Latin is past, the choice 
must necessarily lie between the Slav and the 
Teuton. Already two hundred million Slavs 
are confronting seventy million Germans. Shall 
the Germans vield to the sheer weight of 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 359 

numbers, and to a semi-civilized race which 
even England generally admits to be inferior to 
the Teuton ? Shall Germany surrender her 
continental supremacy merely to indulge the 
jealousy of England ? 

Again, the English diplomatist says : " We 
object to any increase of the German navy 
because such an increase compels England to 
still further add to the crushing burden of 
taxation, and because a formidable German fleet 
can only be intended against England." The 
German indignantly replies that Germany is 
not concerned with relieving the burden of 
the English taxpayer ; that a great nation like 
Germany has the right to build any number 
of ships she chooses ; that although a for- 
midable German navy may eventually be an 
efficient weapon against England, it need not 
be used against England — that it might quite 
as likely be used against Russia, or China, or 
France, or Japan, and that whether it shall 
be used against England or not must entirely 
depend on the future policy of England. 

Again the English diplomatist retorts that 
there is no justification for Germany building 
a large navy ; that Germany has no coastline 
to defend ; that she has only two or three 
harbours in the open sea ; that both history 
and geography have made Germany a continent. 
" That is true," replies the German ; u but both 



360 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

history and geography can be changed, will be 
changed, must be changed. History is a per- 
petual flux. Nations rise and fall. Geographical 
boundaries are continually being shifted. Ask a 
cartographer like Dr. Bartholomew whether there 
is any finality in map-making. Has not England 
herself repainted in red the greater part of the 
world in less than twenty years ? And if the 
map of the world has been entirely repainted in 
the last few years in favour of England, surely it 
may be repainted a little in the colours of Ger- 
many. Your English publicists point out — and, 
alas ! quite rightly — that we have only two or 
three good harbours to protect, and that one 
single ship sunk might block the traffic of the 
Kiel Canal 1 But, surely, no statesman in his 
senses and with any forethought and imagina- 
tion will believe for one moment that such a 
monstrous state of things can continue much 
longer ; that the German Empire can consent 
to have its fleet locked up for ever in the 
Baltic ; that Germany with her enormous oversea 
trade can be for ever satisfied with Hamburg 
and Bremen and with her few miles of shallow 
and sandy coast. Germany does not want at 
present to incorporate Holland and, much less, 
Belgium with its three million French-speaking 
people — Germany has plenty of troublesome 
racial problems to deal with in the meantime ; 
but whether Germany wants them or not f 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 361 

those countries, sooner or later, are bound to 
become part of the empire. Economically the 
Low Countries are already German, and their 
incorporation in the German Zollverein is only 
a question of years. That England should 
dread such a contingency is only natural, but 
it is in the logic of events, it is in the logic of 
geography and economics. If geography and 
economics have favoured England in the past, 
why should they not favour Germany in the 
future ? 

" England cannot help the expansion of Ger- 
many ; she cannot prevent the population of 
Germany increasing at the rate of one million 
a year, any more than the Germans themselves 
can prevent the population of Russia from 
increasing at the rate of two millions a year. 
If England is bent on opposing the commercial 
and territorial expansion of her neighbours — if 
she is bent on preventing the giant child from 
attaining its full stature — the conflict will 
be indeed inevitable. And for that conflict 
Germany must be prepared ; and it is in view 
of that conflict — possible, if not certain — that 
Germany is arming. The Germans are building 
not for to-day but for to-morrow. The Kaiser's 
navy is not meant to defend the hundred miles 
of coastline which Germany at present possesses 
in the open sea, but the three hundred miles 
she is bound to possess in the near future," 



362 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

And thus we might continue the argument 
ad infinitum^ and no patriotic German would 
budge and give in by one inch, for there is no 
one English argument which would not and 
could not be met by a counter German argu- 
ment. Any English argument must necessarily 
fail to carry weight with the Germans because 
the German starts from different assumptions, 
and views the international situation from his 
own German position. And that position is 
perfectly solid, and those assumptions are per- 
fectly valid. What is even more serious and 
ominous, so far as the prospects of peace are 
concerned, the German, who knows that he is 
right from his own point of view, knows that 
he is also right from the English point of view ; 
he knows that the premises on which he is reasoning 
are still accepted by a large section of the English 
people. Millions of English people are actuated 
in their policy by those very Imperialistic 
principles on which the Germans take their 
stand. After all, German statesmen are only 
applying the political lessons which England has 
taught them, which Mr. Rudyard Kipling has 
sung, and Mr. Chamberlain has proclaimed in 
speeches innumerable. Both the English Im- 
perialist and the German Imperialist believe 
that the greatness of a country does not depend 
mainly on the virtues of the people, or on the 
resources of the home country, but largely on 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 363 

the capacity of the home country to acquire and 
to retain large tracts of territory all over the 
world. Both the English Imperialist and the 
German Imperialist have learnt the doctrine of 
Admiral Mahan, that the greatness and pros- 
perity of a country depends mainly on sea power. 
Both believe that efficiency and success in war is 
one of the main conditions of national prosperity. 
Now, as long as the two nations do not rise 
to a saner political ideal, as long as both Eng- 
lish and German people are agreed in accepting 
the current political philosophy, as long as both 
nations shall consider military power not merely 
as a necessary and temporary evil to submit to, 
but as a permanent and noble ideal to strive after, 
the German argument remains unanswerable. 
War is indeed predestined, and no diplomatists 
sitting round a great table in the Wilhelm- 
strasse or the Ballplatz or the Quai d'Orsay 
will be able to ward off the inevitable. It is 
only, therefore, in so far as both nations will 
move away from the old political philosopy that 
an understanding between Germany and Eng- 
land will become possible. As we stated in the 
opening chapter of this book, the majority of 
the British people are, no doubt \ fast moving 
away from the old position. The ideal of a free 
federation of self-governing communities has 
taken the place of the old Imperial ideal, and 
the British Government has consistently applied 



364 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

it in practice. Unfortunately the majority of 
the German people still stand in the position where 
the English people stood before Cob den and Bright 
and Gladstone, The German people still live 
under the spell of Prussia. The Imperial 
Eagle, the bird of prey, still remains the dread 
symbol of German Imperialism. The majority 
of the German people still believe in the virtues 
of protection, of nationalism, of militarism and 
despotism. And being thus steeped as they 
are in political materialism, in Realpolitik — still 
believing, as they do, that national prosperity 
is due, not to economic or intellectual or moral 
or political superiority, but to military supe- 
riority ; believing, as they do, that a victory on 
the battlefield confers upon the victors by some 
mysterious process a greater capacity to produce 
and to sell more cheaply in the markets of the 
world ; believing, as they do, that war is not a 
waste of economic power, but the best means of 
acquiring wealth ; in short, believing, as they do, 
that to-day they are rich and prosperous mainly 
because in 1870 they beat the French people, 
why should they not believe and trust that in 
1 91 5 they would become even stronger and 
richer if they succeeded in beating the English ? 
No diplomatic negotiations can alter the fact 
that the whole fabric of German politics is based 
on militarism and Imperialism. We must 
repeat for the last time the Leitmotiv of this 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 365 

book : If, as the result of some internal difficulty 
or external contingency, those military and Im- 
perialist motives be allowed to gather strength, 
then indeed the political pessimist is right — war 
is inevitable. What Mr. Wells says of the 
social unrest — that it is, above all, a question 
of psychology — is even more true of the inter- 
national unrest. It is not a question of economic 
values ; it is a question of moral values. It is 
not a question of diplomatic moves and counter- 
moves ; it is a question of mental states, a ques- 
tion of ideas and ideals. 

Once again, then, it is the ideas and the ideals 
that must be fundamentally changed : " Instauratio 
facienda ab imis fundamentis" And those ideals 
once changed, all motives for a war between 
England and Germany would vanish as by 
magic. But alas ! ideas and ideals do not change 
by magic or prestige — they can only change by 
the slow operation of intellectual conversion. 
Arguments alone can do it. No banquets, even of 
journalists, no visits, even by Viscount Haldane, 
will achieve it. Only the systematic education 
of public opinion will perform the miracle. 

Towards that political education and conver- 
sion the schools will do — must do — a great deal 
in the future. They are doing very little in the 
present. At present the intellectual training of 
the schoolboy is hopelessly antiquated, and is 
almost entirely based on the study of the military 



366 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

civilizations of the past. The mind of the school- 
boy imbibes from his earliest years the poison of 
militarism and of the old Imperialism. He only 
learns about the glamour and the romance of the 
wars of olden days ; he learns nothing about the 
horrors and realities of the war of to-day. 

And towards that political education the 
Universities will do — must do — a great deal in 
the future. They are doing at present little 
more than the schools. At present in England 
the Universities are still lamentably reactionary, 
and in Germany the Universities are still largely 
dependent on a military government. 

Towards that political conversion the Churches 
will do — must do — a great deal in the future. 
At present they are doing least of all. For in 
Germany the Protestant Churches have lost the 
confidence of the people ; and it almost seems 
as if the Catholic Church would view with favour 
a war with heretical England and atheistic France 
— a war which would create a Catholic Greater 
Germany and would restore the Holy Roman 
Empire. 

And, finally, if from the consideration of the 
intellectual and spiritual forces we pass on to 
an estimation of the forces of finance and com- 
merce, we find that even those forces are still 
divided between peace and war. It may be 
true, as Mr. Norman Angell attempts to prove, 
that bankers and financiers are increasingly 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 367 

made to feel the solidarity of nations ; but there 
are other forces and vested interests in the 
economic world which are only too directly 
interested in the furtherance of war. 

The outlook, then, can hardly be said to be 
hopeful ; but this is only an additional incentive 
to be more strenuous in our peaceful endeavours, 
and to waste none of our efforts in cant and delu- 
sion. Pious intentions and platonic aspirations 
will not suffice. "Porro unum est necessarium /" 
The one thing urgently needed to-day is to bring 
the whole influence of education to bear on the 
conversion of the people. And this conversion 
cannot come from an impulse of the heart ; it must 
be reached mainly as a conclusion of the brain. 
One book, like the masterpiece of Mr. Norman 
Angell, if spread in hundreds of thousands of 
copies, would do more for the cause of peace 
than all the resolutions of a dozen peace confer- 
ences. Peace, above all, will have to be achieved 
by hard thinking. It must be thought out and 
fought out, first in the silent meditation of the 
study, to be heralded after by the loud sounding 
voices of the Press, to be instilled into the minds 
of the growing generation. 

Whilst this intellectual conversion of public 
opinion is preparing, and whilst we are spreading 
the doctrine rather than the gospel of peace, let 
us, at the same time, be watchful of those who 
would threaten us with war, and whose victory 



368 THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM. 

would prevent for generations to come the re- 
alization of our ideal. Some misguided pacifists 
are never tired of telling us that in all consistency 
it ought to be our first and immediate duty strenu- 
ously to oppose the mad race in armaments. I 
fail to see the logic of their conclusion. The 
doctrine of peace is not the Tolstoyan gospel of 
non-resistance ; it is, indeed, its very negation. 
It is no part of the doctrine of the pacifist that he 
shall place himself at the mercy of the militarist, 
and that in his very endeavour to secure peace 
he shall disarm himself whilst the militarist is 
preparing to attack him. The Utopian says : 
"Disarmament first, conversion afterwards." 
Common-sense and sound reason reply: "Such 
a policy would be suicidal. Faith must precede 
works. Let the world be first converted, and 
disarmament must needs follow." The late Mr. 
Stead, who was ever an enthusiast in the cause 
of peace, was all the more determined that this 
country should not relax in her determination 
to maintain her naval supremacy. We can only 
hope that England, which to-day more than 
any other country — more, even, than republican 
France — represents the ideals of a pacific and 
industrial democracy, may never be called upon 
to assert her supremacy in armed conflict, and to 
safeguard those ideals against a wanton attack on 
the part of the most formidable and most syste- 
matic military power the world has ever seen. 



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1911). 

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3 8o 



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) 19 

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jj »* 

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->> • 


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the Naval Situation 




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j> » 


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to England (N., January 




1910). 



3»4 



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<c V *' 



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1908). 
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(N., December 1908). 
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April 1909). 
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February 19 10). 
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Constantinople (F., May 

1907). 
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Brazil (F., Jan. 1906). 
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Holland (F. 5 August 

1906). 
> German Plan of Campaign 

(F., September 191 1), 



THE END. 



V»5 



Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson & Co. 
at Paul's Work, Edinburgh 



